China spreads its peacekeepers
By Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang
The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has increased its participation in a
broadening array of multilateral security arrangements in recent years.
One of the most high-profile aspects of this trend is the dramatic expansion in
Chinese peacekeeping deployments (of civilian police, military observers,
engineering battalions, and medical units) to United Nations operations: since
2000, when China deployed fewer than 100 peacekeepers, there has been a
remarkable 20-fold increase in its contributions.
As of December 2008, China was the 14th largest contributor to UN peacekeeping
operations, providing more troops, police and observers to UN operations than
three other permanent members
of the UN Security Council - Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Nearly three-quarters of China's contributions are concentrated in Africa, and
the Chinese government plans new and even more significant increases to its
contributions in such strife-torn regions as the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Haiti, Liberia and Sudan.
What is behind this approach?
First, this trend reflects China's overall effort, especially since the late
1990s, to become more responsive to international expectations while making
positive and tangible contributions to global peace and security. Positive
engagement with the outside world helps China project a more benign and
"harmonious" image beyond its borders, reassure neighbors about its peaceful
intentions and softly balance the influence of other major players - such as
the United States - while gradually but more firmly establishing acceptance of
China as a great power.
Second, China's stepped-up peacekeeping activity parallels the PLA's growing
interest to expand its non-combat missions or "military operations other than
war" (MOOTW) - disaster response, humanitarian relief and counter-piracy, for
example - both in China and abroad, and put into action calls by Chinese
President Hu Jintao for the PLA to perform "new historic missions" in the 21st
century. The deployment in December 2008 of three Chinese naval vessels to help
protect Chinese merchant shipping in the Gulf of Aden is just the most recent
step along this decade-long path.
Third, it also appears that participation in peacekeeping activities abroad
carries important military applications and lessons for the PLA. According to
the recently released Chinese defense white paper, more than 11,000 Chinese
peacekeepers have been deployed to 18 UN operations since the late-1980s.
These contributions, including repeated deployments of engineering battalions
and police units, provide useful and practical experiences for Chinese security
forces, and help improve their responsiveness, riot-control capabilities,
co-ordination of military emergency command systems and ability to conduct
MOOTW at home, a concept much touted in China's recently released defense white
paper. These benefits will be reinforced if, as expected, Chinese forces
increasingly take on more dangerous and possibly combat missions as part of
their expanded peacekeeping activities.
Recent discussions with foreign policy elites in Beijing and a closer reading
of Chinese actions, statements and writings suggest that there is an
intensifying debate within China on this more active approach to peacekeeping
activities.
In June 2007, the PLA convened the first major internal meeting on peacekeeping
where senior representatives from the PLA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public Security gathered to discuss
ways to further streamline and improve the selection, organization, training
and rotation of Chinese peacekeepers.
At a separate international security seminar organized by the PLA National
Defense University in 2007, senior military officers also called for greater
Chinese activism in peacekeeping operations, rescue and relief tasks,
counter-terrorism exercises and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The PLA's
expanding presence abroad has in turn prompted some Chinese academics to call
for a clearer legislative basis to govern such activities.
China looks to expand its peacekeeping capacity over time: in addition to the
Civilian Peacekeeping Police Training Center in Langfang and the International
Relations Academy in Nanjing, Chinese officials confirm that a new peacekeeping
training center will be operational in Huairou in mid-2009 to help centralize
and better co-ordinate Chinese peacekeeping activities.
To be sure, China's expanding role as a peacekeeper will face a number of
constraints. China's traditional view of state sovereignty and noninterference
will continue to be an important limiting factor for Chinese action. In
addition, practical matters of political, military, bureaucratic will and
capacity will slow Chinese responsiveness in peacekeeping affairs.
For example, China's capability to conduct rapid deployments over long
distances and to make financial contributions to the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations would both need to be augmented if it wants to play a
larger role commensurate with its growing influence globally and within the UN
system. Nevertheless, expectations within the international community should be
modest but cautiously optimistic.
As such, at this relatively early stage, the President Barack Obama
administration in the US should implement policies aimed at reinforcing some of
the encouraging trends related to China's expanding involvement in multilateral
security operations.
China's decision to deploy naval vessels off the coast of Somalia has been
closely coordinated with African and Western partners and has been warmly
received by the US, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union.
In that light, Washington should lead the effort to sustain closer dialogue and
policy coordination with China on other mutual security concerns - such as
assistance for forces in Afghanistan - at a higher diplomatic level to enlist
greater support from Beijing.
In addition, the Obama administration should encourage and work with other
Western countries with substantial interests in peacekeeping affairs to
increase cooperation in peacekeeping seminars, training courses and other
capacity-building programs with China. Collaboration on peacekeeping and other
related forms of military-to-military exchange would also usefully contribute
to building greater openness and transparency within the PLA.
More important, China's expansive engagement in peacekeeping provides an
important and widening window of opportunity to engage with China more closely
on global security issues, deflect Chinese activities contrary to US interests,
and help enlarge China's commitment to regional stability and contribute to
more effective international peacekeeping operations.
Bates Gill (director@sipri.org) is director of the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Chin-Hao Huang(huang@sipri.org)
is a researcher at SIPRI. A previous version of this essay appeared as the
feature essay in SIPRI Update.
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