China's defense: The view from Taiwan
By Cheng-yi Lin
Beijing published the 2008 edition of "China's National Defense" (hereafter
White Paper) on the cusp of US President Barack Obama's historic inauguration
on January 20.
The past three editions (2002, 2004, and 2006) of the White Paper were all
published in the final month of every other year, but this time Beijing
purposely delayed its release for almost three weeks. An incident wherein
Beijing exhibited similar behavior was in July 1998 when it released the 1998
edition of the White Paper on the same day that ministers of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), a landmark security
dialogue
among mainly Southeast Asian states, were meeting in the Philippines.
The meeting coincidentally called on its members to have more transparency in
their defense planning. On both occasions, it is clear that Beijing
deliberately chose the timing of the release to indicate its intention to
accept the common practice of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the
Asia-Pacific and project an image of a responsible stakeholder.
Although the White Paper argues that China "is still confronted with long-term,
complicated, and diverse security threats and challenges," leaders in Beijing
believe that "China's security situation has improved steadily". The White
Paper mentions that "China's overall national strength has increased
substantially, its people's living standards have kept improving, the society
remains stable and unified, and the capability for upholding national security
has been further enhanced".
Most importantly, the White Paper reveals that Beijing's threat perception in
the Taiwan Strait has been greatly reduced. The White Paper, however,
explicitly said that China's military capabilities will continue to grow even
as the Taiwan issue thaws, verifying that a Chinese national security strategy
looking beyond Taiwan is taking shape.
What is said and not said
Beijing harps that the new White Paper provides previously unreleased
information and reflects new changes to the previous editions. For instance,
the current edition includes developments in the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Army, Navy, Air Force and the Second Artillery Force organized by separate
chapters rather than grouped into the same chapter like previous editions.
Some notable developments in each branch of the Chinese armed forces
highlighted by the White Paper include: acquiring capabilities of high mobility
with three-dimensional assault in the army; integrated sea-air capabilities for
offshore defensive operations in the navy; integrated air-land capabilities for
both offensive and defensive operations in the air force; and
surface-to-surface missile equipment system comprising both nuclear and
conventional missiles with different ranges in the Second Artillery Corps.
Most importantly, the White Paper describes when and how China plans to use its
nuclear weapons. The White Paper outlines three different operational scenarios
(ie, under peacetime, nuclear crisis and nuclear attack) for nuclear
escalation. The nuclear missile force of China's Second Artillery Corps will go
into a state of alert when facing a nuclear crisis to deter the enemy from
using nuclear weapons against China. Beijing's leader will then use nuclear
missiles to launch a counterattack against the enemy when it comes under a
nuclear attack. The conventional missile force of the Second Artillery Force is
responsible for conducting medium and long-range precision strikes against key
strategic and operational targets of the enemy.
While building a modern military, China continues to skip doing certain things
in the process of mechanization (ie enhancing hardware and acquiring more
advanced operational platforms) and strives to achieve leapfrog development in
key areas. Therefore, it adopts a policy of composite development of
mechanization and informationization (ie digitalization of weaponry,
information system network, and integration of battle elements, particularly
applicable to military command, control, and communication). The PLA is also
transforming a strategy from winning a local war with the condition of
high-technology to winning a war under the condition of informationization. By
2020, the PLA will accomplish the goal of mechanization and make major progress
in informationization.
Even though PLA experts have known the geographical locations of the three
fleet commands, the 2008 White Paper was the first to explicitly identify
Qingtao as the site for the North Sea Fleet, Ningbo for the East Sea Fleet and
Zhejiang for South Sea Fleet. Nevertheless, the White Paper, as usual, did not
provide any details on the new Chinese destroyers, frigates, submarines and
warplanes that have made the PLA Navy more capable in projecting its power in
the region. Reports on the building of aircraft carriers were also not
confirmed in the White Paper.
The White Paper fails to address concerns over Chinese missile deployments
targeting Taiwan and US forces stationed on bases surrounding Taiwan. Moreover,
Beijing avoided the chance of explaining its anti-satellite (ASAT) test in
January 2007, which remains a major sticking point in Sino-US
political-military relations, as well as the decline of a port visit by the USS
Kitty Hawk to Hong Kong in November 2007. To soothe US security concerns, the
White Paper did, however, acknowledge that China and Russia jointly submitted
in February 2008, a draft Treaty to the Conference on Disarmament on the
Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of
Force against Outer Space Objects.
Beijing cautions in the White Paper that China is facing "the superiority of
the developed countries in economy, science and technology, as well as military
affairs." More importantly, China "also faces strategic maneuvers and
containment from the outside". While not pointing a finger at the United
States, it is indirectly condemning the United States as its major adversary.
China has publicly warned the United States for its arms sales to Taiwan and
claims that this will cause "serious harm to Sino-US relations as well as peace
and stability across the Taiwan Straits".
Beijing suspended its military exchanges program with the United States in
response to the $6.5 billion arms sales package that the Bush administration
sanctioned in October 2008, but with the new Obama administration, the
resumption of a military relationship is expected to take place soon.
In addition to the United States, Beijing lists separatist forces such as those
supporting "Taiwan independence," "East Turkistan independence" and "Tibet
independence" as threats to China's "unity and security." The White Paper
claims that Beijing has succeeded in thwarting "Taiwan independence" from
seeking "de jure Taiwan independence," therefore, the situation across the
Taiwan Straits has taken a significantly positive turn.
Beijing believes that cross-Strait relations have improved because the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) have resumed negotiations on the
basis of the "1992 Consensus." The White Paper, however, did not reflect the
policy articulated by Chinese President Hu Jintao on December 31, 2008,
concerning cross-strait discussion of military CBMs between Taiwan and China
through increased military contacts and exchanges.
In the White Paper, China indicated that it has formulated a military strategic
guideline of active defense for the 21st Century. This active defense guideline
include four components: winning local wars in conditions of
informationization; emphasizing the prevention and deterrence of crises and
wars; enhancing the capabilities to counter various security threats; and
setting up a logistical mechanism of military mobilization and civilian-based
economy, science, technology, information and transportation mobilization.
In different chapters of the White Paper it mentions that the PLA, like the
United States, is focused on the new task of its armed forces in handling the
challenges of military operations other than war (MOOTW) in areas such as
counter-terrorism, stability maintenance, emergency response, peacekeeping,
emergency rescue and disaster relief.
The PLA Navy is also committed to developing a capability of countering
non-traditional security threats in distant waters, which explains Beijing's
decision to dispatch a mini-fleet to the Gulf of Aden in the Arabian Sea for
protecting its national surface ships from piracy.
The White Paper disclosed the trend in defense budget increases throughout the
past three decades. For example, the average annual increase of defense
expenditures in the 1978-1987 was 3.5$, 14.5% in 1988-1997 and 15.9% in
1998-2007. Arguably, the increase reflects its rapid economic growth but also
exhibits its need to meet "the requirements of the RMA (Revolution in Military
Affairs)".
From 2006 to 2008, the PLA's defense expenditure grew even more significantly.
The defense expenditure was 297.938 billion yuan (about US$38 billion) in 2006
and 355.491 billion yuan (about $45 billion) in 2007, up 20.4% and 19.3%
respectively over the previous year. In a longer time span, Chinese defense
spending has risen sharply - from about 16.7 billion yuan ($2.4 billion) in
1978 to about 417.7 billion yuan (about $60 billion) in fiscal year 2008,
roughly a 25-fold increase.
The official figure, however, is much lower than the estimations by different
Western defense-related organizations. For example, the White Paper claims that
China's defense expenditure budget in 2007 was around 1.38% of China's GDP, but
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) calculates that
the real figure might be around 2.1% of GDP.
Overseas concerns
In the 2006 White Paper, Beijing's leaders was more concerned over the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under former President Chen Shui-bian for
pushing a pro-independence agenda, such as the name rectification campaign and
constitutional reform. Then, Beijing warned that political developments in
Taiwan remained a challenge that "must not be neglected", and that the
"struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for 'Taiwan
independence'" poses a "grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial
integrity".
As demonstrated in President Hu Jintao's end-of-year "six-point proposal"
toward Taiwan, Beijing is far more confident now about the prospect of eventual
unification than it was during the past eight years. The new political climate
after the 2008 Taiwan's presidential election greatly altered Beijing's threat
perceptions in the Taiwan Strait.
Although Taiwan's defense ministry shunned away from making a public statement
on the 2008 White Paper, experts in Taiwan argue that there is little new
information revealed in the White Paper. While Beijing continues to warn the
United States over its arms sales to Taiwan, the Obama administration has no
urgent need to consider providing Taiwan with new weapons after the Bush
administration announced $6.5 billion in arms sales to the island.
The Ma Ying-jeou government, restrained by the economic downturn and pressure
to preserve the political gains from cross-Strait rapprochement, might find
less economic and political imperatives to request more advanced US defense
hardware including the F16C/D and diesel submarines. Taiwan has long had
proposed CBMs with the Chinese military, such as making defense information
more transparent, limiting military deployments, establishing communication
channels, and setting up verification measures. Although the 2008 White Paper
fails publicly to endorse the future direction of cross-Strait CBMs, it is
likely that think tanks in Beijing and Taipei will have more opportunities to
talk on issues to "stabilize cross-strait relations and ease concerns about
military security".
Speculation in the Chinese media continues that Beijing might consider removing
or freezing the numbers of its surface-to-surface missiles targeting at the
island. The new scenario, however, could pose a security dilemma for the Ma
Ying-jeou government and the Obama administration, because Beijing will fully
take advantage of this dramatic gesture to weaken justifications of future
US-Taiwan military cooperation.
Two days after the publication of the White Paper, President Ma spoke to
Taiwan's military and urged them to combine hard with soft power to safeguard
the island's security. Ma argued that through military readiness, Taiwan could
deter a war in the Taiwan Strait. Ma also proclaimed that "resolute defense and
effective deterrence" is always the goal of Taiwan's defense. Nevertheless,
both Ma Ying-jeou and Barack Obama will face one chilling reality - that the
military balance in the Taiwan Strait is tilting in favor of the PLA.
Compared to Taiwan's low-keyed response to the White Paper, the Japanese media
have been much more vocal. In an editorial of the Asahi Shimbun it expressed
disappointment because the White Paper "said nothing about China's reported
plans to build new nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles
and aircraft carriers" and its "silence about these projects has only increased
international unease." The editorial furthers its critique by commenting that
"the report didn't refer to any review of China's military capabilities in
response to the improvement in relations with Taiwan".
In the White Paper, Beijing toned down the pronouncement of its security
concerns over Japan's military modernization compared to its 2006 edition.
Japan, however, is particularly concerned that the PLA is building a blue water
navy that will pose a security challenge in the overlapping territorial claims
over the disputed islands in the East China Sea.
Taiwanese and Japanese concerns are not exceptions. In a Senate Armed Service
Committee testimony on January 27, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
identified the threats of Chinese military buildup by stating that "the areas
of greatest concern are Chinese investments and growing capabilities in cyber
and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and
ballistic missiles". Gates believes that "modernization in these areas could
threaten America's primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the
Pacific". The United States, however, stated that it has "the capability in
place to deal with any Chinese threat for some time to come".
Conclusion
Even with further reduction of tension in the Taiwan Strait, China has
decidedly maintained its rapid pace in building a high-tech and digital armed
force with the ability to counter conventional and nuclear threat or to handle
complex issues related to human security. Beijing has shown that its defense
planning is already beyond Taiwan's capability and could potentially challenge
Japan and the United States in the Western Pacific.
Undeniably, Beijing has made progress with each different edition of the White
Paper since 1998, but it still conceals a great deal of defense information
that shrouds its intent. Japan as well as the United States, and to a lesser
extent Taiwan, are not reassured by Beijing's latest Defense White Paper. By
keeping its strategic planning from being completely transparent, it could
strengthen China's psychological defense vis-a-vis its potential adversaries.
Partial revelation of China's defense information to meet the minimum standard
of CBMs, while playing up the role of a responsible stakeholder, appears to be
the strategy and intent behind the publication of China's 2008 National Defense
White Paper.
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