Ambiguity keeps cross-strait thaw alive By Erdong Chen
Since the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) party took office in May 2008, the
globe has witnessed a remarkable detente across the Taiwan Strait, revealing
the extraordinary wisdom of political leaders from both sides. A series of
recent trials conducted by both Beijing and Taipei proved the positive outcomes
of mutual negotiations and compromises.
Fortunately, decision-makers across the strait realized that economic
cooperation and cultural integration, rather than military confrontation, are
the most cost-effective ways to develop themselves and satisfy the demands of
citizens on both sides. In addition, it is reasonable to expect deeper support
and rising
popularity for the regimes themselves under the current peaceful and harmonious
cross-strait relationship.
Opening of three direct links
Unlike President Ma Ying-jeou's predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, who made every
effort to pave the way for the formal independence of Taiwan, the current
leader is fully aware of the island's priorities. He firmly rejected the
pro-independence approach of Chen and managed to thaw the icy cross-strait
relationship through friendly gestures.
High-level officials from both sides regularly meet to advance mutual
cooperation. Channels between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Strait (ARATS), Beijing's primary negotiation body, and the Taipei-based Strait
Exchange Foundation have been actively representing the respective governments
to negotiate non-politically sensitive issues, including economics, trade,
education and even panda exchanges.
Landmark agreements between Beijing and Taipei took place last November during
ARATS president Chen Yunlin's visit to Taipei. Chen is the highest-ranking
mainland official to visit Taiwan since the Chinese civil war in 1949. The
agreements signed during this historic visit marked the final materialization
of the long-expected "three direct links" (mail, transportation and trade)
across the Taiwan Strait. Cargo from both sides no longer needs to be
transferred through Hong Kong.
The "three links" have substantially cut transportation costs, advanced
business cooperation as well as facilitated civil correspondence across the
strait. In addition, the two institutions agreed to establish long-term
connections between banks to deal with the financial crisis collectively. A
notable consensus on food safety issues, highlighted by the recent tainted milk
scandal, has also demonstrated Beijing's goodwill.
On New Year's Day of 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress (NPC) in Beijing issued the "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan",
calling for an end to the military confrontation across the strait while
proposing the "peaceful unification" policy for the first time. Based on the
substantial detente across the Taiwan Strait in the months after the
Nationalist Party took office, Chinese President Hu Jintao delivered a speech
commemorating the 30th anniversary of that message.
Hu's speech highlighted six points: firm adherence to the "one China"
principle; strengthening commercial ties, including negotiating an economic
cooperation agreement; promoting personnel exchanges; stressing common cultural
links between the two sides; allowing Taiwan's "reasonable" participation in
global organizations and negotiating a peace agreement.
Hu's statement revealed Beijing's primary position on the cross-strait
relationship under the current status. Instead of insisting that Taiwan is an
integrated part of China, Beijing has gradually changed its tone by focusing on
the "one China" consensus. Both sides across the strait are more likely to
abide by the "1992 consensus" which allows each to interpret the "one China"
term individually where Beijing claims it is the sole legitimate government
representing China while Taipei regards the Taiwan-based Republic of China
(ROC) as the "China" here.
In fact, the deliberate ambiguity is a wise way to temporarily put aside the
more fundamental disputes while first focusing on economic reciprocity.
Economic development, after all, is critical to the political survival of both
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing and the Nationalist Party in
Taipei.
In addition to the "one China" consensus Hu emphasized in his speech, the
"reasonable participation" for Taiwan in international organizations has also
been studied widely by scholars to examine the meaning behind the phrase.
Beijing deeply understands Taipei's desire for more international exposure to
avoid being isolated from the global community. Possessing the decisive say on
Taiwan's involvement in a variety of international organizations, Beijing has
to play this card with tremendous political wisdom.
On some occasions, by compromising with Taiwan in some less sensitive
organizations, Beijing will establish its goodwill and credibility. At the same
time, it will gain the trust of Taiwanese citizens and further extend its role
as a responsible superpower.
Amid the warming of the cross-strait relationship, Beijing has indeed become
increasingly flexible in Taiwan's international space. Two weeks after Chen
Yunlin's landmark visit to Taiwan, President Hu met Lien Chan, the former vice
president of the ROC, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum leaders'
summit in Lima, Peru. As the highest Taiwanese official to attend the meeting
in history, Lien described it as "very interesting to meet an old friend so far
from home".
Analysts applauded Beijing's compromises on this semi-official occasion where
politicians from both sides were able to sit down and chat. At the same time,
Taipei's satisfaction will surely foster greater trust towards its cross-strait
rival.
The most controversial debate regarding Taipei's international space is its
observer status at the World Health Organization (WHO). Taipei's application
has been rejected 12 years in a row, despite its continued lobbying. However, a
hopeful turn took place last month when the WHO opened a formal line of
communication with Taiwan.
What was more, the WHO also included Taiwan in its International Health
Regulations to "prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health
response to the international spread of disease", according to the China Daily.
It is still under speculation whether Taiwan's dream of WHO status will
eventually materialize in May during the annual convention. The outcome
exclusively depends on Beijing's goodwill and flexibility in making more
international room for its Taiwanese compatriots.
Ideological competition
The increasing economic reciprocity and cultural integration across the Taiwan
Strait can hardly conceal the fundamental disputes. Both sides have established
and further developed their own political and social systems in the six decades
since the end of the civil war in 1949. As one of the few democratic models in
Asia, Taiwan is always trying to differ itself from China in terms of political
freedom.
Taiwan has increasingly deepened its democratic roots since the peaceful power
transition from the Democratic Progressive Party to the KMT last May. The
success of the second political party transition in Taiwan's history marked its
comparative advantage over China in terms of democracy, though Taiwan-brand
democracy is by no means perfect. The scandal involving former president Chen
Shui-bian is a typical example of the flaws in Taiwan-style democracy.
During his attendance at the celebrations commemorating World Freedom Day 2009
last month, Ma Ying-jeou remarked that neither side across the Taiwan Strait
should engage in an arms race, but in a competition involving democracy and
freedom. As universal values, such as human rights and democracy, have spread
and prevailed all around the globe at an unprecedented speed, citizens on both
sides of the strait are asking for more political rights to better defend their
interests.
As a result, it is reasonable to expect that a potential race towards
democracy, if possible, will bridge the ideological gap and promote mutual
understanding between Beijing and Taipei. Despite the mass criticism against
Beijing's human rights record from the Western world, the CCP has actually been
consistently moving towards a more democratic status, starting from direct
elections at the grassroots level and inner-party democracy at the central
level.
The sense of mutual recognition will never take place when citizens on each
side fail to regard those on the other as similar in terms of ideology. When
both sides are accelerating on the democracy path, the political dialogue
between Beijing and Taipei is likely to encounter fewer strikes on an
ideological basis.
Substantial progress in the cross-strait relationship has taken place in less
than nine months since Ma's inauguration. Observers, scholars and policy-makers
are delighted to see the recent detente across the Taiwan Strait. Amid the
increasing economic, social and cultural communications, all are watching
Taiwan's newest bid for observer status at the WHO to view Beijing's bottom
line.
In addition, due to entrenched ideological differences, leaders on both sides
are employing more political wisdom and courage to advance mutual recognition
and understanding. Therefore, it is reasonable to look ahead with cautious
optimism, based on the recent trends across the strait and expect much more.
Though full unification is still far off, decision-makers on both sides are
indeed making every effort to seek common ground while accepting the existing
differences.
Erdong Chen is a student at American University, Washington DC and an
intern at the American Center for International Labor Solidarity. His policy
commentaries have appeared on Asian Times Online and Foreign Policy in Focus,
among others.
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