Chinese carriers - let them have them
By Tetsuo Kotani
China's possession of aircraft carriers is not a matter of "if", but "when".
Last November, an official in China's Ministry of National Defense touched for
the first time in a public venue on the possibility of his nation acquiring
aircraft carriers. China has purchased three carriers built by the former
Soviet Union and one built by Australia, gaining an opportunity to study their
structures.
One of those, the Varyag, was supposed to serve as a floating casino in Macau,
but it is now moored at a shipyard in Dalian, where it has been painted the
same gray as other naval vessels and an angled deck has been installed. The
Varyag does not have
engines and cannot be employed as China's first aircraft carrier, but it can be
used for research/training purposes.
There is a rumor that China will purchase Sukhoi-33 (Su-33) aircraft from
Russia. The Su-33 is a ship-based fighter carried on Russia's only aircraft
carrier, the Admiral Kuznetzov. China has been training pilots for ship-based
aircraft at navy aviation training centers in the Ukraine. The centers are
equipped with simulators for taking off from angled decks, landing with
arresting wires, and emergency response operations. In addition, since 1987,
China has been training pilots as aircraft carrier ship captains at the
Guangzhou Naval Academy. Nine People Liberation's Army (PLA) Navy pilots have
completed the three-year course, and all are thought to be commanding
destroyers. In a few years, they will become ideal candidates to captain an
aircraft carrier.
Given the foregoing, that carrier is likely to be a 60,000-ton conventional
propulsion carrier of a former Soviet Union model, which has been outfitted
with an angled deck. But a carrier program consists of far more than just one
ship. To have one carrier in regular operation, a minimum of two backups (for
maintenance and training purposes) are necessary. It is estimated that a
50,000-ton class aircraft carrier in the British navy costs about US$5 billion
to build and deploy. Even if the Varyag is used for training, it would be
necessary to construct two ships, a cost of $10 billion.
Furthermore, aircraft carriers cannot be operated alone. In addition to
ship-based aircraft, it is necessary to form a strike group consisting of
combatant ships, submarines and supply ships, etc. In short, the possession,
maintenance and operation of an aircraft carrier absorbs an astronomical amount
of money and time.
So why bother? First, possessing an aircraft carrier is proof that China is a
major power, and a sign of prestige. Second, it could shape the balance of
combat capabilities in the South China Sea, where China has territorial
disputes with Southeast Asian countries. To coastal countries that do not
possess powerful military forces, China's aircraft carrier would be a major
threat. China has made Hainan Island a base for its strategic nuclear
submarines, and an aircraft carrier would be useful with regard to making the
South China Sea "off limits".
Furthermore, protection of the sea lanes from the South China Sea through the
Strait of Malacca and up to the Indian Ocean, and in particular, curbing a sea
blockade against China, which could be envisioned at the time of a Taiwan
contingency, would be possible. And finally, an aircraft carrier could be used
for rescue operations during large-scale disasters.
Should we worry? Not yet. First, development and deployment of carriers, and
all their paraphernalia will take decades. Second, the substantial price tag is
not the only cost of such a project. Other countries in the region are likely
to become wary of Chinese intentions as it develops power projection
capabilities.
And third, a Chinese carrier strike group would be no match for a US carrier
strike group, which is said to have striking power on par with a middle power
nation and a defensive perimeter up to 700 kilometers. The United States is the
only country with the capacity to operate the top-of-the-line carrier-based
aircraft - and it can deploy as many as 11 such strike groups around the world.
Although the military balance in the Taiwan Strait already overwhelmingly
favors China, which has deployed more than 1,000 missiles in the coastal areas,
the introduction of Chinese aircraft carriers would not significantly affect
the military balance. In fact, a Chinese aircraft carrier attacking eastern
Taiwan from the sea would be a target for the US forces. Carriers are
vulnerable to precision guided missiles, submarines and mines. In order to rule
out intervention by a US carrier attack group in a Taiwan contingency, China's
current access denial strategy makes more sense. In fact, China would need to
give up some submarines and anti-ship missile development programs to build a
carrier strike group.
China has every right to possess aircraft carriers. The day when China
possesses carriers may not be far off. Although the international community
shouldn't overreact, it is necessary to watch developments and respond. As
Japan debates revision of its National Defense Program Guidelines, there should
be an assessment of the implications of Chinese aircraft carriers on regional
security. In response, Japan should:
Maintain and strengthen the alliance with the United States. Steady
implementation of the realignment of US forces in Japan, particularly involving
the transfer of the carrier air wing from Atsugi to Iwakuni and securing a
permanent training facility for field carrier landing practice within 200 miles
of Iwakuni, are most important. That is because the carrier strike group based
at Yokosuka is the keystone of US forces in the Pacific, and the carrier air
wing provides its "striking power".
Develop appropriate countermeasures. China's possession of carriers does not
mean Japan has to respond in kind. More appropriate countermeasures include
reinforcement of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) submarine fleet
and reinforcement of air bases along the Ryukyu and Bonin islands. The
reinforcement of submarines, the natural enemy of an aircraft carrier, provides
an effective deterrent.
A feasible study of nuclear-powered attack submarines might be necessary as
well since the JMSDF submarine fleet would be required to undertake blue water
operations. Furthermore, since a Chinese aircraft carrier will likely carry the
Su-33, it is also necessary to come to a decision promptly on the
next-generation main fighter aircraft of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force. On
this point, Japan should request a prompt response from the United States on
sales of the F-22.
To counter China's access denial strategy, it is necessary to reinforce
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities. Also, in addition to the steady introduction of next-generation
patrol aircraft, Japan should strengthen cooperation with friendly countries in
the region. For example, South Korea is in the process of building up its ASW
capabilities, so Tokyo should consider revising the three principles of weapons
exports, providing South Korea with P-3C aircraft, and assisting in improving
their support facilities. Given the vastness of the sea areas to be covered,
introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned underwater vehicles
should be encouraged as well.
The PLA Navy just celebrated its 60th anniversary. Today, China is standing at
the crossroads between continental power and maritime power. China is building
up its military capabilities as other naval powers are conducting more brown
water missions with fewer ships to keep vital sea lanes open. They regard the
seas as highways, while China sees them as barriers.
Japan learned lessons from the Pacific War and has behaved as a responsible
maritime power ever since. The possession of aircraft carriers would provide a
good opportunity for Chinese security planners to choose the right path.
Failure to do so will invite tough countermeasures from other maritime powers.
We should not be frightened by China's progress in this area.
Tetsuo Kotani (tetsuo.kotani@gmail.com) is a research fellow at
the Ocean Policy Research Foundation.
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