A healthy turn for Taiwan-China ties
By Jian Junbo
SHANGHAI - A 15-member delegation led by Taiwanese Minister of Health Yeh
Chin-chuan arrived in Switzerland at the weekend to attend the World Health
Assembly (WHA), the first time Taiwan has attended a United Nations event in 38
years.
Taiwan was formally invited at the end of April to join the WHA, the forum
through which the World Health Organization (WHO) is governed, as an observer.
It is attending the event under the name "Chinese Taipei". While its attendance
has been hailed on the island as a breakthrough in its drive for greater
international space, it is essentially an outcome of better relations between
mainland China and Taiwan.
In the 1990s, then Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui started his
policy of "pragmatic diplomacy" to expand Taiwan's international space and
enhance ties with countries and international organizations that did not keep
diplomatic relations with Taipei.
Lee's approach was different from his predecessor Chiang Ching-kuo's
"substantive diplomacy", which aimed at ending the island's isolation after its
seat in the United Nations was replaced by rival communist China in early 1971
and Washington established formal ties with Beijing in 1979. Under Chiang,
Taipei competed for international recognition with Beijing, refusing to take
part in any world affairs that involved the mainland.
Under Lee, Taiwan pursued participation in global affairs, including any
involving Beijing, in the name of the Republic of China (ROC). Beijing
suspected his administration was trying to create two Chinas, especially after
Lee forwarded the view in 1995 that relations between the mainland and Taiwan
were "state to state".
Lee's successor, Chen Shui-bian, of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP), continued the efforts to expand Taiwan's international space. Chen
took a series of moves towards "de-sinification", such as using the name of
Taiwan instead of ROC in international relations. Beijing accused him of
seeking Taiwan's independence.
Beijing distrusted both Lee and Chen's efforts to expand Taiwan's international
role. In the mainland's eyes, Taiwan was competing with the mainland for
international recognition of two Chinas or of an independent Taiwan. Beijing
could not allow either to happen, so in those years under Lee and Chen, the
mainland government tried everything to deprive Taiwan of any possible
international status.
But less than one year after the Kuomintang (KMT) party's return to power, with
Ma Ying-jeou elected as president, the island has ascended to one important
international organization - the WHA. The WHA generally consists of sovereign
countries, though statehood is not required for an observer.
This marks a very significant change in cross-strait relations that was
unimaginable during the Lee and Chen administrations.
In Taiwan's political circle, there are different opinions on the island's
accession to the WHA. The vice president of the Legislative Yuan, KMT member
Yuan Tseng Yung-Chuan told me recently that Taiwan's joining the WHA was a
great achievement of the Ma administration. He said that it could never have
happened under Chen Shui-bian.
However, DPP legislator Lai Ching-Te (or William Lai) said that while Taiwanese
were happy to see the island become a WHA observer, the accession had weakened
Taiwan's sovereignty and made the mainland effectively Taiwan's suzerain, as
its membership is approved and reviewed each year by Beijing.
Either way, the accession is a milestone both for cross-strait relations and
for Taiwan's international relations. It is a result of a gradual buildup of
trust between Beijing and Taipei since Ma came to power, with both sides taking
more pragmatic and flexible approaches to the "one China" concept.
On Taiwan's part, Ma has re-endorsed the "1992 Consensus", which states that
both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China, but leaves it open for each
side to interpret which - the People's Republic of China (PRC) or the ROC -
actually represents China. Negotiators reached the consensus in Hong Kong in
1992, but it was then squarely rejected by Lee and Chen.
On the mainland's part, Beijing has shown flexibility under the leadership of
President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. This is evident in changes of
policy principles towards Taiwan. For a long time, Beijing insisted on three
principles: 1) That there is only one China in the world; 2) that Taiwan is a
part of Chinese territory (or Taiwan is one province of China); 3) that the PRC
is the sole legitimate representative of China in the world.
Now these principles have been changed to: 1) there is only one China in the
world; 2) Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to that "one China"; 3) China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division.
The new principles are an interpretation of the 1992 Consensus that Beijing
feels is more acceptable to Taiwan and show the mainland is willing to deal
with Taiwan on an equal footing. This shows Beijing has begun to recognize
Taiwan as an equal political entity as the mainland, though still under the
"one China" principle. This remarkable change in policy can be seen as display
of cordiality by Beijing to Taipei and the Taiwanese people.
The detente has been helped by the successful launch of a communications
platform for the two parties - the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT.
Since KMT's honorary chairman, Lien Chan, visited the mainland in 2005 and met
CCP general secretary Hu Jintao, ties between the two longtime rivals - the CCP
and KMT - seem to have blossomed. The two parties created regular channels of
communications which have enhanced mutual trust, making made cross-strait
detente appear very likely when the KMT came back to power in 2008.
For some analysts, Taiwan's accession to the WHA is a natural outcome of this
cross-strait detente. Nevertheless, there are still some problems that should
not be overlooked.
Only with Beijing's approval could Taiwan participate in the WHA. The fact that
Taiwan must apply for its WHA observer status each year implies that Beijing
wants to hold leverage on Taipei in case Ma or future Taiwanese leaders change
their stance on the "one China" consensus.
There are also several reasons for Beijing to hold some reservations upon
Taiwan's expansion of its international role.
Firstly, Ma's general policy toward cross-strait relations is still quite
different from Beijing's. He does not seek ultimate reunification of the two
sides or the formal independence of Taiwan, but aims at keeping the island's
status quo. Beijing's Taiwan policy has the ultimate goal of reunification,
although at this stage Beijing will not highlight this. This difference does
not matter at present, but may result in conflict down the road.
Secondly, to win a second presidential term, Ma appears to a certain extent to
be an opportunist who wants to cater to all voters, including those who support
independence. To win more votes in the island's democratic system, Ma may have
to alter his policy towards the mainland if he comes under pressure from the
DPP and its supporters.
Thirdly, in public opinion in Taiwan varies on what should be the policy
towards the mainland.
Such factors, if not dealt with properly, could undermine the base of mutual
trust in cross-strait relations. If this happens, Beijing will not hesitate to
restart efforts to limit Taiwan's outreach.
So far, no such negative factors have surfaced to damage cross-strait
relations. Obviously, Beijing is more confident in dealing with its ties with
Taiwan, which has been hit badly by the global financial crisis and
increasingly needs mainland China's support to ride out the predicament.
Beijing is also convinced that the Ma administration will not stray from the
"one China" principle; at least Ma has stated that his administration
acknowledges this principle according to the ROC constitution.
The "one China" consensus thus is the bridge linking mainland and Taiwan. For
Beijing, under this principle, the two sides can negotiate on anything,
including Taiwan's international role.
The thaw in relations is also the result of direct people-to-people daily
meetings, direct CCP and KMT communication, and increasing mutual trust.
Dr Jian Junbo is assistant professor of the Institute of International
Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, China.
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