BEIJING - The crisis evolving on the Korean Peninsula with the North's testing
of a nuclear device last month is extremely complicated, and following the
example of the Washington Post's John Pomfret [1], we shall try to make sense
of it.
The Chinese angle, prima facie, is not clear-cut. China is not against
North Korea, but also it does not support its belligerent tests. This may
appear puzzling, but some points are clear.
The most recent North Korean nuclear test took place on Monday, May 25, the day
that Wu Po-hsiung, the chairman of Taiwan's ruling Kuomintang (KMT), started an
eight-day visit to
mainland China. Wu was to meet China's President Hu Jintao; take part in the
June 1 celebrations for Sun Yat-sen, the political figure who inspired both
Taiwan's KMT and China's communists; and prepare for further talks between Hu
and Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jiu.
The October 9, 2006, North Korean nuclear test - its first - also took place at
the time of an important political meeting in Beijing. Japan's prime minister
Shinzo Abe was in Beijing for a groundbreaking visit that led to a thaw in
relations between the neighbors.
It can be no accident that Pyongyang chose these days to conduct its tests.
North Korea regards Japan as "public enemy number one", and is always reminding
its people of their suffering under Japanese invasion. China's political
rapprochement with Japan could have been interpreted in Pyongyang as a
betrayal.
Taiwan is more complex. In 1950, Beijing decided to give up its plans for
reunification with what it calls renegade province Taiwan and instead went to
war to defend North Korea in a war that Beijing hadn't started and possibly had
not totally approved of. In a way, Beijing renounced Taiwan for North Korea,
and now Pyongyang could be wary that Beijing will do just the opposite: give up
on North Korea and turn to Taiwan.
Certainly, Beijing hates it when important events and political summits, such
as those with Japan's prime minister and the KMT chairman, are overshadowed by
accidents or other unexpected occurrences - and Pyongyang is close enough to
Beijing to be aware of this. Thus, we can safely assume that North Korea timed
the tests to provoke China, and China understood them in that way.
Yet, this does not explain why China didn't react strongly to these
provocations, as it would if they had come from different quarters.
Here, politics and geopolitics play their role. For Beijing, cutting a
provocative North Korea down to size would bring more problems than it solved.
China, being politically conservative and cautious, tends not to take chances
without being sure of the results. And there are many uncertainties about North
Korea's future.
If the country were to fall apart, who would look after the 22 million North
Koreans left without a state? South Korea, Japan, the United States and China
are unwilling. But China would most likely have to shoulder most of the burden
since refugees would not be able to flee through the highly militarized
southern border into South Korea, but they could enter China by crossing the
poorly guarded Yalu River.
There is then the issue of the 28,500 US troops stationed in South Korea. They
are there in theory against the North, but in practice against China and in
defense of South Korea and Japan. Without the threat of North Korea, would they
leave? If so, who would take care of Japan's security concerns?
China would rather have US soldiers in South or North Korea take care of Korean
and Japanese security than have Japanese soldiers war-ready for their own
defense. But if North Korea is out of the picture and US soldiers remain in the
peninsula, this would mean clearly that China is a security concern for the US
- something Beijing doesn't want to be told openly.
In other words, North Korea is a major fig leaf for security in North Asia. It
can disappear only if the US, Japan and China reach a major new overall
security agreement for the region. Without that, its disappearance would be a
disaster.
Furthermore, there is the issue of a united Korea. Unification would likely
boost Korean nationalism, something that can be directed against the old
invader, Japan - but also against China. South Korea recently changed the
Chinese characters for writing the name of the capital, Seoul, from those that
meant "City of Han" (Han is China's ethnic majority). Moreover, there could be
border issues with China because, according to some Korean nationalists, some
2.5 million ethnic Koreans live in China in areas that are "historically
Korean".
Again, unification could occur only within the framework of an overall
agreement between China, Japan and the future united Korea. In the absence of
this, it is less problematic for China and possibly also for Japan to let North
Korea be as it is.
These major strategic concerns are enough to prevent any rash action being
taken against North Korea - action that could destabilize a region that is home
to two of the world's three largest economies, Japan and China. But there are
even more tactical concerns.
The US could possibly bomb North Korea out of its nuclear arsenal, and perhaps
it could also destroy all of its ballistic missiles. But it can't reasonably
expect to wipe out the thousands of guns aimed at Seoul, a city of eight
million, just 30 kilometers across the border. Even a "modest" North Korean
bombardment would kill thousands in South Korea, destabilizing the country and
the region.
So with "surgical" military options out of the question, massive intervention
would have to be considered. However, while the US is trying to move out of
Iraq and becoming increasingly entangled in the Afghanistan-Pakistan quagmire
it will not have the energy, forces or money to consider a major military
engagement in North Korea.
These grand and small considerations combine to paralyze political and military
action. They are known to everyone, including North Korean leader Kim Jong-il,
who must think he has a lot of leeway. In these circumstances, it is no
surprise that North Korea has conducted two nuclear tests - it is surprising
there have only been two.
Kim could have had a nuclear test every six months and blackmailed everybody
into following his wishes. The fact that he tore down a nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon and took part in the six-party talks on the country's nuclear program
is proof of some political success by the international community.
The aim of the now-suspended six-party talks - involving the two Koreas, the
US, China, Japan and Russia - was to reform North Korea. It was hoped that more
money in Pyongyang would create interest groups partly independent of Kim's
favor, with vested interests in greater opening up. Reforms could improve the
North's economy and thus lower the costs of future reunification with the
South.
But this was a very long-term plan, like the Cold War against the Soviet Union,
and there is no time in emergencies.
Cooperation between the US and China on North Korea has, however, created
better understanding between the two countries, established more trust, and
laid the foundation for the growing collaboration between Washington and
Beijing on many fronts. This collaboration could lead in due time to very
strong bilateral ties that could solve the regional issues underlying the North
Korean issue.
In this sense, for the US, the six-party talks had a smaller and larger goal.
The smaller one was North Korea; the larger was China. With regard to China,
the US is closer; with North Korea the goal is still elusive. But the latter
might not matter, if a major deal with China is clinched, North Korea will
follow.
Then it is just a matter of containing North Korea long enough to allow the
long-term strategy to evolve. From China's point of view, improving ties with
Taiwan and the looming prospect of major agreements with Taipei are clear
indications that the US is working in favor of Beijing's political goals, not
against them. Beijing is clear that "better ties with Taiwan" is a code word
and a multiplier of better ties with America. America is delivering on Taiwan
and thus it can ask for even bigger things from China.
Yet, what can China do about North Korea? If China is too tough or acts too
suddenly, North Korea may fall apart with unforeseeable consequences. Even if
it doesn't, China will not have more pressure to exert. In other words, to be
effective, pressure should be exerted in a calm, gradual manner - not like
driving a nail into the wall with one strike of the hammer, but like turning a
screw, slowly but surely.
This is the position announced on May 27 by Global Times2, the sister
publication of the official People's Daily. The daily explained that the
possibility of an attack on China by the US, Japan or South Korea was very
slim, and thus China had no interest in keeping North Korea as a buffer zone.
Besides, "North Korea recently hurt China's national interests actively and
deeply. For this it is necessary for China to be tough with North Korea and put
a certain amount of pressure on it but still without losing the grand flag of
the Sino-North Korea friendship."
The "grand flag of friendship" can work two ways: it will limit the pressure
China will exert on North Korea, but it will also limit North Korea's reactions
to China. That is, North Korea will have to chastise China on the pretense of
attacking Japan, as it did recently. This is bad, but not as a bad as a direct
confrontation with Beijing, which could arouse nationalist sentiments in China
against North Koreans.
Nationalist sentiments are also very dangerous for China. They can be aroused
against a foreign country, but ultimately they could backfire against the
government, which might be accused of being weak with foreigners.
The practical options left are limited, but not trivial. In 2008, China
accounted for about 70% of North Korean trade; furthermore, a group of
Pyongyang officials - a group that's larger than Kim's immediate family - has
developed expensive tastes for luxury goods and the good life.
On June 1 came the story that China had suspended all exchanges with North
Korea: that is, North Korean officials, who have been generously wined and
dined in Beijing and other Chinese cities, will have no new excuses to come out
of the cold and savor the soft capitalist life.
North Korea's imports of caviar, cognac, autos and fuel could also be halted.
China's exports of expensive mushrooms, crabs, ginseng and gold could dwindle,
and banks providing payments for that merchandise could have their assets
frozen. This time, it would be convenient that China is not democratic, as
China will not need to explain anything openly.
It would be important that the US were on board with this, and that Japan (with
its strong pro-Pyongyang Korean minority) and Russia (which imports Pyongyang's
goods and laborers) also complied.
There are no guarantees that North Korea would buckle under this pressure;
conversely, it could, as it has done many times before, up the ante. But for
the first time, these measures would not hurt the common people, who suffered
horrendously in the famine of the 1990s. Instead, the actions would affect a
circle of senior officials around Kim Jong-il, who will feel deprived of their
hard-won privileges. This, in turn, could sow dangerous seeds of sedition in
North Korea, and it could heighten Kim's ever-present paranoia.
In other words, life could become unpleasant in Pyongyang's upper echelons in a
few weeks. The choice for Kim and his people will be whether to agree to
further talks - in the hope of restarting the good life with no guarantees but
negotiations - or to try to force their hand leveraging their military threat.
In this game, there might be a bigger goal: it could prove that military
threats create no advantage, but only a drain, bringing hardship to Pyongyang
and no gain. If this point becomes clear in North Korea, then the nuclear test
could have been a blessing in disguise after all.
Short of this, Kim could choose to play out his hardball game and see where it
leads. It could be a disaster for the region, but then it would also be the
definite end for him and his family. People who have met him say he is paranoid
but rational, not mad. The next few weeks will tell us if these people are
right.
Notes
1. Pomfret, John, Washington Post, May 27, 2009.
2. Huanqiu shibao, "Qiu zhenhai: zhongguo yinggai dui chaoxian qiangying," May
27, 2009.
Francesco Sisci is Asia Editor of La Stampa, based in Beijing.
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