SINOGRAPH
Hu embarks on a political pilgrimage
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - Next week, Hu Jintao starts an official visit to Italy, the first for
a Chinese president in 10 years. As with his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, Hu will
have a chance to look first-hand at what was for millennia - from the Magna
Grecia in the south to the Roman Empire to the Renaissance - the cradle of
Western civilization. He will thus get a glimpse at the origin and development
of the process of modernization - or "Westernification" - that China is
embracing at the moment.
This, in a nutshell, is the significance of Hu's trip to Italy. It means very
little and very much: There is no huge political agenda but enormous
philosophical significance. It would be a tourist trip for many heads of state,
but for the People's Republic of China (PRC), where the search for and
fine-tuning of new theories is the soul of the political process, this could be
a crucial inspirational
stepping stone as the country prepares for the next generation of leaders and
the political agenda of the 2012 Party Congress.
Italy managed to mold together modernization and tradition, and this is
something that China has been trying to do on a grand scale in recent years,
blending its past with modernization and also making the necessary leap to
future developments.
In this situation, as with Jiang, Hu will come as close as possible to
breathing the air around one of the pillars of Western civilization - the
Papacy, the Holy See, the Vatican, the headquarters of the largest unitary
religion in the world. For centuries, the Vatican has been part of the very way
of thinking in the West. The idea of balancing powers came from the Roman
republican tradition of two consuls, the democracy of the Greek city-states,
preventing a concentration of power; it continued with the balancing of clashes
and friction between the emperor and senate during the Roman Empire, and for
centuries it was embodied in the talks and dialogue between European kings and
the popes - the political and religious powers of the Western world.
During all that time, China had only the idea of concentration of power in the
hands of the emperor. If the emperor failed to hold on to power, the empire
would break up (as happened many times in the past 22 centuries) or the dynasty
would fall. Religious leaders simply had to obey to the emperor, in one way or
another. But since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's reforms, China has
forfeited the idea of an emperor, a single paramount leader. China's
decision-making process is developing fast and learning from the West, and
China is looking around for inspiration. As the Vatican is part of this Western
tradition of balancing powers, it is inescapable for the Chinese leaders.
Jiang, at the turn of the 21st century, started the process of normalizing ties
with the Vatican, a process that stalled for a few years after the Holy See
decided to canonize 120 Chinese martyrs on October 1, 2001, the PRC's 51st
National Day, the first PRC's National Day in the new millennium.
After a few years, the process restarted. Two years ago the pope issued a
groundbreaking letter to Chinese Catholics that, for the first time since the
beginning of the Cold War, recognized the legitimacy of the PRC and thrashed
the old hostility between Catholic believers and the officially communist
Chinese government. It said that a good Chinese Catholic ought to also be a
good Chinese citizen.
The Chinese have since also tried to thoroughly understand the mechanisms
governing the Church, which are often almost unfathomable in Chinese political
culture. Here, the Chinese Foreign Ministry officials, who had possibly the
most difficult task in the history of Chinese foreign affairs, played a crucial
role. They have been grappling with both a political and cultural challenge,
trying to explain to Chinese leaders the foreign logic of the Vatican and to
convey to the Vatican the political and cultural concerns of China. This
discussion was often painfully difficult, with each side sensing they were
talking past each other.
At the moment, it is not impossible to imagine a future breakthrough in the
relationship, which could bring together for the first time ever the head of
the Eastern civilization - the heir of the Chinese emperor - to meet the
spiritual head of the Western world.
This might not happen, but if it does, one should not forget the long-term
contributions of two men who are often considered at odds with each other, yet
who each embodied the very survival of the Catholic Church in China - Anthony
Liu Bainian and Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun. Their lives and personal
experiences could hardly be more different. However, as from different sides of
the same mountain, they both contributed to the historical exchange of ideas
between China and the church.
Liu Bainian, born in Hebei province to a family that has been Catholic since
the 17th century (the "aristocracy" of Chinese Catholicism), was instrumental
in shaping the Catholic Patriotic Association. This organization, now bitterly
criticized by many Catholics in China and abroad, most likely made possible the
very survival of the Chinese Catholic Church.
The association all along kept in touch with Rome through people who came from
Rome, Hong Kong or the Philippines, home to the largest Catholic community in
Asia and whose Nuncio and cardinals officially had competence on China. With
those contacts, not all of which were officially sanctioned, the Chinese
Catholics managed to hold lines of communication with the Pope and stay in tune
with the teachings of their seminars. Without the association, most likely the
Chinese Catholics would have been scattered around China, cut off from any
developments in Rome for decades, and left with basically no teachings or
seminars.
Even the most despised official seminars played a crucial role in the survival
of the "underground" church, the one that refused to collaborate with Beijing.
Many young Catholics from the underground church attended part of the course of
official seminars for decades, but they took off, leaving the seminar before
graduation.
This practice, tolerated by the Patriotic Association, enabled the
"underground" clerics to have a modicum of formal theological education.
Without it, most of them would have simply lapsed into some form of heresy, and
Rome would have to start its evangelization from scratch in China. On the other
hand, Liu showed the extremely suspicious Chinese leaders that a good Catholic
could also be a loyal PRC citizen. In principle, the two things were not in
contradiction. This possible blending was the basis of trust needed for talks
with Rome.
On the other side of the mountainous wall was Joseph Zen, from Shanghai, who
converted to Catholicism in his teens. The whiz kid of Chinese Catholicism was
sent to study in Turin, Italy, where he joined the Salesiano order. He played a
crucial role in improving ties even before he was ordained as a bishop. In
1989, he advised seminarists against joining the Tiananmen demonstrations, and
soon after he was invited back to Shanghai to lecture at the local seminar. At
the same time, he kept his standing with the underground Church, still adverse
to talks with Beijing, by supporting the anti-Beijing, pro-democracy movement
in Hong Kong and being quite vocal against Beijing on many issues.
However, despite his open opposition, in crucial moments, he did not life
impossible for Beijing - unlike other opposition movements that decided to
cause problems during challenging times for China. When he was ordained -
against Beijing's wishes - cardinal in February 2006, Zen unfurled the PRC flag
in the Vatican for the first time. He could have chosen to show no flag, or a
Taiwanese flag, that of the Republic of China, which still holds official ties
with the Vatican. His choice of the PRC and the new Hong Kong flags was a clear
declaration of political loyalty to the PRC government. The pictures of these
flags in St Peter's Square are neatly posted on his office wall in Hong Kong.
Two years later, on the eve of the Beijing Summer Olympic Games and after
violent anti-Beijing protests in Tibet, he agreed to scale down processions
marking the first anniversary of the Pope's letter to the Chinese. This gesture
was crucial because religious activities in that moment, when China was feeling
vulnerable because of the Olympics, could have suggested that the church had
deep enmity for the PRC.
Conversely, the Vatican's willingness to understand and accommodate Chinese
needs proved that Rome could be an honest partner, unlike other opposition
forces. At the same time, Zen offered strong public criticisms against the Hong
Kong government and some of Beijing's policies. This held together - and
ultimately in check - the underground Church, which at times had a fierce
animosity against the Beijing government.
In many ways, Zen's role was similar to that of his saint of inspiration,
Giovanni Bosco, who lived in 19th century Turin and spoke strongly for the
underprivileged, but ultimately remained loyal to the Savoy king.
Hu's trip to Italy, and taste of Rome, will owe at least a little to these men.
And so will Pope Benedict, who more than any of his predecessors has been
pushing for normalizing ties with Beijing.
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