BANGKOK - Arms shipments, cooperation on underground tunneling and a budding
nuclear relationship between North Korea and Myanmar threatens to destabilize
Southeast Asia's security balance and raise the ire of China, both countries'
powerful neighbor and ally.
The global spotlight has focused on North Korean-Myanmar ties ever since a
freighter, the Kang Nam 1, was reported to be steaming towards Myanmar
with a suspected cargo of weapons in violation of a recent United Nations
Security Council ban. The ban came in the wake of North Korea's ballistic
missile test in April and an underground test the following month of a nuclear
device. North Korea has promised to launch another ballistic missile test on
July 4.
Myanmar severed diplomatic ties with Pyongyang in 1983 after
three North Korean agents bombed the mausoleum of Myanmar's revered
independence leader Aung San and killed 18 visiting South Korean officials,
including then-deputy prime minister So Suk-chan and three other cabinet
ministers. However, trade continued between the two isolated authoritarian
regimes and clandestine military ties are known to have been re-established in
1999. Diplomatic relations were publicly restored in 2007.
The nature of those military-to-military ties is now a matter of growing
international conjecture and concern. Several unexplained visits to Myanmar by
North Korean freighters have also been reported in recent years, and the
secrecy and heavy security surrounding the ships has led many analysts to
believe that they consisted of weapons shipments.
The slow voyage of the Kang Nam 1 since leaving Wimpo on North Korea's
western coast has sparked speculation that it may be packed with parts for
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) or even the missiles themselves.
Opposition sources claim that Myanmar's military government, known as the State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC), may have already acquired Scud-type
missiles or is testing its own designs with technical help from North Korean
advisors.
Asia Times Online was not able to independently corroborate those claims at the
time of publication. But Myanmar's interest in the weapons seems to be
partially confirmed by recent photos published in The Irrawaddy news magazine
of chief of staff and SPDC Number 3 General Thura Shwe Mann and his entourage
inspecting a Scud production facility during a November visit to North Korea.
Further evidence may have emerged on Monday when three Japanese executives were
arrested in Tokyo for allegedly trying to sell a magnetic measuring device to
Myanmar. The device, which can be used in the production of ballistic missiles,
was reported by the Yomiuri Shimbun as being ordered by the Hong Kong-based New
East International Trading Ltd, which it said was linked to the North Korean
Second Economic Committee of the Pyongyang Workers' Party. The same company
reportedly tried and failed last year to export to Myanmar a similar measuring
device when it was found to have failed to obtain a proper export application
for the sale.
A major purchase by Myanmar of North Korean-made 130mm M46 field guns was made
in 1999. North Korean C-801 "Eagle Strike" anti-ship cruise missiles were
obtained before July 2006, intended for mounting on several of Myanmar's patrol
vessels. Insurgent military commanders say Myanmar also acquired last year
truck-mounted 107mm or 122mm multiple rocket launcher systems from North Korea
through Singapore.
North Korean involvement in the construction of large-scale underground tunnel
and bunker networks across Myanmar was confirmed earlier this month when
Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner published exclusive photos of the tunnels,
including what are believed to be North Korean technicians and advisors on the
site. The Irrawaddy later published additional photos of the tunnel complexes
last week. The tunnels are believed to be defenses for a possible US-led
invasion.
Nuclear nexus
More worrying to regional governments is mounting evidence of Pyongyang's
involvement in Myanmar's revitalized nuclear program. Myanmar's government
restarted its program in May 2007 through an agreement with Russia to provide
assistance and build a nuclear research center and 10 megawatt reactor.
Although the planned reactor will use non-weapons grade uranium, training
associated with the facility could eventually be turned to develop nuclear
weapons, experts say. They note that North Korea developed its runaway nuclear
program from a similar reactor at Yongbyon.
Opposition groups claim that North Korean technicians are either involved in
the Russian reactor program or building a separate reactor. Asia Times Online
could not independently confirm either claim. But Pyongyang's duplicity in its
own nuclear program and its recent show of contempt for world opinion by
conducting ballistic missile and nuclear tests, combined with past efforts to
export nuclear technology to Syria and Iran, have raised widespread concerns.
So, too, does Myanmar's past record of allegedly using weapons of mass
destruction. Myanmar has been widely accused by international human rights
groups and ethnic insurgents of carrying out clandestine chemical weapons
production in the 1980s and of using those weapons, and possibly biological
weapons, in the early 1990s against ethnic insurgent groups.
While experts agree that Myanmar, even with established nuclear facilities,
would not be able to produce a nuclear-grade weapon for years, Pyongyang's
willingness to export technology and know-how to other reclusive, anti-Western
regimes will raise substantially the regional security temperature and has the
potential to spark a new Southeast Asian arms race.
It's not clear that that's a case scenario China, Myanmar's main international
patron, would favor. China has spent considerable effort in developing Myanmar
as a source of cheap natural resources to supply its growing industrial base,
as a trade gateway to its remote and landlocked southwestern region and as a
soon-to-be strategic conduit for oil and gas shipments from the Middle East.
Work is slated to begin in September on an oil and gas pipeline that will carry
20 million tons of crude oil and 12 billion cubic meters of gas every year
across Myanmar to the southwestern city of Kunming. The proposed pipeline will
allow Chinese oil rigs to bypass the narrow Malacca Straits, where over 80% of
its current fuel imports pass and viewed as a potential strategic chokepoint in
any conflict with the US.
The last thing China would want, say experts, is to see these new commercial
arteries compromised by US concerns over a nuclear Myanmar. After withdrawing
support for the Burmese Communist Party in the late 1980s, China has in varying
degrees propped up Myanmar's military regime. Beijing's support has included
massive arms shipments that allowed the generals to rapidly expand their
military to an estimated 500,000 standing soldiers in the decade after crushing
pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988.
China's influence has also been instrumental in deflecting criticism of Myanmar
in international fora, including at the United Nation's Security Council. It
has also since the 1980s spent considerable effort and money making economic
inroads and securing lucrative concessions over Myanmar's rich natural
resources, including timber, gold, copper and agribusiness interests for
Chinese companies.
Even before the Kang Nam 1 controversy, there were subtle signs of
China's mounting annoyance with North Korea's and Myanmar's brinksmanship
towards the West. Australian Myanmar expert Andrew Selth wrote in a 2007 paper,
"Beijing has also demonstrated a degree of nervousness over Pyongyang's own
rather erratic and aggressive policies."
"Despite some suggestions to the contrary, a closer relationship between two
pariah states [North Korea and Myanmar] on China's borders would not be seen as
a strategic asset. China may even resent Pyongyang's interference in what until
now has been considered by some a Chinese sphere of interest," Selth wrote.
That assumed concern would no doubt grow if Myanmar were to acquire SRBM's or a
nuclear-grade weapon. According to Selth, "Beijing is unlikely to be happy
about the prospect of the SPDC acquiring a nuclear weapon, given [Myanmar's]
proximity to China, its internal instability and the unpredictable behavior of
its leaders."
Tacit tolerance
China has so far tolerated North Korean conventional weapons shipments and
links to supplying ballistic missile and nuclear technology to Syria and Iran,
regimes considered unsavory by the wider international community. That tacit
support has included the transit of Chinese airspace by North Korean aircraft
carrying suspicious cargos. For instance, a North Korean Illyushin-62 cargo
aircraft was stopped last year from proceeding to Iran from the northern
Myanmar city of Mandalay with an unidentified cargo when Indian authorities
declined to grant it over-flight rights. The North Korean aircraft could only
have reached Myanmar through Chinese airspace, experts say.
Chinese goodwill, however, may be stretched by having that same technology
shared with its nearby neighbors, particularly if it sours ties with greater
Southeast Asia, where it has recently dedicated considerable diplomatic and
commercial energies in a so-called "soft power" campaign. Selth speculates in
his paper that China would unlikely grant North Korea permission to use its
airspace to send SRBMs or nuclear components to Myanmar.
Beijing's resistance to international attempts to censure both North Korea and
Myanmar are based on its own perceptions of national interest and security that
often run counter to Western views. Beijing has opposed international sanctions
against North Korea exactly because if they succeeded in toppling the regime it
would cause an influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and a possible
presence of US troops allied to South Korea stationed on its border.
Chinese support for sanctions against Myanmar would potentially have a similar
destabilizing effect, as competing political factions and ethnic insurgent
groups battled in a power vacuum for territory and autonomy. Beijing is already
involved in mediating between the SPDC and ethnic insurgent armies on the
China-Myanmar border, in a bid to stop hostilities from spiraling into all-out
war along its southern border.
Maintaining regional stability is also a paramount Chinese concern. Myanmar's
possession of ballistic missiles or a nuclear capability would risk the spread
of weapons of mass destruction technologies in a region where no state has
acquired nuclear weapons. A regional arms race would likely ensue as Myanmar's
neighbors sought deterrence options.
As Selth wrote, "In this atmosphere of fear and suspicion, the security stakes
in the region would go up, raising the prospect of other countries feeling
obliged to expand their own inventories of strategic weapons. Beijing would
also worry about the possible response of the US to closer [Myanmar]-North
Korea ties."
The US has maintained economic sanctions against Myanmar's rights-abusing
regime since 1997, measures which to date have hurt the broad population more
than the ruling generals. If Myanmar were to acquire ballistic missiles and
launch a secretive nuclear program, Washington would likely be forced to
re-evaluate its Myanmar policy towards more direct engagement, as it has
adopted with North Korea.
China has so far carefully chosen its words in official statements voicing
concern about North Korea's recent actions. Beijing only agreed to the recent
UN resolution against Pyongyang after signatories agreed to remove provisions
which allowed for the use of force to enforce inspections. Despite that
even-handed diplomatic stance, criticism of North Korea's actions has surged in
China's state-controlled media and government-approved journals.
Terms that were previously unknown in state-sanctioned Chinese writing on North
Korea, including "reckless", "ungrateful" and "security threat", have recently
appeared in several news journals. The China Daily, regarded as the
English-language mouthpiece of the government, last week wrote, "Compared with
this sense of failure [of the six-party talks], many Chinese experts and
advisors are more concerned with the threat of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons pose
to China's security ... Such an attitude on the part of Pyongyang is a warning
that China should reconsider its national interest."
Whether China is contemplating a substantive rethink of its North Korea policy
is still a matter of conjecture. But North Korea's provocative move to send a
ship known for transporting arms to Myanmar immediately after a nuclear test
and in violation of a UN Security Council resolution could soon force China to
take a harder look at both regional relationships.
China has become increasingly, if very subtly, critical of Myanmar's regime in
recent years. The September 2007 armed crackdown on peaceful protestors caused
even China to join a strongly worded statement by the UN Human Rights Council
condemning the incident.
On several occasions, Myanmar's leadership has been told by senior Chinese
government officials that Beijing would like to see increased efforts at
national reconciliation. Myanmar expert Lintner told Asia Times Online that
China had recently taken the unusual step of reproducing his reports that
exposed North Korean assistance for tunneling in Myanmar in various Chinese
language publications.
The Kang Nam 1 was reported on Thursday to have reversed course and
headed back to North Korea, putting off for now the difficult question of how
the international community intends to enforce the UN's weapons ban. The reason
behind the course shift is unclear, but behind-the-scenes Chinese pressure
cannot be ruled out.
Whatever the reason, the scrapped voyage has put global attention on Myanmar's
nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions, to a degree that China perhaps can no
longer ignore.
Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist. He may be reached
at brianpm@comcast.net.
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