SINOGRAPH Beware the Tiananmen reflex
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - The deadly July 5 riots in Urumqi, capital of northwestern Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, have ignited the old blame-game against Chinese
authorities. Across the world, many are now labeling the Beijing government
guilty of all death and destruction in the remote city.
It is a Tiananmen reflex: if there are dead people on the streets, it must be
Beijing's fault; just like Beijing was guilty of killing students in the
crackdown on the Tiananmen movement in 1989. After all, Beijing occupies a
land, Xinjiang, that wanted its independence in the 1940s, and many Uyghurs,
the local population that is now in a minority because of Han Chinese
migration, might want to become independent - if only they could.
It is important to try to see clearly the narrow and broad context
behind the Urumqi riot, even forgetting for a moment the obvious points about
greater protection of human rights for the Uyghur minority.
Narrow context
There is no evidence of large-scale indiscriminate shooting by the police as
accounting for the 156 deaths and over 800 injured. The Chinese police did not
try to exterminate the Uyghur rioters because they don't need to. If they
wanted to wipe out the protesters, they could have simply arrested and killed
them in prison, not in the streets. The crackdown could have been more or less
fierce, but they did not massacre people in the street, unlike in 1989.
There is abundant evidence that the protesters set the city on fire, causing
the casualties directly (by beating people) or indirectly (because innocents
were in the buses on fire). Their actions could have reasonable motives and
could be justified, but the killing of scores of innocent people is blood on
their hands, and it is not pretty.
A riot of this scale and scope could well have been organized beforehand to
make President Hu Jintao - visiting Italy for the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting
- lose face. Conspiracies are hard to prove, but because of this, politics tend
to rule out pure accidents.
It is most likely that the brewing hatred among ethnic Uyghurs for the Han
Chinese (the ethnic group making up about 95% of the Chinese population) was
funneled into this demonstration by organizations opposing the Beijing
government. This does not rule out the possibility that a brutal, careless
intervention by the police might have escalated the situation.
Broad context
The riot in Urumqi is a quantum leap in the political opposition to Beijing's
rule in Xinjiang for several reasons. The protests moved from the traditionally
restive Nanjiang (the southern part of Xinjiang, where Uyghurs are still the
majority and retain their traditions) to Urumqi (the regional capital, where
Uyghurs are the minority, are allegedly integrated, and have been "sedated",
largely peaceful for decades).
Most likely, the new restrictions marshaled wholesale onto the Uyghur
population - including in once-peaceful Urumqi - after last year's attacks in
Kashgar, Khotan and Turfan have backfired. For fear of attacks spreading to
cities outside of Xinjiang, as happened in the mid-1990s, Beijing limited the
movement of Uyghurs out of the region, and even those traveling out were under
stricter control. This reinforced the feeling among Uyghurs that they were
second-class citizens.
This decision possibly prevented attacks or bombings against the Han
populations in Beijing and Shanghai, but spread dissatisfaction and loathing
among common Uyghurs, who might have been more middle-of-the-road about
Beijing.
Broader context
There is an old tension between the Han and Uyghurs, sprouting from the lack of
a sense of one Chinese nation, inclusive of all its minority ethnic groups.
With the fall of communist ideals, there is no new ideological glue. There is
also growing nationalism - but it is ethnic Han nationalism. This Han
nationalism widens the divide with other minorities, especially those proud of
their origins, like Uyghurs and Tibetans. Furthermore, Han nationalism kindles
and feeds other ethnic groups' nationalism and it all becomes a vicious circle.
China wants and needs Han nationalism and pride to win the support of the rich
and powerful Chinese diaspora which supported China's growth in the past three
decades. But this nationalism leaves the Tibetans and the Uyghurs behind. They
are less relevant for Chinese development, but can cause a lot of trouble and
embarrassment.
China, now more than any other time, may come to realize that the Islamic
problem is not just part of its foreign policy, it seeps into its domestic
policy. It is impossible to isolate Islamic Uyghurs from radical Muslims
rebelling in Central Asia. Delicate balances in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran
are bound to have consequences in Xinjiang. The stabilization of Central Asia
is crucial for the long-term pacification of Islamic Xinjiang.
China can decide that on balance these are minor costs that it must be willing
to pay, and crackdowns in Urumqi or Lhasa don't really matter. However,
image-conscious Chinese leaders may want to be spared further embarrassment and
might want to consider some proposals already advanced by government
think-tanks.
Broad measures
The idea of nationalism came to China around the turn of the 19th century, when
Beijing was confronting Western nation-states that, unlike imperial China, had
a strong sentiment of state unity.
Scholar Liang Qichao was instrumental in advancing this idea. This came to him
possibly because, as the last reforming mandarin of Han origin in the Manchu
court, he was the object of diffidence, envy and jealousy on the part of the
ethnic Manchu aristocracy.
The great Han nationalism was the stock idea of the Chiang Kai-shek's
Kuomintang, and Mao Zedong corrected it by introducing Soviet-style
"protections" for other nationalities living in China. But in the former Soviet
Union, the issue was that there had been an oppressive Russian nationalism that
needed curbing.
In China, there had been no Han nationalism to speak of. Mao's nationalities
instituted for the first time minute divisions among the ethnic groups living
in China, which de facto promoted national and ethnic sentiments that
previously were more blurred.
It is necessary to drop the institution of ethnic nationalities and develop a
Chinese dream - inclusive of non-ethnic Han - and to revamp the old imperial
idea of huaren, people who belong to the new Chinese culture. This can
be inclusive of Tibetans, Uyghurs and foreigners emigrating to China, just like
the idea of being an American is based on sharing a culture, not an ethnicity.
This can be achieved also by looking at the example of India, divided by dozens
of languages and ethnicities. In school, Indian children have to learn their
own language, English and another nationality language. They may not be
proficient in the other languages, but the process of learning conveys a deep
sentiment of unity.
If Han schoolchildren could choose to learn Uyghur, Mongolian or Tibetan, this
would give them and the Uyghurs, Mongolians or Tibetans a stronger sense of
being one country and one system.
Narrow measures
A crackdown must work with laser-fine precision. Wholesale measures that net
together activists, sympathizers and neutral bystanders are bound to spread
hatred and dissatisfaction against the Beijing government. It is a
well-established principle in penal culture: if you execute the killer, the
robber and simple accomplice, you encourage everybody to go to the extreme and
become killers.
If, for fear of Uyghur terrorists, you turn a whole people into suspects, you
then push them to become terrorists. Then what can you do, wage war on a
people? This is actually what terrorists want - an expansion of state
repression so that angered people will flock to the terrorists' ranks.
The opposite must occur: safeguard the common Uyghur population from
terrorists. In that case, the problem now should be how to scale down the size
of the crackdown and increase its accuracy.
These measures will be difficult and time-consuming. But without them, Han
nationalism will dominate the national ideology, and this will hinder domestic
and international politics as China grows into a global power.
The immediate thought abroad will be: "Will Chinese nationalists, once big and
powerful, do to me what they are now doing to the Uyghurs and Tibetans?"
Denials will be to no avail. Only facts - and the careful communication of
these facts - will prove to the world China's true intentions.
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