Page 1 of 2 China stalls on the AfPak road
By Walid Phares
This report was presented as testimony for the US-China Economic and Security
Review Commission in Congress in Washington DC on May 20, 2009.
China's strategic interest in the "AfPak" region (Afghanistan and Pakistan) is
of great importance to United States interests, particularly since the fall of
the Taliban regime in December 2001 and even more importantly as Taliban forces
are escalating their offensive against Pakistan's government. At the same time,
the US administration is preparing a renewed campaign inside Afghanistan and is
devising a new plan to provide support to the government of Pakistan.
Chinese strategic options in Central and Southern Asia can complicate and
mitigate US, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and allied efforts against terrorism, or they can bring additional
strength to the international campaign against dangerous radical forces in the
region. Chinese strategic behavior regarding the ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan and Pakistan can also have an impact on China's internal national
security and territorial integrity in the longer term.
In this testimony, I will draw the attention of the government to the point
that if China's leadership develops an accurate long-range perception of the
jihadi threat in the region, its behavior and strategic response could bring
about a significant effort against the Taliban and al-Qaeda and therefore
tighten cooperation in Asia and beyond against the terror forces.
Hence, in this testimony I will review quickly the impact of the AfPak conflict
on China's national security and argue that Beijing has a vital interest in
joining the US-led efforts in the sub-continent against the threat of jihadi
terrorism and should be engaged by Washington from that perspective. I will
also raise questions about China's understanding of the threat, its potential
policies regarding the latter and make recommendations regarding US initiatives
to influence that understanding and encourage a new Chinese participation in
the global confrontation with the common threat, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. [1]
China's global geopolitical interests
Traditionally, China's leadership has perceived its geopolitical and economic
interests in several concentric circles from the inside out. In the inner
circle, the regime's primordial interest has been to insure the territorial
integrity of the country.
Several regions of China, some acquired via past military campaigns, have
continued to witness separatist movements. Most active has been Tibet followed
by Xinjiang (Sinkiang) northwestern province. Other areas have been candidate
to potential separatist trends, including lower Mongolia and Manchuria.
The next wider circle of national-security concerns and geopolitical goals has
been the return of former territorial possessions. Reuniting with Hong Kong,
Macau and Taiwan has been on the list of goals to achieve, in one way or
another. The reintegration of Hong Kong and Macau at century's end was seen as
a tremendous success and as a indicator for future possibilities regarding
Taiwan.
In addition to the highly publicized claims for reunification, other less
visible claims had developed during the Cold War, but never pursued: contiguous
territories belonging then to the Soviet Union and now to the Russian
Federation along the northern frontiers of the People's Republic of China
(PRC). Beyond the two territorial circles of national security interest,
China's projection of power expressed itself eastbound militarily during the
Korean conflict drawing a red line against the West in defense of North
Korean's communist regime and southbound during the Vietnam War.
But on its western and south western frontiers, China's regime developed also
transnational attitudes. With India, at times, Beijing experienced border
tensions generated over border delineation disagreements. However with
Pakistan, even as Islamabad and Washington entertained good relations, China
built a series of relationships, which can be defined as close to strategic in
more than one domain. Chinese-Pakistani partnership in more than one area has
been traditionally perceived in Beijing as a balance of power play with a
growing India. But beyond regional consideration, the Chinese "window" into
Pakistan has also served as a testing ground of influence into the wider Muslim
world. [2]
In the past few years, China's government has increased its level of trade and
military transactions deeper in the Greater Middle East, particularly with
regimes hostile to the US and Western efforts against terrorism and under
United Nations sanctions, including Iran, Syria and Sudan. Hence, one major
trend to be noted is Chinese strategic cooperation with Pakistan against India
on the one hand and supplying the axis Iran-Syria-Sudan - themselves supporters
of terrorist organizations - with advanced weapons on the other.
In short, China's strategic policies regarding two parties in the Muslim world,
collides with US and Western interests. With Pakistan, Beijing's interest is
aimed at a strategic balance with India. With the axis Iran-Syria-Sudan,
Beijing's interest is to empower the latter against US-led efforts. [3]
China's strategic benefit to global jihadi forces
By engaging in backing Pakistan's military exclusively against India while
ignoring the Taliban threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Beijing indirectly -
and perhaps unwillingly - finds itself injecting strength into the sub-Indian
regional jihadi web. Indeed, by supplying Pakistan with missile technology and
weapons capable of escalating the military buildup with India, China would be
encouraging both nuclear countries to expand their strategic armament and
reduce their diplomatic attempts to reach solutions to their bilateral crises.
By supplying Pakistan with long-range missiles, Beijing would be forcing India
to improve its own. And by focusing on equipping Pakistan's military with
weapons aimed at India, China would be lessening Islamabad's focus on the
Taliban and the jihadi organizations operating on the Pakistani-Indian and the
Afghani-Pakistani borders. In short, Chinese support to Pakistan is aiming at
the wrong foe: India.
On the other hand, China's strategic arms support to the "confrontational axis"
(known as al-Muma'naa in Arabic) including the Iranian, Syrian and
Sudanese regimes, is also strengthening the two large trees of the global
jihadi web, directly and indirectly. Iran's regime is Khomeinist-jihadist.
Tehran and Damascus strategically support Hezbollah, a Khomeinist-jihadist
organization.
Iran, Syria and Hezbollah openly support Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ), both Salafi jihadis. Furthermore, Iran and Hezbollah cooperate
with Sudan's regime which is Salafist and has ties to international jihadi
organizations in Africa and beyond, themselves with ties to the Taliban and
al-Qaeda. In short, eventually, China's strategic arming of the
"confrontational axis" ends up backing international jihadism, including the
Taliban and al-Qaeda - even if Beijing is not directly supplying the latter
with weapons, as far as we know. This raises the question: is supporting jihadi
forces in the interest of China's national security? [4]
China's jihadi problem domestically
At the core of China's self-perceived priorities with respect to its national
security are two secessionist movements, one in Tibet and the other in
Xinjiang. Both movements are ethnically and historically grounded and have
developed international outreach. While Tibet's independence movement inspired
and led by the Dalai Lama is essentially non-violent and non-armed, some
networks in the Xinjiang's separatist movement have adopted terror methods and
have conducted operations against Chinese authorities as recently as last
summer.
The latest security reports, including some by Chinese authorities, confirm
that a jihadi terrorist organization is now operational in Xinjiang province
and its latest actions have reached areas across China and its capital. What is
the nature of that jihadi threat inside China?
Xinjiang province inside China is inhabited by 45% Uyghurs, 40.6% Han Chinese,
6.7% Kazakhs and 7.5% from other ethnicities. The Uyghurs have been opposing
Chinese domination of the province for decades and in alliance with other
non-Han ethnicities form close to a 60% majority inside the province. Xinjiang
has a Muslim majority.
The separatist claim in the province is a classical ethnic conflict but in the
past few years a jihadi movement has made inroads inside the Muslim
communities, indoctrinating and recruiting a significant number of jihadi
militants. Many "Chinese jihadis" have been recruited by al-Qaeda and fought in
Afghanistan. Some are now fighting in the ranks of the Taliban in Pakistan.
These Xinjiang jihadis have been dispatched by the jihadi network to countries
and areas remote from Central Asia, such as Chechnya, the Caucuses, the Horn of
Africa and South Asia. Hence, the Chinese-based jihadi movement not only aims
at separating Xinjiang from China but is now embedded in the worldwide terror
network threatening several countries around the world.
The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM, Dogu Turkistan Islam Hareketi)
is declared as a terrorist organization by the governments of China,
Kazakhstan, Pakistan and the United States, as well as the United Nations. [5]
The Chinese government accused ETIM for car-bomb attacks in Xinjiang during the
1990s, as well as the death of a Chinese diplomat in Kyrgyzstan in 2002.
ETIM is linked to al-Qaeda as well. In its 2005 report on terrorism, the US
State Department said that the group was "linked to al-Qaeda and the
international jihadi movement" and that al-Qaeda provided the group with
"training and financial assistance". In January 2002, the Chinese government
released a report in which it revealed that Hassan Mahsum, the head of ETIM,
met with Osama bin Laden in 1999 and received promises of money, and that Bin
Laden sent "scores of terrorists" into China.
During the summer of 2008, Chinese authorities arrested members of ETIM and
other jihadi terror groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and
stopped others as they were planning or executing terror attacks against the
Beijing Summer Olympic Games. To this date, ETIM and TIP as well as other
jihadi factions are still operational inside China, in Central Asia and
embedded in international networks. [6]
Jihadi strategies towards China
What are the strategic goals of the "Chinese jihadis"? By exploring the
available literature produced by ETIM, TIP and other transnational Central
Asian jihadi groups as well as al-Qaeda, the Taliban and international
Salafists, one can understand the long-term goals of the movement as follows:
To indoctrinate a vast pool of ethnic Uyghurs and other non-Hans inside
Xinjiang province into jihadism before recruiting them into a local jihadi
urban army.
Unleash a jihadi intifada inside Xinjiang by attacking Chinese military,
economic and urban targets.
Organizing terror strikes across China, focusing on major cities, financial and
economic centers, including foreign establishments with the aim of weakening
the political resolve in Beijing.
Establish large Taliban-like enclaves inside Xinjiang and implement tightly
interpreted sharia law.
When the time is ripe and amid severe internal crises in China, to declare a
Taliban-like emirate in parts or all of Xinjiang.
Launch jihadi operations from Xinjiang into the other Turkic-speaking republics
of Central Asia and link up with their local jihadi movements.
Separate Xinjiang from China and merge it with the other "emirates" of Central
Asia to form a regional Taliban-like power with ambitions to unite with all
other emirates already formed in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan and India.
In a sum, the ETIM-TIP terror campaign in China may overlap (or claim to
overlap) with the ethnic Uyghur struggle for liberation or separation, but in
fact exceeds that goal in order to create a totalitarian fundamentalist regime,
similar and parallel to the Taliban and al-Qaeda model. Note that the "Chinese
jihadi" movement is part of the international jihadi movement at the center of
which is al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
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