Page 2 of 2 China stalls on the AfPak road
By Walid Phares
ETIM-TIP terrorists have been spotted, arrested or killed in "battlefields" as
far as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, the Caucuses and Africa, in
addition to China. Therefore, Beijing is facing off with a jihadi international
threat, as are the United States, Europe, Russia, India and the moderates in
the Arab and Muslim world. But is the Chinese government acting accordingly and
what are its real stakes in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
China's stakes in AfPak
Had the Taliban not been removed from power in Kabul, they would have pressed
forward north to defeat the Northern Alliance and eventually reached
international borders, including with China. The 76-kilometer frontier between
a Taliban/al-Qaeda state and
the Chinese state would have been a corridor for jihadis crossing into and from
China.
A well-established jihadi regime in Afghanistan would be compelled
ideologically and strategically to lend its support to jihadi activities in
Xinjiang. The presence of ETIM Uyghur fighters with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
prior to September 11, 2001, is clear evidence that the projection was for
Kabul under Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden to serve as a base
for an insurrection in China's northwestern provinces.
Beyond the "Islamist" ideological agenda, a Taliban 'jihad" for power across
Xinjiang has other strategic incentives. This vast province has an annual
runoff of about 88 billion cubic meters of surface water together with 25
billion cubic meters of exploitable groundwater. Glaciers covering 24,000
square kilometers lock away about 2,580 billion cubic meters of water.
Xingjian's coal reserves are about 38% of China's national total. Petroleum and
natural gas reserves estimated at 30 billion tons and that is more than 25% of
the national total. Add to it the strategically important nuclear installations
in the province as well as some of China's space program components in the near
future.
In short, a jihadi takeover of Xinjiang, outside any norm of peaceful
resolution to the ethnic minorities question, would be catastrophic to Chinese
economic and political stability. It would also add severe threats to world
security. Thus, the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul must be perceived
by China's strategists as a direct threat to the country's national security
and economic development.
The Chinese stakes in Pakistan aren't that different. In some regards they may
be higher. A Taliban victory over the secular government in Islamabad will have
cataclysmic consequences on China's national security and economy as well.
Pakistan has 523 kilometers of borders with the People's Republic of China. A
jihadi takeover of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan will lead to a campaign of
jihadi activities via the common borders and through the two zones of Kashmir
(India and Pakistan) into Chinese territories to link up with and support an
intifada in Xinjiang.
The jihadi strategic agenda in the sub-Indian continent consists of seizing
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indian Kashmir and wage a massive jihad along the
entire western borders of China, including with Central Asia. The minor Chinese
experience with few terror attacks or attempted plots inside the country are
only a minute sampler of what will hit the Asian giant if US efforts collapse
in Afghanistan and Pakistan's government crumbles under the Taliban.
Beijing, a super nuclear power, understands perhaps better than other countries
the cataclysmic meaning of a nuclear-armed Taliban federation of emirates
across its southern borders. Simply put, China will be the next
nuclear-threatened target, along with India. But is the Chinese leadership
aware of the menace? And if so, is it applying the right strategic choices to
pre-empt this mounting danger? [7]
China's current policy on AfPak
In 2006, Chinese and Afghan authorities signed an agreement of cooperation on
their joint border. One of stipulations stated
Both sides agreed that
terrorism constitutes an international menace, as it poses a grave threat to
world peace and security. China and Afghanistan are both victims of terrorism
and they both firmly oppose terrorism of any form. The Chinese side supported
Afghanistan's efforts in combating terrorism and safeguarding national
stability and is ready to work with the Afghan side to fight terrorism,
separatism, extremism, organized crime as well as illegal immigration, drug
trafficking and illegal arms trade. The Afghan side reaffirmed its strong
support to the Chinese side in combating the three forces.
Without
naming the threat, both countries committed to fight terrorism on both sides of
the border. This is a good step in the right direction.
On the other hand, Beijing and Islamabad have a web of relationships related to
the military, economic and technological realms. This web of connections can
become a starter for a new Chinese involvement in counter-terrorism on a
regional scale. On August 8, 2008, a joint statement said, "Pakistan and China
have agreed to coordinate and help closely with each other in the fight against
terrorism." More recently, on May 5, a high encounter between the Punjab
governor with the Chinese ambassador reaffirmed the common concern:
All
of us have realized that the terrorists were the country's "number 1 enemy" and
we need to unite to overcome the threat posed by them. By joining hands with
the international forces, Pakistan would eradicate terrorism from the region,
the governor said. Reciprocating Taseer's friendly gestures, Zhaohui expressed
his satisfaction over the pace and depth of cooperation between the two
countries and hoped that mutual cooperation at the strategic level will go a
long way.
However, Beijing must come to realize that a set of
classical bilateral measures with Kabul and Islamabad aren't enough to stop the
Taliban threat, which rapidly would generate into a Xinjiang jihad if
Afghanistan and Pakistan failed to contain the flow of terror on short, medium
and long terms. China's strategic planning must preempt the scenarios where
terror forces would establish launching pads for future attacks across the
borders from the Vakhan corridor and the Karkoram range. Hence, Beijing needs
to develop a new policy of strategic cooperation with the international
campaigns in AfPak, particularly with the US-led NATO efforts along with the
Afghan and Pakistani government. [8]
China's needed new approach
Beijing must redesign its platform for AfPak along the following tracks:
Reconvert its support to Pakistan, not to escalate the balance of power with
India but to enable Islamabad to contain and roll back the Taliban.
Open a dialogue with India based on joint efforts against the jihadi threat in
the sub-continent covering the three nuclear powers, China, Pakistan and India.
Increase its cooperation with Afghanistan against the joint menace of the
Taliban and the Xinjiang jihadis.
Establish a strategic dialogue with the US and NATO on common concerns
regarding international jihadi terror and lay the groundwork for economic,
political, security and military joint measures against al-Qaeda, the Taliban
and their global web.
Join a consortium on the terror threat in Central and South Asia along with the
US, NATO, Russia, India, Pakistan and all concerned governments to isolate the
jihadis and deny them control of any country in the area, particularly if
nuclear.
US suggested initiatives
The United States' relations with the People's Republic of China depends on a
wide array of components, ranging from strategic nuclear security, military
balance, economic issues, diplomatic questions to human rights and the question
of Taiwan and North Korea.
The web of areas of concerns and of areas of cooperation is large and complex.
Washington's decision-makers must indeed take into consideration all other
factors when dealing with one issue at the table. Based on this overarching
reality, I suggest the development of a new initiative towards China focusing
on an elevated cooperation against terrorism in general and on the
Taliban-al-Qaeda threat in Central and South Asia in particular.
China has a vested interest in stopping the Talibanization of AfPak and thus
pre-empting a projected terror campaign in Xinjiang; and the US has a vested
interest in defeating the jihadi threat in Afghanistan and rolling it back in
Pakistan. Hence I do propose the following measures:
That the US engages China in a joint program to counter jihadi terrorism in
AfPak, in particular, and in South and Central Asia, in general.
To form a consortium including the US, China, Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
the European Union, India and other willing governments to fight the scourge of
jihadi terrorism and work on de-radicalization programs across the region.
The US must not abandon its policies of defense of human rights and democracy
towards China as a price for such a new initiative.
The US must not turn a blind eye to any legitimate ethnic and cultural claim of
any minority in China in return for cooperation with Beijing on countering
jihadi terrorism. American foreign policy must be able to perform both missions
with equal success.
Notes
1. "From Washington to Kabul to Beijing Assessing Prospects for
US-China-Afghanistan Cooperation" by Nirav Patel and David Capezza, Small Wars
Journal.
2. "Regional autonomy for China's ethnic minorities," April 30, 2008 (Xinhua).
See also Colin Mackerras, China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation London,
New York, Routledge Curzon, 2003.
3. See "Iran's New Alliance With China Could Cost US Leverage." Robin Wright,
Washington Post, Wednesday, November 17, 2004; Page A21.
4. See "Iran's China Option," Roger Cohen, The New York Times, February 8,
2009.
5. Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, Holly Fletcher and Jayshree
Bajoria, ETIM: "East Turkestan Islamic Movement," July 31, 2008.
6. See "China hands death penalty to 2 'bent on jihad'." MSNBC; December 17,
2008; also "Jihad in China's Far West," Times, Austin Ramzy/Kashgar, August 6,
2008.
7. See Peter Lee, Taliban
force a China switch Asia Times Online. March 6, 2009.
8. Read "China Versus the Taliban" Strategy Page; August 14, 2007.
Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the
European Foundation for Democracy. Professor Phares teaches Global Strategies
at the National Defense University and is the author of several books on ethnic
and ideological conflicts.
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