Conflicts in China's North Korea policy
By Cynthia Lee
Like past economic sanctions by the United Nations, the success or failure of
Resolution 1874, which calls for clamping down on the alleged trading of banned
arms and weapons-related material by North Korea through stepped-up inspections
of suspect shipments by sea and air, will depend on Chinese cooperation.
As the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) becomes increasingly
reckless in its foreign policy, the need to reverse the trend of Chinese
non-compliance has become ever-more urgent.
China, however, has already expressed reluctance towards the policy of
interdiction and protested mandatory sanctions during Security Council
deliberations. The UN in June passed Resolution 1874, which allows inspections
of air, ship and land shipments in and out of North Korea, in response to North
Korea's nuclear and
missile tests in May. If China's early actions are any indication, Resolution
1874 will likely follow the path of its predecessors and flounder due to
Chinese non-support. What does China stand to gain from a nuclear North Korea
and the survival of the Kim Jong-il regime?
From the time of ancient kingdoms, Korea has been a "shrimp among whales", a
strategic military location so tantalizing that no great Asian power has been
able to resist a forceful invasion. Chinese foreign policy towards the two
Koreas is then partly an inheritance from its imperial era and aims to prevent
a foreign foothold in Korea.
Unless of course, it is China's own.
Unfortunately, a unified Korea, resulting from the dissolution of the Kim
Jong-il regime, would not only implicitly recognize US supremacy in the region
(current efforts are Western led and conceived). It would also present ample
opportunity for the development of a strong foreign presence, particularly the
US's. As South Korea's most powerful and generous benefactor, the US has the
resources to help unite two nations whose levels of urban and economic
modernization are jarringly different and bound to pose difficulties in the
case of reunification.
The possibility of a strengthened US presence so close to its borders is
troubling for China more so than the presence of any other nation. A US
presence in Korea would not only guarantee its regional hegemony (a prize which
an ambitious China has been hungrily eyeing) but also create Chinese
insecurities over possible US military involvement in the Taiwanese issue. As
long as this current policy prevents this scenario, it is likely to be
considered effective.
The other oft-cited rationalization is the prevention of a potential refugee
crisis triggered by the collapse of the Kim Jung-il regime. The crisis may
precipitate UN involvement (which protects refugee rights under its charter) as
well as pose a serious threat to the nation's "One China" policy.
A domestic policy the authoritarian regime takes seriously, "One China" is
aimed towards maintaining the territorial integrity of this vast and ethnically
diverse nation (the Chinese Community Party or CCP recognizes 55 ethnic
minorities).
One group, almost 2 million ethnic Koreans, occupy an area of the Chinese-North
Korean border once part of the Korean kingdom, Koguryo. The Chinese fear that,
in the event of a refugee crisis, the ethnic Koreans living in this area "may
undergo an identity crisis as China nationals through frequent contact [with
the North Koreans]".
Many of these Koreans already long for the "Korean dream" promised by popular
soap operas, and some 300,000 have immigrated to South Korea as low-wage
workers in search of that dream. Should they undergo this identity crisis,
ethnic Koreans may push for separation from China and seek instead to integrate
(or at the very least ally) with Korea where greater civil freedoms and
economic opportunities lie.
Lending further credence to such a possibility, China's claim to this region is
tenuous and largely disputed by scholars who claim the Yanbian Korean
Autonomous Prefecture once belonged to the Korean kingdoms, Koguryo and Balhae.
In 2002, China mounted a large-scale campaign entitled the "Northeast Project"
to deflect these claims even as the project seriously cooled relations with
South Korea. Its willingness to risk key diplomatic relations suggests that the
CCP fears broader consequences from a Yanbian rebellion: the strengthening of
the various separatist movements in China and the weakening of an already
fragile legitimacy.
As the author Andrew Nathan eloquently put it, "The Chinese system suffers from
a birth defect that it cannot cure: the fact that an alternative form of
government is more legitimate."
Therefore, to retain the appearance of legitimacy, it must repress opposition,
maintain a front of good governance, and suppress any threats to the CCP's
jurisdiction over China's vast territory. This policy is in some ways an effort
to undercut any future form of a challenge.
Closely tied to domestic concerns is the long-standing Chinese policy that it
does not interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state. In an increasingly
globalized world where transnational organizations wield significant power,
this argument is a rare and dying breed. But it is a crucial one: in a nation
where rampant human-rights violations occur, denial of an outsider's right to
interfere in sovereign actions is necessary for its own attempts to deflect
criticism of brutal authoritarian practices, foreign attempts at human-rights
interference, and international calls for democratization.
The CCP then sees criticism of North Korea as the beginning of a slippery slope
that could end in a human-rights intervention and/or democracy movements in its
own state. The current DPRK policy not only ensures consistency among Chinese
policies but helps to stabilize the current regime for the time being.
Just as any policy must have its own equilibrium of gains and losses, China's
preferential treatment of North Korea has its drawbacks. To start, what
international prestige China gained by hosting the six-party talks, which
include North and South Korea, Japan, the US and Russia, disintegrated as North
Korea withdrew from the negotiations and emerged more dangerous and reckless
than ever.
While the Barack Obama administration in the US has prioritized Chinese
cooperation as part of his North Korean policy, it is unclear how long US
patience towards a reluctant China will last. The prestigious Center of New
American Democracy for its part has argued against allowing China to determine
the timetable of America's North Korean foreign policy, and the Obama
administration reserves the option to internationally rebuke China for failing
to be a "responsible stakeholder".
The loss of international prestige as a powerbroker and potential criticism
from the Obama administration pose serious threats to the "Peaceful Rise"
public relations campaign it has mounted since 2002. A campaign designed to
generate acceptance into the international community and to justify its
economic actions (such as foreign acquisitions), the "Peaceful Rise" has
facilitated the economic growth of China (on which CCP legitimacy is based) and
represents a significant monetary and political investment. It remains for
China to consider then whether the loss of a key policy's legitimacy is a
worthwhile value trade-off.
Chinese inaction creates another loss to which the Peaceful Rise is loosely
tied - regional hegemony. China has long been an ambitious country, and its
current wave of nationalism has roots in the Maoist calls for a return to
greatness.
Over the years, as the US-centric San Francisco system declined and key nations
like South Korea expressed anti-Americanism, China attempted to realize that
goal by seeking hegemony in the Asian region. These attempts are now
complicated as the US reasserts its hegemony by strengthening its alliances
with distraught players like South Korea and Japan.
Japan furthermore has taken renewed US leadership in the region as an
opportunity to push for normalization. Normalization, or re-militarization, of
Japan constitutes a political move likely to inflame Asian nations once victim
to Japan's imperial aggression. China, in particular, has vigorously protested
the normalization of Japan, which it sees as not only a national security
threat but also as an attempt to increase Japanese prospects for a regional
hegemony.
While there is evidence to suggest that US is too uncomfortable with Japanese
normalization, the US's restored position as regional hegemony automatically
renews Japanese importance in the region as America's most trusted ally,
therefore diminishing Chinese claims to regional leadership.
Regional leadership aside, China's current reluctance to take a tougher stance
may destabilize the entire region by setting off a regional arms race. The
North Korean regime has expressed no qualms over the sale of their nuclear
technology to other nations, even those with dangerous and oppressive regimes.
In fact, some analysts have argued that North Korea's astoundingly belligerent
display of missile and nuclear technology in recent weeks may be a perverse
form of advertisement from a regime badly strapped for cash.
As the threat of proliferation in Asia becomes heightened, non-nuclear nations
will likely argue for and seek nuclear weapons of their own. A serious threat
to China's own national security (it is particularly vulnerable as it shares
its border with 14 other nations), an Asian arms race is a sobering prospect.
Most nations in this region are unpredictable, autocratic, and vulnerable in
one way or another. Combined with high poverty and low education levels, there
are no assurances that nuclear proliferation with follow the Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD) paradigm of Western proliferation. Deterrence through MAD
simply may not work or rogue nations bound by heavy sanctions may sell their
technology to other states and worse, to non-state actors.
Equally disturbing is the reality that the Asian region is one marked by high
levels of mistrust (which are owed largely in part to its complicated and
violent history). Once proliferation begins, mistrust amongst the political
actors will make it difficult to stop - to say nothing of Asia's lack of an
effective regional architecture and thus a central, impartial organization to
conduct proliferation efforts.
Asia's inability to unite and act in the face of a proliferation crisis will
bring international organizations and the US to the backyard of China. In
recent years, China has supported the development of a regional architecture
that excludes the involvement of these actors. China, like numerous Asian
countries, believes that US and international influence over regional matters
has been far too deep and lengthy. US and international involvement then will
pose significant problems for China's regional vision.
As North Korea continues its dangerous and nonsensical path, China's response
to the heightened threats will be crucial for the success of DPRK deterrence.
Yet the odds are not in the free world's favor.
While China is no longer the DPRK's infallible ally (indeed new reports suggest
its growing impatience with the regime), China is likely to place more value on
the negative consequences this policy has for possible separatist movements and
for domestic legitimacy than on any other.
The CCP's first and utmost concern will always be its own survival, and the
threats to CCP legitimacy may be real and immediate enough to make the other
value trade-offs worthwhile. Actions of the CCP suggest that they are. Much of
what the CCP stands to lose from its current position have been key to its
foreign policy - a campaign for a "Peaceful Rise", regional hegemony over
Japan, and a peaceful Asia independent of US string-pulling. It is not likely
that the CCP is trading them in for anything less than the regime's own
survival.
Cynthia Lee is a student of political science at Columbia University.
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