SPEAKING FREELY Wilhelmine China?
By Sebastian Bruck
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In recent years, a number of analysts have drawn attention to supposed
similarities between the rise of modern China and the rise of Wilhelmine
Germany a century ago. Citing two prominent examples, American legal scholar
Richard Posner has argued that he is “struck by the resemblance between China
and Wilhelmine Germany [1871-1918], two aggressively, at times hysterically,
nationalistic countries, paranoid about encirclement by potential enemies […]
and possessed of economic institutions more advanced than their political
institutions."
Newsweek's Fareed Zakaria, meanwhile, has written that "like Germany in the
late 19th century, China is also growing rapidly
but uncertainly into a global system in which it feels it deserves more
attention and honor. The Chinese military is a powerful political player, as
was the Prussian officer corps. Like Wilhelmine Germany, the Chinese regime is
trying to hold onto political power even as it unleashes forces in society that
make its control increasingly shaky."
The unstated fear behind these assertions is the potential for future war
between China and the US. However, apart from general allusions to a shared
penchant for nationalism and militarism, a fear of encirclement and a quest for
honor and recognition, these accounts tend to fall short of providing a
systematic comparison of Wilhelmine Germany at the beginning of the 20th and
the People's Republic of China at the start of the 21st century.
As a result, intuitive agreement with the diagnosis ("a politically
authoritarian, economically dynamic nation will always challenge a declining
hegemon!") is almost instantly combined with equally intuitive disagreement
("surely, the international system has moved on from the times of unfettered
Bismarckian realpolitik?").
Given the definite room for friction associated with China's growing importance
in the international system, that feeling of ambivalence is rather unfortunate
- ideally, one would like to know more specifically whether a raging bull or a
youthful yet peaceful lamb is currently entering the China shop. What, then, is
the truth of the matter? Is war inevitable?
Essentially, any meaningful analysis that goes beyond casual comparisons will
have to factor in all three "levels of analysis" central to international
relations theory, that is, the international system, the domestic situation and
the role of individuals. Regarding the international system, Wilhelmine Germany
faced an environment that offered enticing opportunities for national power
expansion alongside potential threats to the country's security.
Sensing the decline of the ruling hegemon - Britain - and bolstered by a
well-functioning army (whose main contributor, Prussia, had been undefeated in
three previous campaigns), pre-World War I Germany clamored for its "place in
the sun" and acquired colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Apart from
vigorously promoting a navy fit to sail the world's high seas and defend the
empire's overseas territories, the leadership also sought to back up Germany's
aspirations with an intricate alliance system, notably with Austria-Hungary.
At the same time, despite trade, investment and family links, Wilhelm II and
his advisors feared encirclement by France, Russia and Britain, whose armies
surrounded the German forces in the west, north and east. In the eyes of the
German leadership, France was hell-bent on regaining territories lost in 1870
and Britain strongly opposed Germany's naval build-up. This difficult-to-read
mix of opportunities and threats at the level of the international system
contributed to the general wish for a "cleansing thunderstorm" which ultimately
helped bring about catastrophe in 1914.
In a number of respects, China today appears to face a very similar situation:
bound up in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as struggling with the devastating
effects of the credit crisis, America, the ruling hegemon, increasingly looks
the part of a lame duck. Sensing weakness and despite its own calls for a
"peaceful rise", China is building up its military presence, expanding its navy
to include "blue water" forces that can defend the country's burgeoning
overseas economic interests (particularly in Africa) and boosting its space
capabilities (China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile in early 2007
and recently completed another manned space flight).
Alliances with Russia and a number of Central Asian republics (for example via
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) underpin this Chinese quest for the
country's very own "place in the sun". And even in terms of international
system threats, there are similarities between Wilhelmine Germany and China.
Thus, despite extensive trade and financial links, Beijing also fears
encirclement by powers such as the US (via its South Korean and Japanese
allies), India and Vietnam. Potential conflicts often center on territorial
disputes too (Taiwan, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands etc).
Still, two major differences separate the international system of the early
20th century from the international system of the early 21st century: firstly,
the role of international law, institutions and organizations, as well as norms
and values, has been vastly expanded, not least because of the world's
disastrous experience with untamed great-power politics. So far, it seems that
China wants to play by this international rulebook as well. Yes, the realists
reply, but it only wants to do so until it is powerful enough to change the
rules.
This is where the second major difference to the international system of a
century ago enters the picture - the power of the atom. Mutually assured
destruction prevented two superpowers from going to war before; it likely will
do so again in the future. Put differently, no major power today is easily
willing to risk total extinction for the pursuit of its interests.
Unless, one may have to add, domestic circumstances force the leadership's
hand. How then does China's domestic situation compare to Wilhelmine Germany's?
Domestically, Wilhelmine Germany was a strange animal. With a strongly growing
population (41 million citizens in 1871, 68 million in 1913), rapid
urbanization and an economy that in 1914 was second only to America's (the
period for example saw the founding of Krupp (steel), Siemens (electronics) and
Hapag (shipping) which continue to the present day), Germany had decidedly
entered the modern age. Natural science flourished too, with Albert Einstein,
Max Planck and Robert Koch making ground-breaking scientific discoveries,
whereas Thomas Mann and Friedrich Nietzsche underlined Germany's
self-perception as the "land of poets and thinkers".
Politically, however, the country remained underdeveloped. While there was a
constitution, parliament, elections and other trappings of representative
democracy, voters' interests were often sidelined by the emperor and his
advisors, most notably in the case of the workers' movement. Importantly, the
army did not answer to civilian authorities but directly to the emperor. In
order to compensate the masses for their lack of political influence, the state
promoted a social welfare agenda and fanned the flames of nationalism, labeling
France the nation's "hereditary enemy".
It is on this second level of analysis that modern China appears a close match
to Wilhelmine Germany. China's population continues to grow (albeit that trend
will reverse soon), its cities are swelling with migrants from the countryside
and its economy is booming, with companies such as Bank of China, Haier and
Lenovo making a global mark. After the devastations of the Cultural Revolution,
science and the arts are back in vogue (Chinese research and development
spending as a percentage of gross domestic product more than doubled between
1995 and 2005, according to Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development figures, while the British newspaper The Guardian recently named
China "the hottest art market in the world").
At the same time, political representation is still muted and the Communist
Party, rather than elected politicians, exerts control over the People's
Liberation Army ("the party controls the gun"). Mirroring Germany, political
discontent is countered by a mix of coercion (think Tibet and Xinjiang),
economic payoffs and nationalism, principally directed against Japan and the US
but at times also involving other countries (for example France before the 2008
Beijing Summer Olympic Games).
While the current international system is less prone to induce armed conflicts
between, say, China and the US, due to both liberal (international law) and
realist (nuclear weapons) factors, domestic circumstances could still force war
onto a national leadership facing its own demise. Such a war, if started by
China (for example over Taiwan), wouldn't be a rational attempt to win a "spot
in the sun"; rather, it would be a last-ditch effort to save a desperate
leadership's legitimacy. Ultimately, the likelihood of such an outcome depends
on the leadership skills of individual decision-makers.
The psychological condition most often associated with the German leadership on
the eve of World War I is one of nervousness. On a societal level, the
transformation from an agrarian time of certainties to the modern industrial
era of uncertainty had brought with it the proverbial moniker of the "nervous
age". This peculiar condition was further compounded in the emperor and the
military leadership as they faced shifting alliances, fleeting opportunities
and veiled (as well as open) military threats.
In the end, the declaration of war in August 1914 seemed to almost have a
liberating effect for Wilhelmine Germany's key decision-makers - finally,
friend and foe abroad could be clearly delineated and domestic infighting would
give way to national unity. "From this day on I recognize no parties but only
Germans," the kaiser declared before Germany's elected representatives
following the start of hostilities.
Rather than trying to prevent war, Germany's political and military masters
chose war as a way to escape from the heavy demands of public-interest
leadership. With a bit of luck, China's current generation of rulers will not
repeat these leadership failures. Calm and reasonable decision-making, instead
of nervous and trigger-happy international policy moves, is the order of the
day. One hopeful sign is that China's leadership is obsessively introspective
and extrospective at the same time, analyzing both the impact of its own
policies and the experience of other countries in international affairs.
In this respect, considering the success of, for example, Chinese economic
reforms since 1978, they may act as a restraint on any daring move in the field
of foreign policy, given the distinct success of gradualism in the economic
sphere. At the same time, studying the fate of aggressive challengers of the
international order such as Wilhelmine Germany may reduce the appeal of
actually following in the kaiser's footsteps (the politburo of the Chinese
Communist Party has explicitly discussed past experiences of rising powers).
Another reason for cautious optimism regarding the foreign policy agenda of
future Chinese rulers is that the party now appears to have found a way to
peacefully hand over power to new generations. This institutionalized approach
to political succession has so far prevented the rise of "political mavericks"
with radical policy agendas. Rather, careful consensus-builders have been
favored. Thorough examination of self and others as well as the selection of
comparatively cautious leaders could bode well for the international conduct of
China's rulers.
Having said that, when faced with a direct challenge to the rule of the Chinese
Communist Party, boring bureaucrats may yet turn into aggressive
saber-rattlers.
China and Wilhelmine Germany are odd inter-temporal twins. They share a similar
domestic predicament but rather different international environments. In the
case of Germany, increasing might combined with a lack of effective
international deterrence and a nervous leadership meant war. In the case of
China, domestic developments point toward potential conflict while the
international environment calls for peace. In the years ahead, it will be up to
the skilful individual leadership of Chinese and American policy-makers to tip
the scales in the right direction.
Sebastian Bruck recently completed his PhD at the School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London, and works for a major international
strategic consulting company.
(Copyright 2009, Sebastian Bruck)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in contributing.
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