The People's Liberation Army (PLA) marked its 82nd birthday on August 1, with
the Hu Jintao leadership having taken several major initiatives to raise the
quality of its senior personnel. President and commander-in-chief Hu has also
given a big boost to military modernization by pledging unprecedented civilian
support for the PLA's ambitious goals "in the new century and under new
historical circumstances".
Yet, China's defense establishment still suffers from enduring problems,
ranging from an aging leadership to factionalism. Further, Hu's re-hoisting of
the Maoist standard of junmin jiehe, or "the synthesis of the army and
the people", could exacerbate the privileged "state-within-a-state" status of
the armed forces - and
further stoke fears about the "China threat".
The prediction that the year 2009 could become a watershed for the PLA is
supported by growing evidence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership's
eagerness to show off the troops' state-of-the-art weaponry. During the
celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA Navy back in
April, authorities unveiled the first Chinese-made nuclear submarine to an
audience that included military delegations from 30-odd countries.
More sophisticated hardware, including jetfighters and missiles, are set to
dazzle the world at a gargantuan Tiananmen Square military parade scheduled for
the People's Republic 60th birthday on October 1. There is intense speculation
in Chinese online military forums that Hu and his generals want to take
advantage of the Barack Obama administration's just-announced moratorium on the
development of high-tech weapons to narrow the gap between the two nation's
combat capabilities.
At a CCP Politburo Study Session last month, Hu, who has chaired the
policy-setting Central Military Commission (CMC) since 2004, noted that the
authorities would do more to attract "high-caliber talent from society" as well
as "different types of talents" to military work. He also announced measures to
ensure that the next generation of military chieftains would be full of
"enthusiasm, initiative and creativity".
In senior-level reshuffles ongoing since early this year, Hu has broken new
ground by moving more officers from the academies, research institutes and
headquarters units to the frontline. According to the Southern Metropolitan
Daily, the CMC has, since April, rotated 33 high-level officers among the four
headquarter departments, the seven military commands, PLA academics and
institutes, the People's Armed Police (PAP) as well as headquarters and
grassroots units of the army, navy, air force and the Second Artillery or
Missile Corps.
For example, nine generals from departments in the headquarters have been
transferred to grassroots divisions and military academies, while seven
generals from academic and research institutions have been posted to frontline
service units. The official daily said this had the advantage of achieving a
"synthesis between military theory and practice, and between officers from
headquarters and those from the grassroots".
In an article released on the eve of Army Day, CMC vice chairman Guo Boxiong
asserted that the PLA had been able to nurture a corps of officers who were
"revolutionary, modernized and standardized". Guo saluted the rapid
"intellectualization" of officers as well as rank and file cadres. He disclosed
that 61% of PLA officers with the rank of "cadre" held college degrees or their
equivalents.
Yet Hu and his military colleagues have yet to tackle two organizational
problems within the barracks. One is that rejuvenation within the top brass has
severely lagged behind that in party and government departments. The average
age of the 10 CMC members is over 66; while that of the 14 heads - the
commanders and political commissars - of the seven military regions is 61.
To bring in new blood, Hu has adopted unconventional methods such as elevating
relatively junior officers to senior slots. For instance, the chief of staff of
the Shenyang Military Region, Lieutenant-General Hou Shusen, was promoted last
month to vice chief of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD). Normally, a
regional chief of staff has to become a regional vice commander and then
commander before being considered for this senior GSD post. Yet at 59, General
Hou only has six more years of active service before reaching the mandatory
retirement age.
An even more daunting challenge for military reform is cliquishness within the
top ranks. The so-called Gang of Princelings - a reference to the sons and
daughters of party elders - has occupied a sizeable portion of senior PLA
slots. This is despite the fact that owing to negative public sentiments about
"the revolutionary bloodline", the proportion of princeling cadres in the
party-and-government apparatus has declined over the years.
One needs only to look at the background of the three PLA officers who were
elevated to full generals last month: Political Commissar of the Chinese
Academy of Military Sciences Liu Yuan; Political Commissar of the Chengdu
Military Region Zhang Haiyang; and vice chief of the General Staff Ma Xiaotian.
They are the sons of former state president Liu Shaoqi, former politburo member
and senior general Zhang Zhen, and former dean of the PLA Political Academy Ma
Zaiyao, respectively.
Of particular significance to factional dynamics within the CCP is the fact
that Vice President Xi Jinping - himself a princeling - has a reasonably good
chance of being named CMC vice chairman at the CCP Fourth Plenary Session
scheduled for September. Since Xi is a probable successor to Hu upon the
latter's expected retirement from the politburo at the 18th CCP Congress of
2012, it is in accordance with party tradition that the 56-year-old
Fifth-Generation leader be inducted into the CMC at least a couple of years
before his elevation to the party chief position.
Due largely to recommendation by his father, former vice premier Xi Zhongxun,
Xi worked for three years as a secretary at the CMC General Office right after
graduation from Tsinghua University in 1979. Moreover, it is well known that Xi
has kept up intimate ties with fellow PLA princelings. Given that Hu and Xi are
heads of respectively the Communist Youth League Clique and the Gang of
Princelings, Hu has a vested interest in ensuring that there will be at least a
rough balance of power between the two power blocs even after his retirement.
An exacerbation of the princelings' grip over the PLA, however, would upset
this delicate balance.
At the same time, Hu has sought to bolster his support among the top brass by
promising extra civilian support in areas such as research and development of
weapons and infrastructure, especially transport and communications. These
massive resources are on top of the 15% or so budget boosts that have been
granted the PLA for the past decade.
The CMC chairman said last month that army development in China would be marked
by "the synthesis of the military and civilian [sectors], and of [the
requirements] of peace and war". "The concepts of a rich country and a strong
military should be unified," said Hu. "We will uphold the principle of joint
military-civilian development, and push forward the benevolent interplay
between national defense construction and economic construction."
This means, for example, that the planning of new civilian airports, highways,
and ports should take military requirements and applications into
consideration. And the fact that much of the research and development
expenditure for military hardware comes from the budgets of civilian government
departments is behind the widespread perception that the publicized PLA budget
only represents up to one-third of the actual outlay for China's defense
forces.
While the so-called pingzhan heyi ("synthesis of war and peace") dictum
was enunciated by chairman Mao Zedong when he invented guerrilla warfare in
rural China in the 1930s, Hu is the first military chief to have revived this
ideal in the age of reform.
Critics of the theory of "army-civilian fusion", however, have pointed out that
this will tend to make the Chinese military even more of a "state within a
state". They point to the fact that, compared with the situation in almost all
other countries, the PLA has enjoyed a disproportionately large share of
political and economic resources. In a Liberation Army Daily article dated
August 2, CMC vice chairman Guo again saluted the principle of "the party's
absolute leadership over the army".
"We shall resolutely abide by the instructions of the party Central Committee
and the Central Military Commission," Guo wrote. "We shall resolutely complete
all the tasks mandated by the party." Among the nine-man Politburo Standing
Committee, however, only Hu has the requisite authority to influence day-to-day
military operations.
As the Sichuan earthquake demonstrated, even such a senior cadre as Premier Wen
Jiabao had difficulty soliciting the full support of PLA and PAP divisions in
emergency situations. This perhaps explains why immediately after the
horrendous riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang on July 5, Hu had to drop out of the Group
of Eight meeting in Italy to hurry back to Beijing in order to direct military
operations against the "Uighur splittists".
The CCP leadership's less-than-stringent control over the top brass - and the
relentless aggrandizement of the PLA's clout - could engender concern
particularly among China's neighbors that hawkish elements within the defense
establishment could prod the nation into adopting an aggressive foreign policy.
Influential PLA theorists including National Defense University Professor Jin
Yinan - who was one of two experts to brief the Politburo last month on global
strategies - have noted that the PLA would play a pivotal role in China's
emergence as a world power.
Jin noted that "China's rise can never be accomplished in the midst of
nightingale songs and swallow dances" - a reference to the placid pleasures of
peacetime. Other military officers have urged tougher steps to resolve the
country's sovereignty disputes with Southeast Asian nations including Vietnam,
Malaysia and the Philippines.
The upside of the Hu leadership's support for fast-track military modernization
is that this could generate national pride among Chinese and boost
socio-political cohesiveness. The downside, however, is that a corps of
generals that is not subject to institutional checks and balances could have an
undue impact on the nation's foreign and even domestic policies. In conclusion,
even if CMC chairman Hu is successful in raising the caliber of the top brass,
the latter's preponderance in Chinese politics could worsen already serious
tensions between China and its neighbors.
Dr Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He
has worked in senior editorial positions in international media including
Asiaweek newsmagazine, South China Morning Post and the Asia-Pacific
Headquarters of CNN. He is the author of five books on China, including the
recently published Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders,
New Challenges. Lam is an Adjunct Professor of China studies at Akita
International University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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