A positive role for Sino-Western synergy
By David Gosset
One can describe the Eurasian dynamics in the form of a syllogism: instability
in Central and South Asia is a serious threat for the global village; the
direct and permanent stabilizing force at the heart of Eurasia is China;
therefore, Sino-Western synergy is the long-term solution to Inner Asia's
problems.
Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947) in the seminal Democratic Ideals and Reality
(1919) sought to see in maps "not merely the conventional boundaries
established by scraps of paper, but permanent physical opportunities". China's
Xinjiang is certainly about "permanent physical opportunities" and a
geopolitical variable of the highest importance. For Western strategists, it
is
urgent to rediscover Xinjiang's central position and to realize without
preconception or prejudice how its current dynamics are creating a new
configuration in Central and South Asia.
One cannot overestimate the centrality of Xinjiang described after World War II
by Owen Lattimore (1900-1989) as the "pivot of Asia" [1]. By contrast with
Lattimore's insight, the current paucity of Western strategic thinking on
Xinjiang is unfortunate, and the absence of a specific European strategic
reflection on China's Far West transformation is stunning given its
implications on Russia, the "Stans" and the Turkic Eurasian continuum.
Xinjiang covers a sixth of China's territory and is by far its largest
administrative division. From a European point of view, one tends to confine
China within what is relatively to Europe the "Far East", and by doing so, one
often fails to appreciate the Inner Asian dimension of the Chinese world.
Interestingly, when a Japanese scholar like Okakura Kakuzo (1862-1913) views
the Chinese as "agricultural Tartars" [2], he certainly integrates China's
Inner Asian dimension but falls into another extreme.
Under the long Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD) which gave to the Chinese world
lasting political and administrative forms, Xinjiang was just called "xiyu"
or the western region, and was referring to the land west of the famous
Dunhuang in today's Gansu province. During the Tang Dynasty (618-907) whose
role was unique in the fabric of the Chinese culture, approximately the same
huge area west of the Pass of the Jade Gate was called the "longyou circuit".
The name Xinjiang, which means new frontier, was given under the Qing Dynasty
(1644-1911).
Beyond the toponymic changes, one observes a recurring phenomenon: there are
interactions between China's Inner Asian strategic depth and its most glorious
periods. In 1932 in On Ancient Central-Asian Tracks the Hungarian,
archeologist Aurel Stein (1862-1943) rightly mentioned "the traditions of
China's great past as a Central-Asian power still protecting the peace of the
region".
A 21st-century analysis of Central Asia has to go beyond the "Great Game"
stereotype. Introduced first by the British intelligence officer Arthur Conolly
and immortalized by Rudyard Kipling [3], it was mainly the rivalry in Central
Asia between 19th-century superpower, the British Empire, and a rising Russia,
made to a certain extent possible by a decadent Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) and a
weak Republic of China (1912-1949). The game is well summarized by Conolly in
his fascinating Journey to the North of India (London, 1838):
Some
years must elapse before the Russians can themselves advance, or extend their
influence, to points whence they can make a fair start for the invasion of
India; but distant and uncertain though the danger may be, it certainly is one
that the British government should provide against, since the Russians can
still extend their power eastward, and since it is their policy to do so, in
order to the increase of their military and commercial ambition.
Today's configuration can not be more different. The British Empire is gone and
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia is facing extremely serious
difficulties. By 2050, Russia's population could be 100 million (142 million in
2008), and some predictions suggest that the number will be closer to 80
million. [4]
The "Great Game" or the "New Great Game" implies that Central Asia's components
are passive pawns in the hands of more powerful and distant entities. However,
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established in 2001 is showing that
Central Asia's actors have gained some degree of independence. But
fundamentally, China's re-emergence introduces a level of predictability
unknown in the nebulous "Great Game".
"Zhang Qian's Diplomacy" and not the Great Game is the framework apt to
describe Central Asia's current dynamics. Zhang Qian was a Han Dynasty diplomat
who, as an envoy of the Emperor Han Wudi, explored the Silk Road 14 centuries
before Marco Polo, and by doing so, gave China the basis of its strategic depth
in Inner Asia.
Not formulated as an official doctrine, not a predetermined strategy, "Zhang
Qian's Diplomacy" can be defined today as a posture induced by geography and
can be interpreted as the continuation of historical patterns. The pragmatic
and flexible opening up to the advantages and options that Inner Asia can offer
reaches now an unprecedented level of activity proportionate with China's
demography and comprehensive strength.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as national security advisor to US president
Jimmy Carter, wrote in the Grand Chessboard (1997): "Eurasia is the
chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played."
But Western analysts should pay attention to the fact that in Eurasia and
beyond, China does not really try to play chess but is more probably
spontaneously engaged in a series of moves congenial with its own understanding
of strategy.
Therefore, if one needs a strategy game metaphor, Weiqi (known as Go in
Japan) might be more appropriate. In the subtle and infinitely complex Weiqi,
nothing is written in advance - the board is empty when the game begins. One
does not have to checkmate the opponent, as only positions in relation to
others really matter. Weiqi is more about influence than confrontation. It is
certainly on a grand Weiqi board that "Zhang Qian's Diplomacy" is quietly
unfolding.
One aspect of "Zhang Qian's Diplomacy" is well described by China's current
ambassador in Kazakhstan, Cheng Guoping, when he declares to the Xinhua Agency
(August 22, 2009) that Xinjiang has to serve as a "bridgehead" and "logistics
center" for Chinese companies to export to Kazakhstan and the rest of Central
Asia. Another aspect of "Zhang Qian's Diplomacy" is the growing synergy between
China and Central Asia with the "Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline" and the future
"Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline".
"Zhang Qian's Diplomacy” is also in action through the SCO. In June 2009, at
the SCO Yekaterinburg summit, China announced plans to provide a US$10 billion
loan to SCO member states to help their struggling economies amid the global
financial crisis.
Xinjiang's stability and development, and beyond, the success of "Zhang Qian's
Diplomacy" are in the highest interest of the international community. The
massive Chinese investment in the gigantic Aynak copper mine project near Kabul
signals that "Zhang Qian's Diplomacy" also integrates South Asia. At a moment
when the AfPak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) concept is at the center of President
Barack Obama's military strategy, the US administration has to measure
Xinjiang's centrality and appreciate how combined Sino-Western efforts could
prevent extremism from taking over Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Wisely, Pakistan's former president Pervez Musharraf concluded his 2008 visit
in China by a stop in Xinjiang. After the July 5 riots, Pakistan President Asif
Ali Zardari expressed his support for China's policies in Xinjiang and played a
key role in dissuading Muslim countries from taking the issue to the
Organization of the Islamic Conference. China has provided US$1.5 billion to
Pakistan since 1998 and Beijing is presently involved in 120 projects in the
country with more than 10,000 Chinese engineers working on these projects.
Political stability, economic development and the emergence of modern societies
free from religious obscurantism have to be, at the heart of Eurasia,
Sino-Western common objectives.
It is time to look anew at a reopened Eurasia under the growing influence of
China's re-emergence. Some analysts still regard China's Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region as another source of instability in a larger zone of
disorder, the borderless "Jihadistan" at the heart of the Eurasian continent.
However, despite the July 5 tragedy which killed 197 people, Xinjiang will not
only help to sustain the energy demand of the world's largest developing
economy but "Zhang Qian's Diplomacy" will also prove to be the best guarantee
of stability in Central Asia. For those whose objective is long-term
geopolitical equilibrium, this is a dynamic to acknowledge, monitor and
support.
Notes
1. In Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and
Russia, 1950.
2. In The Ideals of The East, 1904.
3. "Now I shall go far and far into the North, playing the Great Game," Kim,
1901.
4. "Russia may be dying as a nation, and it faces a threat that no one will
talk about: AIDS," The New Yorker, October 11, 2004.
David Gosset is director of the Euro-China Center for International and
Business Relations at CEIBS, Shanghai, and founder of the Euro-China Forum.
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