China's navy sails past India's dock
By Peter J Brown
India learned to live with Chinese merchant ships in the Indian Ocean region
long ago, and even the Chinese vessel seized by pirates this week was bound for
India from South Africa. And yet, India is taking stock of the presence of
Chinese naval vessels in the Indian Ocean region. This development will
constitute a major headache for India as it unfolds - something altogether new
and unsettling.
Three Chinese PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels do not make a fleet, but they do make a
statement. By sending them to patrol off the coast of Somalia as part of the
multinational force, in effect, China simply is saying to India," We're back."
Just as it has done on India's northern border, where the number
of reported border incursions doubled to almost 300 from 2007 to 2008, China
has undertaken a series of actions in the Indian Ocean region which may not be
as menacing or confrontational as what has been underway along India's northern
border, but it suggests a shift in attitude in Beijing. In the process, these
not-so-subtle naval moves by China are proving to be far more than mere
distractions in New Delhi.
"For the first time ever in the western IOR [Indian Ocean region], India has
set up a listening post in Madagascar - a high-tech monitoring station in
northern Madagascar. This station is of great significance given its proximity
to [the port of] Gwadar [in Pakistan] as well as the Chinese increasing [their]
presence in the western IOR. Unlike in other countries of the region, China has
not made much headway in Madagascar," said Dr Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior
fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.
"The Chinese were quick to note how their lack of a maritime capacity to engage
in disaster relief and rescue during the 2004 tsunami also redounded in the
formation of an ad hoc maritime alliance between the US, Japan, Australia and
India to its detriment," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at
Samuels International Associates, Inc in Washington, DC.
"By appropriating capabilities in this disaster assistance and humanitarian
relief area as well as participating in global stakeholder activities such as
the Somalia anti-piracy mission, the PLAN seems to have cottoned on to a
convenient vehicle for regional and 'out of area' naval activity -
non-traditional security missions - without setting off alarm bells."
Beijing's resource-based diplomacy is emerging as a major challenge not only
for the US - in the Indian Ocean region and elsewhere - but for other major
players in Asia as well, including India.
"Energy security and hunger for other natural resources are the primary
motivating factors besides gaining strategic foothold in the IOR. The region
has about 40% of the world's oil and gas reserves and additionally the locus of
several important sea lines of communication [SLOCs, or the primary maritime
routes between ports]. Constraining India's growth aspirations and limiting its
potential in the South Asian region continue to be underlying objectives in
Chinese policies in several countries in the IOR such as Sri Lanka, Maldives
and Pakistan," said Rajagopalan.
Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Marao in the Maldives along
with another seaport site - or two - in Myanmar now serve as the nucleus for
China's so-called "string of pearls" strategy. Gwadar in particular offers
China a base of naval operations close to major energy transportation routes
from the Persian Gulf, according to Rajagopalan.
"While many of the Chinese moves [in the Indian Ocean region] may not be
overtly confrontational, they do create potential for tension between India and
China, Japan and China and so on. Beijing has consolidated its relations with
almost all of the IOR countries in the last few years," said Rajagopalan. "For
example, President Hu Jintao's recent visits to Mauritius and Seychelles were
about establishing a firm strategic foothold in these IOR states. Mauritius is
particularly important, given its proximity to Diego Garcia and the US military
presence there."
Despite much talk of this "string of pearls" strategy in the Indian Ocean
region, Gupta sees no compelling evidence of PLAN basing activities as yet
beyond port development activities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.
"Indeed, the recently retired top Indian foreign policy bureaucrat - Shiv
Shankar Menon - pointed this fact out very recently. Of course, the
apprehension persists that some of the maritime security dilemmas that prevail
in East and Southeast Asia will gravitate to the IOR and compound tensions,"
said Gupta.
Chinese shipping companies have maintained port operations on the Panama Canal
and even in Long Beach, California, for years, but while this trend is
disconcerting, it does not translate into any immediate overt military presence
or decisive strategic advantage. It does, however, enable China to conduct
naval intelligence, economic espionage and other related covert activities more
easily.
Gupta emphasizes that while China is raising the temperature in the Indian
Ocean region a notch, observers should avoid distorting or exaggerating the
scope of China's naval activities there.
"Their naval forces are heading 'out of area' for the first time in many
centuries and, paired with the poor communications skills of the Chinese
military, there are concerns within the region. But when compared to the PLA
Navy's [PLAN's] situation and activities in East and Southeast Asia - active
maritime territorial disputes; snooping in territorial waters; tangling with US
vessels in exclusive economic zones [EEZs] - the PLAN's current IOR activities
are relatively benign," said Gupta.
Chinese naval strategists subscribe to the view that naval power is truly a
representation of a country's comprehensive power. China cannot attain
greatness without being a full-fledged seafaring power, and yet, "The Chinese
do swimmingly free-riding on the back of US underwriting of the global
commons," said Gupta.
Meanwhile, any reading of the tea leaves on the Southeast Asian side of the
Indian Ocean region is difficult indeed.
"Some of the Southeast countries which are littoral states in the Indian Ocean
region also have been watchful of the increasing competition in the region.
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are becoming more aware of the consequences of
a potential major power conflict in the region and are becoming parties to
various regional and sub-regional groupings to mitigate the regional tensions,"
said Rajagopalan.
Singapore and Thailand, for instance, are already squaring off over the
long-discussed Kra Canal, which would provide a direct link between the South
China Sea and the Indian Ocean - bypassing the Straits of Malacca through which
an estimated 80% of China's oil now flows.
"China is a new enthusiastic partner [and a big potential investor in this
instance]. However, Singapore and the US remain opposed to the idea, for
different reasons. The US opposition has to do with the fact that it will
enable China to develop a much stronger influence in the region. This is a
concern shared by countries like India and Japan as well," said Rajagopalan.
If angered, certain of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN's) 10
countries could have an immediate adverse impact on China's naval operations,
quickly sealing off the Indian Ocean region.
"ASEAN, because of its proximity as well as its South China Sea disputes with
the PRC [People's Republic of China], has an especially lucid window to Chinese
naval practices. It has the inclination and the will to invite US forces to
bottle-up the Chinese navy in its own backyard if it was deemed to be acting
mischievously," said Gupta.
As for the role of former US bases in ASEAN nations, especially Subic Bay in
the the Philippines - once the site of a large US Navy base along with a US Air
Force base until the end of the Cold War - in support of Indian Ocean region
military operations, any return to Subic Bay by US military forces in large
numbers now seems farfetched.
"Already, given the perennial controversy that surrounds the Okinawa bases, a
return of US personnel in large numbers to any Southeast Asian base - short of
outright Chinese regional aggression or provocation - is likely be seen as an
unwelcome throwback to the past," said Gupta. "Given the recently agreed-upon
realignment of forces in Japan and additional forward positioning there of some
command functions as well as the availability of Guam, I think a Subic Bay
redeployment in this day and age of beyond-the-horizon capabilities is
superfluous."
Gupta recommends that if there are US needs beyond Japan and Guam, they are
probably best attained through joint pre-positioning sites, similar to what
exists in Singapore, "with additional contingency access to host-nation
facilities, but with only a skeletal American permanent presence on site".
In addition to engaging in an extensive schedule of joint exercises and
training, Singapore's level of cooperation with the US serves as a model here.
It offers the US vital logistical infrastructure, including aircraft carrier
dry-dock facilities, and pre-positioning of US equipment, among other things.
For years to come, the US will remain the dominant player in the Indian Ocean
region, while "India is likely to pick up some of the slack in the future and
be a reliable defender of regional maritime responsibilities. In its own
theater, Australia already is projected to commit greater naval assets, too,"
said Gupta.
On the other hand, greater Asian economic interests might prove to be a
powerful and quite unexpected catalyst for change in the Indian Ocean region.
"After all, in a significant way, the Chinese economic interest in the security
and stewardship of SLOCs is synonymous with India's as well as its ASEAN and
East Asian partners. Hence, cooperative great power initiatives including China
to safeguard the maritime commons and limit their mutual competitive tendencies
within a broader framework of cooperation is not beyond the realm of
possibility," said Gupta.
Losing the Indian Ocean region as a sphere of influence is not an option for
India under any circumstance. Sharing it is another matter entirely and India
would have to be far more trusting of China than it is now for such a scheme to
float.
Regardless, India cannot afford to become so narrowly focused on China's
blue-water aspirations because India has urgent coastal protection concerns as
well. The terror attack on the city of Mumbai last November demonstrated that
India's coastline is quite unprotected - the militants arrived by sea.
"One must reflect on the fact that India's lone aircraft carrier provided no
defense against the Mumbai attackers who after all infiltrated by sea from [the
Pakistani port city of] Karachi. Big ticket items and strategic deterrence and
power projection notwithstanding, it is coastal defenses and the unsexy
business of strengthening coast guard capabilities that is the crying need of
the hour," said Gupta.
Among other things, India still has considerable time to further develop and
deploy land-based naval aviation assets in a multi-layered defensive posture
using a forward-thinking approach. While borrowing certain elements from the
system that was deployed by the Russians to counter US carrier groups in the
western Pacific might make sense, the door is also open to a greater role for
unmanned aerial vehicles both for maintaining maritime domain awareness and
engaging in force projection.
India has room for "helicopter carriers" - both for defensive purposes and
rapid response to disasters throughout the Indian Ocean region - such as those
that Japan has been building lately and India has new space assets including a
new ocean surveillance satellite at its disposal.
India has much to sort out. Its reluctance to join the anti-piracy mission off
Somalia, and its attachment to big carriers with all their inherent littoral
vulnerabilities, might be easily explained, but agility and quick maneuvers
count as well when the chips are down. China may go on winning points and
gaining some ground in the Indian Ocean region, but India sits right in the
middle of it, and that geopolitical reality will not turn with the tide.
"The US is likely to play a greater role in the region, given the developments
of the past few years. Its military presence in Diego Garcia is likely to be
augmented in the coming years for several reasons, including the China factor,"
said Rajagopalan. "Additionally, it might be important for countries like India
and the US, as key players in the IOR, to strengthen their maritime
cooperation. Such cooperation could also involve other states such as Japan,
Australia and Singapore."
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the US state of Maine.
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