Thanks to a series of political reforms implemented by then-president Chiang
Ching-kuo in the late 1980s, Taiwan has gradually become a liberal democracy.
In the recent two decades, it saw its first democratically elected president,
Lee Teng-hui, in 1996, the first directly elected non-Kuomingtang (KMT)
president, Chen Shui-bian, in 2000, as well as the second democratic power
transition with the election of the current KMT president, Ma Ying-jeou, in
2008.
The advent of democracy for the first time in history in an ethnic Chinese
society not only marks the open-mindedness of Taiwanese statesmen, but also
calls for a broader range of democratization in greater China. Therefore, many
have wondered what implications a democratic Taiwan might have for the present
cross-strait relations, and whether or not the Taiwan-type
democracy could serve as a model for mainland China.
Playing the 'democracy card'
The term "democracy" has transcended its literal meaning and been used with
multiple purposes in the case of Taiwan. With the current ambiguity, Taiwanese
policymakers are eager to acquire recognition from the international community.
At the same time, they deploy the "democracy card" to establish a more just
political mechanism and a fairer social order to appease discontent from the
general public by endowing them the discourse power they seek. Moreover, the
democratic cover is also regarded as a superiority over mainland China in terms
of a political system and institutional guarantees.
First of all, democratization allows Taipei to enter the global "liberal
democratic community" of which Beijing is yet to be a member. To maintain
semi-official diplomatic relations with powerful stakeholders such as
Washington, it is essential for Taipei to hunt for ideological similarities
with those influential powers.
The Taiwan-based Republic of China (ROC) has longed for United Nations
membership ever since it was kicked out and substituted with the
Beijing-based People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971. As neither unification
with mainland China nor independence will likely occur in a near future, it is
more essential than ever for Taiwan to figure out an appropriate position in
the international community.
As a result, the "democracy card" is used to aggregate international sympathy
and ensure its de facto autonomy under Beijing's shadow. However, the
effectiveness of this maneuver is inevitably on the decline as major powers,
specifically the US, possess little will to provoke mainland China by
supporting or even acquiescing to Taiwan's efforts to accelerate its way
towards independence.
When it comes to the core interests of those important stakeholders who
have, or want to have, a say in Taiwan's future, the interests of this tiny
island are likely to be ignored or sacrificed for overall harmony, particularly
under the current condition when both the United States and China tend to sail
in the same boat on a variety of issues.
What is more, the "democracy card" fails to either solicit majority support at
home or remove threats from Beijing. As the Taiwanese middle class group is the
"silent majority" and strategically prefers the "middle way" over extremes,
democratization could hardly generate sufficient echoes from citizens. In
addition, as Taiwan is a fledgling democracy and therefore possesses various
deficiencies, its performance in maintaining social justice is still far from
satisfactory.
Similar to transitioning democratic systems in other East Asian governments,
Taiwan also sufferers the immaturity and ambiguity at this infant stage of its
democratization. The power struggle in Taiwan's domestic politics has never
come to an end, while competition between the two major parties, say the KMT
and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has turned increasingly vicious.
The detention of the former president Chen Shui-bian due to alleged corruption,
money laundering and abuse of power partly demonstrates the glamour of
democracy in supervising and punishing everyone within society, and partly
reveals the deficiencies of the Taiwanese brand of democracy which allowed such
a scandal-laden president to stay in power for as long as eight years.
Therefore, the utilization of this seemingly omnipotent "democracy card"
entails tremendous political wisdom and caution to avoid any unexpected
catastrophes.
A democracy reference for Beijing?
Based on the young democratization in Taiwan, the appeal of democracy,
therefore, is not impressive enough to serve as a trigger for echoes from the
mainland. Beijing, on the contrary, frequently laughs at the chaotic democratic
governance in Taipei.
State-owned media groups in China are particularly fond of capturing turbulent
power struggles in Taipei's Legislative Yuan, the primary legislature, in terms
of both verbal squabbles and physical fights. As mouthpieces of the ruling
communist government, domestic media in mainland-China intentionally reveal
shortcomings of the democratic transition in Taiwan and indirectly eulogize the
superiority of their one-party system. Therefore, at least in regards to the
present status, political reforms in Taiwan have not yet yielded any profound
outcomes for democratization in its counterpart across the Taiwan Strait.
On the one hand, Taipei enjoys economic cooperation with mainland China. The
mainland has become the largest trade partner of Taiwan in both imports and
exports. Especially in the current financial crisis, Taipei is more likely to
de-emphasize its differences with the mainland in terms of ideological notions
and political modes. Democracy is nothing more than a slogan when fundamental
interests, including but not limited to economic interdependencies, are
critically affected.
Even though the respect for democracy and human rights is among the core values
of a democratized Taiwan, decision-makers on the island have become
increasingly realistic and have adopted a more practical strategy in dealing
with its long-standing cross-strait rival. Substantial detente across the
strait has come since Beijing-friendly Ma Ying-jeou took office in May.
Soon after Ma's inauguration, the long-debated "three direct links" of mail,
transportation and trade across the strait were finally established.
Interactions between the sides have ranged from food safety and financial
cooperation to even "panda diplomacy".
Last month, Taipei firmly rejected the entry of Rebiya Kadeer, president of the
World Uyghur Congress, for the reason that the latter maintained close
relations with terrorist groups. However, it is generally believed that the
most pertinent explanation of this rejection is that Rebiya is regarded by
Beijing as the behind-the-scenes manipulator of the July 2009 Urumqi riots.
Therefore, Taipei's fear of harming the current detente across the strait
forced it to stay away from politically sensitive figures such as Rebiya.
During Chen Shui-bian's term, Taiwan hosted a variety of political dissidents
from mainland China. However, Ma did not follow his predecessor in this issue
and has implemented a more politically reasonable and procedurally realistic
approach. Ma is indeed seeking a balance between domestic opposition from the
DPP and pressures from the mainland to pave a both politically stable and
economically favorable way for Taiwan's future.
To gain support from Beijing on a variety of issues, particularly those related
to more "international space", Taipei is intentionally downplaying the
"democracy card" and seeking common ground with its cross-strait counterpart.
On the other hand, it is not likely that Beijing will be subject to any
external pressure in its democratic transformation. Some within the Zhongnanhai
compound - central headquarters for the Communist Party in Beijing - are even
considering popularizing the China model of development with other developing
nations.
Many in the decision-making community do not recognize the superiority of
liberal democratic systems in the West and persistently insist that China
should adopt a unique approach in advancing its own democratization. The
multi-party mechanism is unhesitatingly rejected as inner-party democracy is
favored.
Indeed, present-day China has transformed from the strongman politics under Mao
Zedong to collective leadership under a group of statesmen framing critical
policies together in both domestic governance and diplomatic relations. The
decision-making circle in China is extremely complicated and Beijing is not
likely to succumb to any external pressures.
Conclusion
The "democracy" factor is always an important element in cross-strait
relations. Ever since the launch of democratic reforms in the early 1990s,
Taiwan has been proud to grow into the first democracy in an ethic Chinese
society.
During the same timeframe, the utilization of "democracy" as a card by Taipei
has been consistently used to both gain more international recognition
and boost domestic support. What is more, the island is also trying to
demonstrate its superiority over its long-standing cross-strait rival in terms
of political system and institutional guarantee.
However, it is not likely that the supposed superiority will genuinely become a
catalyst for political reforms in mainland China. On the one hand, as economic
ties across the strait substantially deepen, Taiwan hardly dares to challenge
any status quo by deploying its "democracy card". On the other hand,
democratization in mainland China is a tremendous and formidable project that
entails sophistication, patience and tolerance.
Beijing is on its way to seek the best approach that could accommodate both
one-party rule and power restrictions within the party. Therefore, it is very
unlikely that Beijing will be subject to any external pressures, including the
stimulus from Taipei, on its own way towards democratization.
Erdong Chen is a student and freelancer based at American University,
Washington DC.
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