BEIJING - The Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, recently visited
Tawang Monastery in Arunachal Pradesh, a move that has re-ignited the dispute
between China and India over this contested border area.
The area is divided into three parts: western, central and eastern. The central
portion is the least contentious and bilateral talks have registered the
highest level of agreement here. The western and the eastern parts are
troublesome. The western part is occupied by the Chinese but claimed by the
Indians; the eastern part, conversely, is occupied by the Indians but claimed
by the Chinese. In theory, the two sides could swap claims - the Indians could
recognize the Chinese occupied territory in the west and
the Chinese could do the same with the Indians in the east.
However, things are more complicated in reality. In the west, China holds an
area of Kashmir leased to Beijing by Pakistan (part of the Tibetan plateau
known as Aksai Chin), something that strengthens the Pakistani claim to Kashmir
and involves the generally thorny issue of Kashmir, a divided territory that
has caused decades of wars and friction between India and Pakistan.
A China-India agreement in that area would weaken the Pakistani hand in the
region and with India, and would betray decades of bilateral friendship.
Furthermore, China-Pakistan ties are important and useful to help find a
solution to the Afghanistan problem. Still, China might not be totally opposed
to the idea of swapping recognition in order to improve bilateral ties.
The issue of Arunachal Pradesh is somewhat similar. The region is historically
part of Tibet, held by India after independence in 1947. It was largely
occupied by advancing Chinese troops in 1962 after the defeat of the Indian
army in the war of that year. Yet the Chinese withdrew after the victory
without occupying new territory. That proves that China has no real appetite
for Arunachal Pradesh, otherwise it would have held it then.
Still that episode has also deeply marked bilateral relations. The Chinese do
not take seriously the prospects of the Indian threat - they beat the Indians
during one of the worst times of Chinese history, right after the huge
catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward, which killed over 30 million people and
left hundreds of millions starving. The Indians conversely felt bitterly stung
by that defeat, which proved the reality of the Chinese threat to India and
reinforced the feeling of being encircled and besieged by China in the north
and Pakistan (China's friend) to the west.
The Indian sense of siege was boosted in later years as Myanmar tilted towards
China, while the Chinese sense of superiority over India was also underscored
by looking at India's fractious domestic political, religious and social
controversies. Clashes between Hindus and Muslims, conflicts between Hindus and
Christians and the spread of radical neo-Maoist guerillas in impoverished
tribal areas gave Beijing the idea that India was too fragile internally to be
a real strategic competitor to China. The real issue for Beijing is not how to
prevail over New Delhi, but how to prevent India from falling apart.
This knotty and sensitive border predicament is further complicated by the
Dalai Lama's recognition of the Indian claim over Tawang, home of the largest
Buddhist monastery in India. On the face of it, this "cession" by the Dalai
Lama looks like the Pakistani lease of a section of Kashmir to China; however,
it is somewhat different and more delicate.
First, it introduces an issue of territoriality that could have helped bring
China and the Dalai Lama together. For instance, Beijing and Taipei control
different islands of the South China Sea, yet Taipei, like Beijing, claims the
whole area. In other words, the two governments have issues with each other but
no difference about territorial claims in the South China Sea - something that
reinforces a sense of unity.
On the issue of Tawang, however, the Dalai Lama and Beijing hold different
views - and that worsens the Tibet issue. Moreover, some Chinese feel that
there are Indians trying to play the Dalai Lama card against Beijing, and the
Dalai Lama's "cession" of Tawang to New Delhi reinforces the Dalai Lama's claim
of political power over all of Tibet. It is just like the Chinese holding a
portion Kashmir, which reinforces the Pakistani claim over all of Kashmir,
including the part administered by India.
If the geography of the issue is then so intricate, the real redefinition of
the China-India border requires broad yet separate solutions: one on Kashmir
between China and India that includes Pakistan, and another on Arunachal
Pradesh between China and India that includes Tibet.
In this puzzle, the weak element is that Tibet is not an independent state,
like Pakistan; ii is an autonomous region of China. Thus, at least in theory,
everybody would like to see a solution to the Kashmir issue, which could also
help create a solution in Afghanistan and stabilize Pakistan - but the same is
not true in Arunachal Pradesh.
On what grounds does the Dalai Lama recognize India's sovereignty over Tawang?
Is the Dalai Lama the recognized political ruler of Tibet? Is Tibet his to give
in whole or in part to India or anybody else? The answers to these questions
are, to say the least, highly controversial. Therefore, the Dalai Lama's role
in Tawang can't be as politically strong as Pakistan's role in Kashmir, and
this is true also for the Indians, who never disputed Chinese sovereignty over
Tibet, and thus can't politically use the Dalai Lama's concession of Tawang to
India.
Certainly, the Dalai Lama's involvement in the China-India border issue could
enhance his political profile by placing him in the middle of possibly the most
sensitive territorial issue in the world - one between the two global
demographic superpowers.
Then, the politically incorrect topic - the one thing that is hard to discuss
because of the Dalai Lama's international stature - is that the Dalai Lama's
involvement in Arunachal Pradesh further confuses the Indian border issue with
China; and India knows that solving the border issue (something it is very keen
on doing) also means further undermining the Dalai Lama's political aspirations
in Tibet.
While in the short term the Dalai Lama's involvement may help India's hand, in
the long term, for a solution to the border issue, the Dalai Lama will have to
be removed from this political equation. The same is even truer for the Dalai
Lama. For him, getting in the middle of this thorny issue may earn him some
short-term gains. In the medium- and long-term, however, it weakens his
position with China, India and the international community, as nobody will
seriously support his political claim and thus his cession of Tawang or part of
Tibet.
For China, the political position best fitting its interests is the one it
appears to be taking now, after some hesitation: to downplay the role of the
Dalai Lama in India and brush aside his moves as irrelevant and unimportant in
order to put down his political value in any China-India border bargains. This
bargaining would take years in normal times, but the present American necessity
to find a quick political solution in Afghanistan - involving also Pakistan,
India and China - could press all relevant parties to get their act together on
many problems, including border disputes.
In his imminent visit to Beijing, United States President Barack Obama will
talk to the Chinese of their possible involvement in Afghanistan, and both
parties will be fully aware that this involves also the issue of Pakistan,
India, Kashmir and thus the whole China-Indian frontier.
Meanwhile, this whole game, in the end, might further harm the Dalai Lama's
cause so that - short of an unlikely break in hostilities between China and
India - he could be sooner or later squeezed and sacrificed on the altar of a
grand Asian reconciliation starting from Afghanistan.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
