A disturbing article entitled "How the United States Lost the Naval War of
2015" describes China's destruction of a US aircraft carrier, the USS George
Washington, in the East China Sea. This fictitious account appears in
the current issue of Orbis, a leading US foreign affairs quarterly published by
the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, and shows how easily it
is to generate a stark, one-sided portrayal of China as a hostile state ready
to pounce.
Author James Kraska, a former adviser to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff's
director of strategic plans and policy, is currently working at the Marine
Policy Center at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.
While Kraska makes many valid points, it is not what he is trying
to say in his article that matters, but how he says it.
By endorsing the concept that China is contemplating acts of war, including a
surprise attack on the US Navy in the near future, Kraska is ending 2009 on a
very sour and controversial note.
The author is not breaking new ground by highlighting the increasing
vulnerability of the US Navy and emphasizing that US aircraft carriers could be
caught off guard in a surprise attack by China. These are concerns that are
openly acknowledged and frequently discussed.
The abstract is sobering.
Abstract: Years of strategic missteps in
oceans policy, naval strategy and a force structure in decline set the stage
for US defeat at sea in 2015. After decades of double-digit budget increases,
the People's Liberation Army (Navy) was operating some of the most impressive
systems in the world, including a medium-range ballistic missile that could hit
a moving aircraft carrier and a super-quiet diesel electric submarine that was
stealthier than US nuclear submarines. Coupling this new asymmetric naval force
to visionary maritime strategy and oceans policy, China ensured that all
elements of national power promoted its goal of dominating the East China Sea.
The United States, in contrast, had a declining naval force structured around
10 aircraft carriers spread thinly throughout the globe.
With a maritime strategy focused on lower order partnerships, and a national
oceans policy that devalued strategic interests in freedom of navigation, the
stage was set for defeat at sea. This article recounts how China destroyed the
USS George Washington in the East China Sea in 2015. The political fallout from
the disaster ended 75 years of U.S. dominance in the Pacific Ocean and cemented
China's position as the Asian hegemony.
Perhaps the former PLA
chief naval commander, Admiral Liu Huaqing, who branded the 21st century
China's "century of the sea", is the one responsible for opening this can of
worms.
Because US President Barack Obama has been talking recently about potential
US-China cooperation in space, and because reports of alleged acts of Chinese
economic espionage in the US are on the rise, the US public is exposed to all
sorts of conflicting messages about China and its intentions.
In this case, the editor of Orbis, Mackubin (Mac) Owens who is an associate
dean and professor of national security affairs at the US Naval War College
prepares the reader for Kraska's article in his "Editor's Corner" by saying
Obama has opened a dangerous new chapter in US history.
"Unlike his predecessors from both parties since World War II, President Obama
has embarked on a grand strategy that seems to relegate the United States to
the status of just 'one among many.' The president has firmly rejected the idea
of American particularism and the status of the United States as the
indispensable nation," Owens wrote. "This is a radical shift and a dangerous
one. Of course President Obama, like his predecessors, also desires peace and
prosperity, but he will discover that the liberal world order that provides
peace and prosperity does not arise spontaneously. It must be underwritten by
American power."
This statement might have been on target a few months ago, but today, Obama and
senior members of his administration may be rethinking and gradually revising
their overall approach to foreign policy.
The "discovery" that Owens discusses may have already taken place. Not seen as
having hawk credentials in the past, Obama has taken a few tiny steps in that
direction. His decision to send more troops into Afghanistan is seen as
evidence that he is inclined to rethink his stance.
"With perhaps the sole exception of Jimmy Carter, President Obama's
predecessors have recognized that the key to peace and prosperity is for the
United States to maintain a dominant power position. The twin objectives of
this grand strategy have been to underwrite a liberal world order by providing
security, while preventing the emergence of a potential new rival along the
lines of the former Soviet Union," Owens wrote. "American primacy is based on
the assumption that US power is good not only for the United States itself but
also for the rest of the world."
Kraska uses his fictitious scenario to question the scope of this US power in
the following statement about the US Navy's strategy and planning.
"When China acted, it was the culmination of a patient and focused national
plan to couple naval technology and resources to a corresponding political,
legal and diplomatic strategy in the oceans. The US Naval force plans had been
in disarray for decades. The nation was implementing a 'cooperative' naval
strategy designed for peace - preventing brushfire wars rather than deterring
great power conflict," Kraska wrote.
In disarray for decades? The US Navy may not be not perfect but it outperforms
all other navies on a daily basis. A country might want to think twice before
doing anything that might result in the US Navy demonstrating that its force
planning efforts have been relatively sound and comprehensive over the past few
years. The US Navy is and will remain a remarkably responsive and formidable
fighting force at sea despite the best efforts of some critics to highlight its
deficiencies and failings.
Despite China's habit of displaying regional muscle and restlessness, the type
of attack which invites and requires immediate escalation seems farfetched at
best.
China's experience with a devastating war on its own soil - a past it shares
with Russia - helps to explain why both routinely refuse to accept anything
remotely hostile on or close to their borders or coasts.
Like many others who spend much of their time immersed in naval and maritime
matters, Kraska fails to include any important information about the possible
role and formidable might of the US Air Force and the US Army, let alone US
land-based strategic forces in general. This is a major flaw in his article.
"B-2 bombers repositioned to Guam," is Kraska's lone remark about a
hypothetical US Air Force response here.
Any attack of this magnitude by China would require swift and simultaneous
attacks by China against a minimum of two other countries, Japan and the
Republic of Korea. The list is actually greater because certainly India, and
perhaps Australia and Vietnam - joined by other Association of Southeast Asian
Nations including Singapore - would be compelled to act. Add Taiwan here, too.
Kraska sprinkles his article with passages such as this one: "The United States
Navy was living off its legacy. The incessant search for naval 'partnerships' -
'no nation can do it alone' - was tacit recognition that President Reagan's
600-ship Navy was a shell of its former glory. The country lay under the
illusion of naval superiority, but it was a mirage."
A mirage? This is very wide of the mark. The US Navy of today is no doubt
suffering from multi-mission overload, but to say it maintains an "illusion of
naval superiority" is to suggest that someone else's navy is superior. If
Kraska sees China filling this role globally, or any other country for that
matter, he does not back this claim up.
Would the US Navy suffer losses in a surprise attack? Of course, no question
about it.
Because the author is a former adviser to the US Department of Defense, the
underlying message and consequences of his writing cannot be divorced entirely
from his prior affiliation. Orbis is a highly regarded publication.
A recent exchange in Vietnam needs to be mentioned. It illustrates how quickly
talk of war - even when done with very little or no substantiation whatsoever
via the Internet - can inflame an audience as well as shape discussions between
countries.
These excerpts come from a lengthy interview last month in Hanoi. Sun Guoqiang,
China's ambassador to Vietnam, was asked a series of questions by VietNamNet
Chief Editor Nguyen Anh Tuan.
Tuan: The Vietnamese people are friendly
with the Chinese people. The Party, government and people are always put great
efforts into maintaining friendship with China.
[Some] Chinese websites posted articles that have a negative effect on the
bilateral relationship. Sina.com published a plan for a 31-day attack on
Vietnam.
Have the Chinese leaders a means to put an end to this situation?
Ambassador Sun: Both countries have people who release inappropriate and
irresponsible information about the relationships between the two countries on
the Web.
The point of view of the Chinese Party and Government in this issue is very
clear. We aim to deal with this issue. We have been, and we still are, guiding
the media to publish information that is appropriate to the relationship,
stories that promote our bilateral relations.
Tuan: It's just a shame that a big website like Sina.com posts stories like
that from time to time. [Earlier he specifically accused The Global Times, an
English-language spinoff of People's Daily, of publishing content that
denigrated Vietnam, too.]
Ambassador Sun: [These] are personal speeches, not the position of the Chinese
Government. Vietnam also has blogs that post articles inappropriate to the
bilateral ties between the two countries. Luckily, the viewpoints of (both
governments are) to further (promote) bilateral relationships.
Vietnam,
by the way, announced this week that it is buying patrol boats, frigates,
submarines, and aircraft from Russia, among other things. Specifically, Vietnam
will spend almost US$6 billion to acquire six super-quiet Kilo-class Project
636 diesel-electric submarines, which are designed for stealthy operations in
shallow seas.
The point here is that the Vietnamese are alarmed by the signals that a few
Chinese are sending, and demand that something be done about it.
The reaction that this article is going to engender is unknown. However, count
on it being a strong one. China and the US already have a rocky relationship
that will require constant attention in order to minimize the risk of conflict.
One does not have to sink a US aircraft carrier in the East China Sea to call
attention to this.
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the US state of Maine.
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