China shuffles military and security leadership
By Willy Lam
China's president and commander-in-chief, Hu Jintao, has reshuffled the
leadership of China's military and security forces to speed up rejuvenation and
raise the efficiency and combat-readiness of the generals. The supremo also
wants to ensure the officers' loyalty to the Hu, or Communist Youth League
(CYL), faction, which is the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) dominant clique.
The quality of the top brass has assumed critical importance because, at a time
of growing socio-political instability, the
military forces are playing an increasing role in maintaining order and
upholding the CCP's "perennial ruling party status".
Since the October 1 National Day military parade, dozens of senior appointments
in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the quasi-military People's Armed
Police (PAP) - both of which report to the Central Military Commission (CMC)
headed by Hu - have been announced by the official media. Given the party's
reliance on the PAP to crack down on "the three evil forces of separatism,
terrorism and religious extremism" across the nation, high-level personnel
changes at the PAP deserve special attention.
In late December, Lieutenant General Wang Jianping was appointed PAP commander.
The 56-year-old Wang replaced General Wu Shuangzhan, 64, who is retiring after
having served a record 10 years as head of the paramilitary force. Wang and
about two dozen officers were promoted in what the Chinese media described as
one of the largest reshuffles since the PAP was set up in 1983.
A native of Hebei province, Wang is deemed a protege of Hu's. A fast-rising
star within the military and security establishment, Wang was elevated two
times in 2009 - from PAP chief of staff to vice commander, then to commander.
Like most senior PAP staffers, Wang began his career in the regular army. His
career might have benefited most from having served as commander of the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) PAP from 1996 to 2000.
With conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang expected to remain unpredictable for the
near future, the PAP is Beijing's main weapon in thwarting "splittist"
activities in China's vast western flank. Moreover, experience in Tibet - where
Hu served from 1988 to 1992 as party secretary - is deemed critical for senior
military and security cadres.
It is perhaps not coincidental that the newly minted party secretary of the
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, Hu Chunhua, 46 - the most senior-ranked
among Sixth-Generation cadres - also earned his spurs in the TAR. Both Wang and
Hu Chunhua (who is not related to Hu Jintao) have impressed the president with
their ability to "nip the destabilizing forces in the bud".
In addition to Wang, eight other senior PAP headquarters staff recently
received their commissions from the CMC. They include the deputy commander,
Lieutenant General Xue Guoqiang, the chief of the general staff, Major General
Niu Zhizhong, and the director of the Political Department, Major General Wei
Liang. Quite a number of these newly elevated officers have college degrees in
addition to diplomas from military academies. Xue, 58, for instance, is a
graduate of the elite Nanjing Political Academy.
Equally significant are reshuffles of provincial PAP commanders and political
commissars. Within China's 31 provincial-level PAP brigades, nine commanders
and 15 political commissars have been named since last autumn. Personnel shifts
in regions plagued by ethnic strife have attracted the most attention. Soon
after the July 5, 2008 Urumqi riots, Xinjiang PAP vice commander Major General
Chi Baowen was promoted commander. Chi's predecessor, Major General Dai Sujun,
was given a lateral transferal to PAP headquarters.
Dai, who had become Xinjiang PAP chief just nine months earlier, had to vacate
his post to take political responsibility for the uncontrolled outbreak of
violence in the summer. While his new position - vice chief of staff at PAP
headquarters - did not amount to a demotion, it seems clear that the career of
the 54-year-old officer has been dealt a big blow.
Personnel changes in the four headquarters of PLA units - the General Staff
Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics
Department and the General Equipment Department (GED) - as well as major
divisions reflect the strict implementation of the retire-at-65 regulation for
generals.
As in the case of the PAP, the CMC has rewarded PLA officers who boast solid
academic and professional credentials, including long stints in renowned
military institutes. Examples include GPD vice director, Lieutenant General
Tong Shijing, who was formerly political commissar at the National Defense
University; and the assistant GPD director, Lieutenant General Nian Fuchun, who
is a former vice political commissar at the Academy of Military Sciences.
Exceptionally qualified officers were given double promotions. Thus, Major
General Niu Hongguang, a chief of staff at the GED, was elevated to GED vice
director; and Lieutenant General Hou Shusen, a chief of staff of the Shenyang
Military Region, was moved to the post of vice chief of the general staff, the
number two slot at the GSD.
Several rising stars had distinguished themselves in unconventional campaigns,
such as the reconstruction of Sichuan province after the devastating earthquake
of May 2008. This reflected a just-issued CMC directive on the fact that the
PLA must boost its capacity in mobilization and operations that are not related
to military combat.
Given the fact that China has not been at war since 1979, large-scale maneuvers
ranging from combating natural disasters to fighting pirates in international
waters have given up-and-coming officers an ideal platform to prove their
mettle. For example, the new vice chief of the general staff, Lieutenant
General Sun Jianguo, and the new assistant chief of the general staff, Major
General Qi Jianguo, had impressed the CMC with their leadership of relief and
rebuilding projects in Sichuan.
From the perspective of factional politics, it is significant that Hu is
speeding up personnel changes in the defense and security establishment in the
run-up to the 18th Party Congress in 2012. A key goal of the CMC chairman is to
dilute the stranglehold that "princelings" - the sons of party elders - have on
a sizeable number of top slots in the PLA and the PAP.
After all, the so-called Gang of Princelings, which is headed by Vice President
Xi Jinping, is deemed the clique that will give the most competition to the CYL
faction in the coming decade or so. The strength of the Gang of Princelings is
demonstrated by the fact that quite a few of the freshly elevated officers are
the sons of illustrious party elders and generals.
They include General Zhang Haiyang, the political commissar of Chengdu Military
Region, who was made political commissar of the Second Artillery Corps, or the
Strategic Missile Forces, last month. Zhang is the son of General Zhang Zhen, a
former politburo member and CMC vice chairman. Another princeling who just won
promotion is the assistant chief of the general staff, Major General Chen Yong.
His father is the former commander of the Shandong Military District, General
Chen. The CYL Faction, by contrast, is thinly represented, if at all, in the
PLA and the PAP.
According to unpublicized decisions made at the 17th Party Congress of 2007,
Vice President Xi, 56, the most senior-ranked among China's Fifth-Generation
leaders, is slated to take over the post of party general secretary and state
president from Hu at and soon after the 18th Party Congress. However, Xi's
failure to be made a CMC vice chairman at the Fourth Central Committee Plenum
last September has fed speculation that Hu will hang on to his CMC chairmanship
beyond the 18th CCP Congress.
"Xi's delayed entry into the CMC suggests that Hu Jintao would like to remain
in charge of the military a few years past his retirement from the party
general secretary's position in 2012," said Northwestern University Sinologist,
Professor Victor Shih. "Hu would like to maintain power in order to place
trusted followers from the CYL system in important [party and state] positions.
This is especially important for Hu as the influence of princelings is growing
rapidly in China." [1]
Apart from personally selecting the country's top PLA and PAP officers, Hu has
effectively raised his prestige among the top brass by giving the forces
double-digit annual budgetary boosts - as well as repeatedly raising the
salaries and fringe benefits of military personnel. Last month, the CMC
approved unprecedented four-fold and six-fold increases in insurance payouts to
soldiers who died in the course of duty, and those honored as "martyrs"
respectively.
Anxiety to win over the generals, however, may run counter to the goal of
streamlining and modernizing the military structure. For instance, the
long-contemplated abolition of the seven regional commands of the ground
forces, deemed a relic of Maoist-era military thinking, has been delayed owing
to the top brass's opposition to the likely curtailment of a slew of senior
positions. In the final analysis, Hu and the CCP leadership must strike a
balance between maintaining the generals' loyalty and nurturing a leaner, more
professional defense corps that can effectively uphold national security.
Note
1. Author's interview with Professor Victor Shih, January 2, 2010.
Dr Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a senior fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He
has worked in senior editorial positions in international media including
Asiaweek newsmagazine, South China Morning Post, and the Asia-Pacific
Headquarters of CNN. He is the author of five books on China, including the
recently published Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New
Challenges. Lam is an adjunct professor of China studies at Akita International
University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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