Page 1 of 2 US seeks to turn China over Iran sanctions
By Peter Lee
A flurry of recent diplomacy has centered on the United States' drive to have a
further round of United Nations sanctions slapped on Iran over its nuclear
program on concern that it might not be solely for peaceful purposes; something
Tehran consistently denies.
The most magnificent gesture, according to a report in the UK's Telegraph
newspaper on February 28 [1], was made by Tehran:
Seeking to undermine
[sanctions] efforts, Iran on Sunday presented Russia with two rare Persian
leopards - a gift personally solicited by Vladimir Putin, the Russian prime
minister.
However, it will take more than exotic livestock to
derail the US-led drive to sanction Iran. In recent days, the focus has shifted
to
Asia as Iran has lobbied Japan and the United States has finally turned its
attention to China. However, the risks to China of the Iran sanctions campaign
are clear, and the case for how it benefits Beijing have been made poorly and
unpersuasively.
After the Barack Obama administration's two top China hands, James Steinberg
and Jeffrey Bader, visit Beijing this week, the world may learn if the US has
been able to crack the China puzzle.
If Steinberg and Bader fail, there is the danger that China will play the
spoiler, both on Iran sanctions and at a conference in New York in May on
reforms to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Obama
administration sees as a set piece of its anti-proliferation-centered foreign
policy.
Iran last week sent a high-level delegation to Japan, headed by the speaker of
the Iranian parliament, Ali Larijani, previously Iran's top nuclear negotiator,
in search of a potential crack in the West's united front. Instead of leopards,
it offered discussions on enrichment and cooperation in civilian nuclear
energy.
The Iranians may have thought Japan would be interested in proactive nuclear
diplomacy in light of its history as a victim of atomic attacks, and because a
Japanese citizen, Yukiya Amano, is now head of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).
However, according a Japanese report, the Iranian delegation received little
comfort as Japan didn't seem interested in undercutting Amano's position at the
IAEA. Note that Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada called on Iran to "end'' - not
"suspend" - its enrichment activities:
Okada told Larijani on Wednesday
that he hopes Tehran will take steps to regain the trust of the international
community and end its nuclear enrichment activities.
"If a resolution against Iran is passed in the UN Security council, there is
little that Japan can do but to abide by it," local media reported Okada
telling Larijani. "And there is little time left to prevent this from
happening." [2]
Little time, indeed.
Despite a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm by China, Brazil, and even Russia for
"crippling" sanctions, and a widespread attitude that more "jaw-jaw" inside the
IAEA is preferable to a destabilizing combination of UN Security Council and
bilateral and multilateral sanctions, the campaign for sanctions gained
momentum with the leaking of a critical IAEA report on Iran's nuclear program
in mid-February.
The Obama administration hopes the sanctions campaign will rush ahead at a
speed designed to confound and confuse Tehran and Beijing.
The second stage of the campaign - whisking the Iran nuclear debate out of the
IAEA and back to the Security Council - may have already happened.
The IAEA is in the hands of the new, reliably pro-Western director general
Amano. Members of the skeptical IAEA Safeguards Department who felt
marginalized under the previous head, Mohamed ElBaradei, now drive reporting on
Iran, and Iran-friendly nations are a dwindling minority on the board of
governors, which is at present meeting in Vienna.
Amano has removed the IAEA from the sanctions line of fire by writing his
report and kicking the Iran question up to the Security Council, thereby
sidestepping contentious debate by its board and avoiding (or at least papering
over) the rifts and angry arguments that characterized the ElBaradei years.
This is an approach that the West - eager to eliminate the inconvenience of the
IAEA filter - is apparently very happy to endorse.
Western diplomats served notice that Amano's critical report on Iran, already
leaked, would probably be sufficient grounds for UN Security Council
discussions, without any enabling decision by IAEA governors.
From Agence France-Presse:
Diplomats close to the UN watchdog say the
IAEA's 35-member board is unlikely to censure the Islamic republic over its
contested nuclear work, despite some blunt words by Amano in his first report
on the matter.
But the four-day meeting, also the first since Amano took over the reins on
December 1, could well pave the way for a new round of sanctions by the
Security Council, the diplomats say. "Fundamentally speaking, the issue is
currently more one for New York rather than here," one western diplomat told
AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity. [3]
If the West is
successful in sidelining the IAEA, it will wrong-foot Iran and China, which
have consistently pursued a strategy of bottling up the argument inside the
IAEA.
Iran, in particular, had gone to some lengths in its efforts to frame the issue
as a debate best handled by the IAEA mechanisms. In preparation for the March 1
board of governors meeting, it obtained a strong statement [4] from the
Non-Aligned Movement that explicitly criticized Amano's approach and urged that
the IAEA continue to serve as the venue for resolving the dispute:
In a formal letter to the IAEA, Iran also resurrected the idea of a swap
through the IAEA's good offices of Iran's low-enriched uranium (LEU) for
foreign-fabricated fuel plates for the Tehran research reactor.
In a supporting letter designed to elicit sympathy for Iran's demand for a
simultaneous swap of LEU for plates on Iranian soil, Iran's envoy to the IAEA
reminded the organization that the West had reneged at least three times on
promises and, in some cases involving firm contracts backed up with prepayments
or investments, to provide Iran with nuclear fuel [5].
However, it appears that no appeals to equity or the dignity of the IAEA will
entice Amano to re-enter negotiations with Tehran and expose his organization
to the resentment of the West and anti-Iranian factions within his staff.
Barring a rebellion by the pro-Iran minority on the board, it appears clear
that the that the focus of Iran activity therefore can be shifted away from the
IAEA meeting in Vienna and back to where the West wants it: the anticipated UN
Security Council debate in March over Iran sanctions.
The United States has been vigorously lobbying everybody - the five permanent
members and the 10 non-permanent Security Council members who don't have a veto
but whose help is needed to achieve the nine "yes" votes required for passage
of a sanctions resolution. China has been publicly identified as the main
sanctions holdout among the five permanent members.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the scramble for China's vote - and the
entire Iran sanctions process - has been the conspicuous participation of
Israel. In addition to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's high-profile
visit to Moscow and Defense Minister Ehud Barak's visit to Washington, Israeli
diplomats are reaching into corners of the world not usually associated with
Israel's sphere of influence: places like Brazil, Gabon and Nigeria - and
China.
Beijing received a delegation from Israel last week led by Strategic Affairs
Minister Moshe Ya'alon and central bank chief Stanley Fischer. The Israeli
delegation had a two-hour meeting with State Councilor Dai Bingguo and
presented a dossier of Israel's secret intelligence on Iran's nuclear program.
Presumably giving the Chinese a peek at the original Israeli intelligence was
meant to undercut one of Iran's objections to the IAEA process: that the United
States and Israel pitch intelligence summaries over the IAEA's transom, where
they are converted into unassuageable and eternal concerns over Iran's nuclear
intentions without giving the IAEA or Iran a chance to examine or respond to
the original documents.
Israeli sources reported to Ha'aretz that the discussions were held in a
"friendly atmosphere" and the delegation had "a positive feeling". [6]
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