F-16 upgrade doesn’t fly with Taiwan
By Jens Kastner
TAIPEI - Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou has asked the United States to sell
F-16C/Ds to Taiwan so many times that he must have lost count. Even warming
cross-strait ties haven't led to the advanced aircraft being taken off his wish
list. But over fears of infuriating Beijing, Washington won't risk more than
offering to upgrade the island's long-serving F-16A/Bs.
However, what at first glance seems a less-than-ideal solution is far from a
toothless tiger, since the suggested refurbishment involves equipment for the
aging Taiwanese fighters that can't by any means be called purely defensive. In
fact, the upgrade of
Taiwan's more than 140 F-16s would effectively turn the planes from fighters
into fighter-bombers, and this would have an impact on the cross-strait
military balance.
But even though Taiwan is being promised F-16A/Bs packed with sophisticated US
weaponry, the Taiwanese are far from grateful. They believe that not only is a
war with China not going to happen, but that the Americans will eventually
backtrack on their promises anyway, as they have done many times.
"Some of the weapons on the list do have so-called offensive capabilities, but
in the end I think the US, as always, will only provide scaled-downed
versions," said Professor Alex Chiang of the Department of Diplomacy at
Taiwan's National Chengchi University, in an interview with Asia Times Online.
"An overwhelming majority of the people in Taiwan think a war with China is
highly unlikely, and we have seen just too many instances where the US did not
keep its promises in terms of arms sales."
The weapons the US has promised to supply for Taiwan's F-16s – bought almost
two decades ago – are its impressively advanced GPS-guided smart bombs. They
would improve Taiwan's ground attack capability substantially. Unlike bombs
that are simply dropped, smart bombs are accurate, with a likelihood of hitting
their targets better than 90%.
As another major plus, satellite guidance means the weapons can be deployed in
all weather conditions. If the bombs are additionally equipped with
laser-guidance, both moving and fixed targets can be attacked. The most
striking aspect, however, is that since any Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan
would involve sea and air battles rather than engagements on land, GPS-guided
smart bombs don't quite fit in the category of purely defensive weapons: packed
on an F-16, their prime objective would likely be targets on or near the
Chinese coast.
The other top-notch weapon system on the list is the AIM-9X Sidewinder
air-to-air missile. These short-range, heat-seeking missiles are relatively
inexpensive and are so reliable that they are predicted to remain in US Air
Force inventories for the rest of the century.
The version Taiwan is to get comes with helmet-mounted displays and 3D control
systems that are much superior to traditional control surfaces. A pilot can
point the AIM-9X seeker, "lock on" by simply looking at his target, and keep
his hands free for combat maneuvers. Another of the missile's advantages that
could be of particular use to Taiwan's air force is that the system can be
modified relatively easily. It is likely that the Taiwanese would opt for
changes to the fire-control system that allow for the targeting of warships and
even of armored vehicles on land. Again, like the GPS-guided smart bombs, the
AIM-9X Sidewinder can't be called a strictly defensive weapon.
Naturally, the US is expected to consider Beijing's reactions. As a likely
concession to sooth Chinese anger over equipping Taiwan with such deadly
weaponry, the F-16's combat radius won't be extended to 1000 km in the upgrade.
AGM-88 high-speed anti-radiation missiles – contrary to what had earlier been
speculated – also won't be included in the deal. Nonetheless, even with a
relatively small combat radius, China's southeast coast, Shanghai and other
important industrial areas would be in bombing range of Taiwan's air force.
That the upgrade might come sooner rather than later has to do with a
phenomenon described as ''US re-engagement in the Asia-Pacific region''.
Countries along China's eastern boundaries, such as South Korea, Japan, Vietnam
and Indonesia, have been drawn ever closer to the US as a reaction to Beijing's
recent clumsiness over issues of security and territorial disputes. The US,
which under the George W Bush administration abandoned much of its influence in
Asia due to a preoccupation with the ''war on terror'' in the Middle East, has
been responding to the cries for help with diplomatic initiatives and joint
military maneuvers.
If China's ambitions in the Pacific have to be contained militarily by the US
and its allies in the region, it must happen along the so-called ''First Island
Chain'', which runs roughly between Korea and Japan's western coasts, through
the Taiwan Strait along the northern half of the Philippines, and ending at the
Indonesian island of Sumatra. This maritime line, which originally had been
thought up by Chinese strategists as a basis for China's maritime defensive
perimeter, has to the US and its allies already become a “containment of China
chain”.
China's navy has recently been crossing the chain at ever-shorter intervals,
and China's air force has – through advances in the aerial refueling of its
aircraft – extended its combat radius. The prospect that the US Navy will as a
consequence have a harder time sailing near China's shores makes almost all of
China's neighbors feel uneasy. About the only exception, however, is Taiwan
where interest in renewing ties with the US is shrinking. Whatever future
cross-strait relations will bring, it's not going to be war, according to
mainstream Taiwanese perception.
But through its geographical location, Taiwan happens to be the most important
link in the First Island Chain, and is therefore crucial to any attempt to
contain China militarily. As long as the island doesn't fall into China's
hands, the US and its allies will have an advantage over China as significant
as the powers fighting Nazi Germany in World War II had with their ability to
use Britain as a base for bombing campaigns against German cities and for the
D-Day invasion. An island so close to the enemy's shores is an asset of
strategic importance that can't be overestimated. To make sure that China can't
speed up the already rapid process of cross-strait assimilation by pressuring
Taiwan through Chinese military superiority, the US has no other choice than
risking significantly strained ties with Beijing through the resumption of
substantial weapons sales to Taiwan.
Another country that had once contemplated giving its fleet of F-16A/Bs a
comparable overhaul is Israel. The Israeli Air Force eventually dropped those
plans and decided to gradually phase out the aging planes. Presumably, there
were reasons other than simply cutting costs that made the Israelis opt for the
purchase of new planes. Unlike Taiwan, however, Israel doesn't have a hard time
purchasing the kinds of weapons it wants.
As with the Israelis, the age of the planes is another reason Taiwanese
observers show strikingly little enthusiasm for the F-16A/B upgrade. Arthur
Ding, a research fellow at the China Politics Division of Taiwan's National
Chengchi University, dryly suggests that Taiwan's F-16s could simply break
apart carrying GPS-smart bombs, modified missiles and 3D helmet-mounted
displays. ''After 14 years of service for the F-16A/B in Taiwan's air force
inventory, I am rather worried about material fatigue on the planes' frames,''
Ding said.
Jens Caster is a freelance journalist based in Taipei.
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