NEW YORK - When a United States delegate once confronted a Chinese diplomat
about Beijing's uncompromising support for Pakistan, the Chinese reportedly
responded with a heavily-loaded sarcasm: "Pakistan is our Israel," he said.
Judging by China's unrelenting support for some of its allies, including North
Korea, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Sudan, its protective arm around these countries
is no different from the US and Western political embrace of Israel - right or
wrong.
While China is battling the West over exchange rates, import tariffs and its
territorial claims in the South China Sea, Beijing is also lobbying furiously
to stall a Western-inspired proposal for a commission of inquiry on possible
war crimes by the military junta in Myanmar.
"Such a commission should not be seen as a way to punish the
government, but to prevent impunity and help prevent further abuse," says the
UN special rapporteur on Myanmar, Tomas Ojea Quintana.
But China, which in January 2007 exercised its veto, along with Russia, to
prevent Security Council sanctions against Myanmar, has not shown any
willingness to back the proposal - even for a watered-down commission.
"Clearly," says one Asian diplomat, "China is trying to reassert its political
clout at the United Nations as a counterweight to its defensive stand on
currency and trade issues."
The New York Times said on Tuesday the US administration was facing a
"confrontational relationship" with an assertive China and is trying to respond
to "a surge of Chinese triumphalism" by strengthening Washington's relationship
with Japan and South Korea.
United States President Barack Obama is planning to visit four Asian countries
next month - Japan, Indonesia, India and South Korea - while bypassing China.
Meanwhile, secretary general Ban Ki-moon, who needs China's support in the
Security Council if he decides to run for a second term next year, is currently
on his fourth trip to China, having visited the country in May and July 2008,
and in July 2009.
In recent months, China has prevented a Security Council resolution against
North Korea over the sinking of a South Korean ship and also tried to suppress
a UN report alleging the use of Chinese-made bullets in attacks on UN
peacekeepers in Darfur, Sudan.
"China sees value in promoting its image as the Security Council member
defending the rights of the developing world, and China sees value in relying
on the UN to counter US power," Linda Jakobson, director of the program on
China and Global Security at the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), told Inter Press Service (IPS).
Jakobson, an in-house China expert at SIPRI, points out that Beijing also sees
value in participating in UN peacekeeping operations "both because this
enhances the image of China as a responsible power but also because it gives
Chinese military experience".
Still, China relented to US and Western pressure in supporting four Security
Council resolutions imposing sanctions against Iran, one of Beijing's
staunchest political, economic and military allies.
The fourth round of sanctions, all of them aimed primarily at Iran's nuclear
programme, was imposed in June this year.
Justifying his country's support for the resolution, Chinese ambassador Li
Baodong was quoted as saying that Beijing wanted to make sure that sanctions
would not affect the Iranian people or its normal overseas trade.
Jakobson told IPS that China agreed to these sanctions after much deliberation
and on the condition that the energy sector was excluded.
"This can be seen as a compromise solution on China's part," she said. "The
exclusion of the energy sector was crucial."
Jakobson also pointed out that China wants to protect the massive investments
by Chinese energy companies already in Iran or under negotiation with Tehran,
and China wants to ensure that its long-term strategic plans for energy
security are not threatened.
In a detailed policy paper released last month, and titled "New Foreign Policy
Actors in China", SIPRI said the increasing sway of large state-owned energy
companies have an increasing influence on foreign policy deliberations in
China.
Jakobson, who co-authored the report with Dean Knox, said this is one example
of that sway, though it is noteworthy that there are other foreign policy
actors who presumably were not inclined to advocate China's support of the
resolution.
On the other hand, she said, there were presumably actors who advocated China's
support for the resolution because China supports non-proliferation and does
not want to see Iran go nuclear.
"If China had not supported the resolution, it would reflect badly on China's
image and undermine its efforts to portray itself as a responsible global
power," Jakobson said.
She said China attaches great importance to the United Nations and would like
to see the role of the UN strengthened - though Beijing is wary of many
proposals that want to expand Security Council membership and/or give power to
members other than the present five permanent members, the United States,
Britain, France, Russia and China.
The SIPRI report argues that actors outside the traditional power structure are
increasingly shaping China's foreign policy.
Influential new actors on the margins include Chinese state-owned enterprises,
especially energy companies, which, due to their widespread international
outreach, affect China's bilateral relationships and diplomacy at large.
The others include local governments, especially in border and coastal
provinces, which seek more lucrative trade and foreign investment
opportunities.
At the same time, there is growing importance of researchers, who serve as
advisors to officials and media, and netizens, who constitute a new pressure
group that China's leaders at times feel compelled to take into account, not
least during international crises. The findings also point to a fracturing of
authority in foreign policy formulation.
Diversification outside China's official decision-making apparatus - along with
changes within it - means that foreigners can no longer expect to only deal
with one government agency or party organ but must take into account multiple
actors that have both a stake and say in the decision-making processes.
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