China's rise on the
international stage has been accompanied by an
increase in its military's presence. Beijing's
expanding ambition is prompting calls on the
country's leaders to be more proactive in
protecting its national interests. These calls by
Chinese analysts have raised concerns about the
military's capability to mobilize troops to defend
the country's vast borders.
For example,
in the aftermath of the April 2010 Kyrgyzstan
crisis when violent protests forced the collapse
of the government, Chen Xiangyang, an associate
researcher at the Chinese Institute of
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR),
called for a "Large Periphery" strategy to
safeguard China's neighboring areas.
Chen's call was echoed by senior Chinese
military leaders about
possibly intervening in
Central Asia. The Hong Kong-based Jing Bao in a
January 2010 article argued that railways - and
their military significance - need to be infused
into Chinese leaders' strategic lens when
exporting railway technology as they enhance
military power projection.
Indeed, in
applying this strategic vision, on November 17,
2010, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)
took the Shanghai-Nanjing express train for the
first time to return to their barracks after
completing security duty at the Shanghai World
Expo 2010.
According to the Military
Representative Office of the PLA stationed at the
Shanghai Railway Bureau, the Shanghai-Nanjing
express railway is an inter-city railway that can
run at a maximum speed of 350 kilometers (km) per
hour. Some Chinese military analysts touted this
as an ideal way for the PLA to project troops and
light equipment in military operations other than
war (MOOTW).
China has built rail lines to
Tibet, is building connections to Nepal, and is
planning high-speed rails to Laos, Singapore,
Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Burma (Myanmar).
On November 15 last year, then Iranian Foreign
Minister Manouchehr Mottaki announced that Iran,
Afghanistan and Tajikistan had agreed to cooperate
with China to build a China-Iran rail link from
Xinjiang, passing through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Afghanistan and finally arriving in Iran.
The longer plan seems to connect westward
into Iraq (where China has large oil and gas
investments), Syria, Turkey and onto Europe. This
is based on an overall United Nations-sponsored
Trans-Asia Railway (TAR) network to link China to
Europe, using the Middle East as a transit hub.
Although the UN engineered the TAR
agreement, China has done more than any other
nation to re-forge trade and transport links to
reestablish the Silk Route. Negotiations are
already underway with 17 countries across Eurasia.
With China's high-speed trains having clocked
speeds as high as 486.1 km/h (302 mph) and the PLA
aggressively upgrading its long-range combat
capabilities by using rail as logistical support
for its air force (PLAAF) and troop projection,
this new "Orient Express" across the revived Silk
Road will have important military and strategic
implications for US and Western interests in the
region.
Militarization of the Iron Silk
Road Military requirements are part of
China's rail development, and the PLA actively
participates in the design and planning of China's
high-speed rail. For example, Chengdu Railway
Bureau has 14 military officers taking lead
positions in key departments at all major
stations, are tasked to coordinate railway
planning, design, construction, timing of
requirements and track implementation.
Shenyang Railway Bureau, which is in the
strategic location of Liaoning province next to
North Korea, Inner Mongolia and the Yellow Sea,
has also established a regional military
transportation management mechanism with the PLA.
According to the Military Transportation
Department of the PLA General Logistics Department
(GLD), over 1,000 railway stations have been
equipped with military transportation facilities,
thereby establishing a complete railway support
network that enhances the PLA's strategic
projection capability.
GLD had cooperated
with the PRC's Ministry of Railway in 2009, and
fulfilled over 100 military requirements for 20
odd railways in China with the capability of
military transportation. In 2009, large sums of
money were invested to build military
transportation facilities for a few railway
stations and military platforms for loading and
unloading materials.
This investment was
made to meet military requirements used for
activities such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization's (SCO) Peace Mission in 2010. GLD is
actively involved through the entire process of
the railway construction, varying from the
programming to the completion of the railways. For
example, when building the railway from Kunming,
capital of Yunnan province, to Nanning, capital of
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, in order to meet
troop maneuver requirements the Ministry of
Railway had to revise a partial route and prolong
12.4 km of railways at an increased cost of 1.55
billion yuan ($232.66 million).
With
China's expansionist policy and infrastructure
projects toward its neighbors, some analysts are
beginning to sound the alarm on the militarization
of these projects.
Central, Southeast
and South Asia For example, Konstantin
Syroyezhkin, in Kazakhstan's Institute of
Strategic Studies, points out the rapid
development of road and railroad infrastructure in
Central Asia with Chinese participation may be
used for future PLA troop deployments in case of a
serious conflict threatening China's security or
strategic interests. This concern is corroborated
by the recent SCO Peace Mission 2010 military
exercise, whereby China transported troops to
Kazakhstan by rail.
Likewise, other
countries such as Vietnam, and India, as well as
the Tibet Autonomous Region share the same
concern. Vietnam for one rejected China's
high-speed railway technology ($32.5 billion) in
favor of Japan's Shinkansen technology ($55
billion) despite its higher cost.
On June
19, 2010, Vietnam's National Assembly voted down
China's high-speed rail plan. According to Chinese
language magazine Yazhou Zhoukan, some Vietnamese
politicians oppose adopting Chinese high speed
rail technology out of the fear that China might
use it to transport PLA troops to invade Vietnam,
in reprise of its 1979 Sino-Vietnam War.
In the Tibet Autonomous Region, China's
high altitude Qinghai-Tibet railway that opened in
2006 is being used as a supply line to enhance
PLAAF mobilization capability. On August 3, 2010,
PLA Daily reported that a train loaded with
important air combat readiness material for the
PLAAF arrived in Tibet via the railway.
China is rapidly upgrading railways and
airports in Tibet, with four operational airports
and a fifth one under construction. During the
March 2008 Tibetan protests, the Qinghai Tibet
rail enabled rapid PLA deployment. Within 48
hours, at the start of Lhasa riots, T-90/89
armored personnel carriers and T-92 wheeled
infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the streets
- apparently from the 149th Division of the No. 13
Group Army under the Chengdu Military Regional
Command.
This was indicated by the
"leopard" camouflage uniforms specifically
designed for mountain warfare operation from the
149th Division. Should Sino-Indian relations ever
deteriorate to the verge of military confrontation
and if riots in Tibet spread, the PLA's Mountain
Brigades can rapidly deploy to the region via the
railway. Indeed, railway and road construction
have been China's Himalayan strategy for decades -
as the PLA prepared to annex Tibet, Mao Zedong
advised it "to advance while building roads".
China-Iran railway In October
2010, the transport ministers of China,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran
signed an agreement in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, to
commence China-Iran railway construction. The
railway from Xinjiang, China, would pass through
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, arrive in
Iran and split into a southern line to the Gulf
and a western line to Turkey onto Europe.
Earlier in August, China and Iran had
signed a $2 billion agreement on construction of
the railway network in western Iran, which will
continue westward into Iraq, eventually connecting
with Syria, Turkey and the Mediterranean coastal
countries.
China-Turkey railway Around the same time, in October 2010, Turkey
and China elevated their relations to one of
"strategic partnership", signed deals for
high-speed rails in Turkey to eventually link with
China, upgraded their military ties, and
participated in the traditional NATO air combat
exercise of Anatolian Eagle - with China replacing
Israel and the United States.
China will
extend $30 billion to construct 7,000 km of
high-speed rail lines across Turkey, as well as
upgrading rail links between Turkey and Pakistan
and planning a railway around Lake Van to Iran and
Pakistan. Moreover, China has invited Bulgaria to
join Turkey in its Eurasian high-speed rail plan.
China offered huge loans for construction in
return for the use of Bulgarian rivers, seaports
and airports, as transit hubs onto Western Europe.
Given the Sino-Turkish strategic
partnership and anticipation of future military
exercises, Chinese railways could enhance PLA
military projection and presence in the Middle
East and wider Black Sea region. In addition to
Chinese warplanes over the Black Sea region during
the October 2010 Anatolian Eagle exercise, Chinese
special op forces conducted joint exercises at a
Turkey commando school in early November. With
reports of PLAAF refueling in Iran en route to
Turkey, high-speed rail could enable logistic
support and transport of combat readiness
materials in the future.
Missing links
- Iraq and Afghanistan While China is
constructing railways across Eurasia, Iraq and
Afghanistan still present significant missing
links due to the security situation and large
presence of US and NATO troops.
Yet, when
the United States' draw down, China may try to
push for UNPKOs to take over and deploy the PLA
under blue berets to protect China's energy and
strategic interests. It has a $3.4 billion
investment in the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan
as well as various oil and gas fields in Iraq.
China will also likely use SCO to foment
regional cooperation for constructing the railways
through Afghanistan to Iran, eventually linking
with Iraq. China and Iran are not interested in
joining western-led initiatives, such as the
Transport Corridor of Europe, Caucasus, and Asia
(TRACECA), which is also known as the "new Silk
Road". Rather, they want to forge their own
projects and not be beholden to Western interests
or sanctions.
Conclusion China's ambitious high-speed rail projects
across Asia and the Middle East have important
strategic implications. It links up poorer regions
with more prosperous regions, provides jobs during
an economic downturn, and allows Chinese military
and security services to better project power both
within and outside the country's borders. While
air transport is faster, it is limited to fewer
people and lighter gear, whereas rail is a crucial
means for moving soldiers and heavy equipment, and
is much easier to sustain logistically.
As
China's economic and energy portfolio continues to
increase in the Greater Middle East, there may be
future conditions under which the PLA might deploy
troops using high-speed rails for MOOTW to protect
its strategic interests. Indeed, in January 2011
there were reports that the PLA had deployed
troops to the economic zone of Rajin-Sonbong in
northeast North Korea in order to "guard port
facilities China has invested in".
Whether
this is a telltale sign of what may happen with
China's interests in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
elsewhere, will still remain a mystery for the
future of the PLA's Orient Express.
Christina Y Lin, PhD is research
consultant for IHS Jane's and former director for
China affairs in policy planning at the US
Department of Defense. Her 2008 paper linking
Middle East and East Asia nuclear issues, "The
King from the East" published by the Korea
Economic Institute, was recently referenced in The
Wall Street Journal.
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