India picks a quarrel with China
By M K Bhadrakumar
India, which has been wetting its toes sporadically in the South China Sea in
the recent years, is apparently taking the plunge to wade waist-deep into the
troubled waters. It is a historic move - be it there is no clarity whether
merely tactical or strategic. But it is historic; India's "Look East" policy
acquires swagger. The Sino-Indian geostrategic rivalry is not going to be the
same again.
Two months ago, an unidentified caller on an open radio channel hailed an
Indian naval ship INS Airavatas as it was leaving Vietnam after a
"goodwill visit", and advised it to lay off the South China Sea. The Chinese
denied Beijing's involvement in the incident. India kept an ambiguous silence
over the incident, which the Western media played up.
But this time around, the spat is for real and is inflammable. It has
to do with exploration projects by Indian state-owned company Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (ONGC Videsh) in two offshore blocks that
Vietnam claims. The Indian establishment selectively "leaked" ONGC Videsh's
move just ahead of the visit by India's external affairs minister SM Krishna to
Hanoi this week, presumably to draw out Beijing into a reaction.
Beijing promptly obliged by taking exception to India engaging in oil and gas
exploration projects in the disputed South China Sea. The Chinese foreign
ministry spokesperson said in reply to a query: ''Our consistent position is
that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and
development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction.''
While maintaining that Beijing was not aware of any Indian involvement in any
project in the South China Sea, the spokesperson stressed that China enjoyed
''indisputable sovereignty'' over the South China Sea and its islands. Then
came the swipe. ''We hope foreign countries will not get involved in the
dispute. For countries outside the region, we hope they will respect and
support countries in the region to solve this dispute through bilateral
channels.''
The Indian spokesman promptly reacted in Delhi to the Chinese foreign ministry
statement insisting, ''Our cooperation with Vietnam or any other country is
always as per international laws, norms and conventions … cooperation with
Vietnam in the area of energy and to secure India's energy security is very
important. There are a number of Indian companies already operational and we
are looking at further enhancing the cooperation in the years ahead.''
Oil slicks can spread…
The Indian contention, as articulated by unidentified official sources to the
Delhi media, is that the dispute in the South China Sea is strictly bilateral
between China and Vietnam and that is something to be addressed within the
framework of international law. ''In the meantime, it is in public knowledge
that we [India] are going ahead with expanding our ties with Vietnam.''
ONGC Videsh has been active in Vietnam for some years already and is now
expanding its activities. The subject is on Krishna's agenda of talks in Hanoi.
Meanwhile, other private Indian companies are also beginning to scout around
for exploration work in the disputed offshore fields. The ball is now on
Krishna's court. How he takes the discord forward, whether he pushes the
envelope, how assertively he is going to do that - all this is going to set the
tempo for Sino-Indian interactions in a near future.
This is by no means a quarrel over energy security or international law. It is
a carbon copy of the triangular equations involving China, Pakistan and India.
Replace Vietnam with Pakistan and the South China Sea spat is almost a replay
of the Indian disquiet about the burgeoning Sino-Pakistan alliance. That
alliance is virtually cascading in front of Indian eyes and Beijing blithely
pretends it doesn't notice. Not a month passes without some Pakistani dignitary
or the other cogitating with the Chinese political and military leadership.
Far more important is China stepping up its involvement in the disputed part of
Kashmir that India claims as its territory but which is under Pakistani
occupation and Delhi has named 'Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir' [POK]. A recent
Chinese commentary attributed to an influential strategic thinker, Pan Guang,
Director of the Shanghai Center for International Studies and Institute of
European and Asian Studies and concurrently the Director of SCI Studies Centre
in Shanghai suggested that China might be on the brink of using the Karakorum
and the POK territory for developing communication links with Afghanistan. Pan
claimed that the matter was under the active consideration of the United States
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization following discussions with Beijing.
Pan wrote in an article in China-US Focus titled ''China and US in Central
Asia: Role of the SCO and Possibility of Cooperation in Afghanistan'':
''Even
though China has not sent its troops to Afghanistan, the Chinese support for
the allied forces in the country is widely observable.
''At present, the United States and NATO are considering three options for
involving China in the logistic replenishment for Afghan actions. First, China
is required to open the Wakhan Corridor on the Sino-Afghan border as a channel
for providing logistic support for NATO troops. But the corridor, over 5,000
meters in altitude, has very challenging topography and climate, posing serious
technical difficulties to any passage. Second, highways and railways in China
are used for transporting goods into the Pakistani Part of Kashmir, to be
further trans-shipped into Afghanistan. Third, Goods are to be shipped to
Gwadar, the Pakistani port constructed and managed by the Chinese companies,
before they are transported into Afghanistan on land. For the moment, the
second option is being focused upon by the two parties in negotiation.''
Conceivably, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. What is
absolutely clear is that Delhi took a calculated decision to nudge Beijing.
Vietnam is a unique strategic option for Delhi to make Beijing comprehend the
depth of Indian feelings about China's ties with Pakistan. The parallel is
almost complete insofar as there is a lot of empathy that India would have from
other Southeast Asian countries with involvement in the South China Sea dispute
- and from Japan - just as China enjoys in the South Asian region among the
small countries surrounding India with which India has had difficult
relationships.
… but conflict is unlikely
India has shied away from the US attempts to get it onto a bandwagon along with
its other Asian allies but has preferred to go it alone so that the current
spat is strictly 'bilateral' and its resolution would have to be within the
Sino-Indian framework. Delhi could be probing the scope for ground rules with
Beijing guiding their behavior in each other's 'spheres of influence' that are
equitable and sustainable and based on mutual advantage. The issue here is
whether China would see things that way.
For China, its ties with Pakistan or any other South Asian country are not
necessarily "India-centric". Nor can India openly claim the South Asian region
to be its "sphere of influence" where China is obliged to calibrate its
behavior to suit Delhi's sensitivities. Over and above, China's expanding
interest in the Indian Ocean region is of such far-reaching consequence to its
global strategies that it will be hard-pressed to curb them in order to
accommodate the Indian sensitivities. In sum, therefore, a new chapter is
commencing in the Sino-Indian geostrategic rivalry.
The pattern of conflict and cooperation inherent in the Sino-Indian
relationship is acquiring a new template. In a masterly recent work on India's
foreign policy, Does the Elephant Dance?, David Malone, who served as
Canada's High Commissioner to India during 2006-2008, wrote with great
prescience:
''While there can be no certainty with respect to either
possible future conflict or sustained cooperation between India and China, the
likelihood is a mix of security-related tension and economic cooperation.
Outright war is highly unlikely - both sides have too much to lose. But the two
nations will continue to rub against each other, with unpredictable outcomes,
as they seek to expand their respective spheres of influence.''
Indeed, the economic relationship is rapidly growing. Ironically, on the same
day that the Indian foreign-policy establishment chose to "prick" the Chinese
sensitivities over South China Sea, the Indian finance ministry took a huge
leap forward to encourage Chinese investments in India.
The Indian government decided to allow Indian companies to borrow in yuan up to
a new ceiling of US$1 billion. The move aims at facilitating borrowing from
China whose cost of credit is low for India's infrastructure development.
So far India allowed overseas borrowing only in US dollar, euro, yen or pound
sterling. In essence, Indian private companies are being enabled to place big
orders with Chinese suppliers, especially for power-generation
equipment.Arguably, the rapidly developing trade and economic ties between
adversaries could have a calming effect on their choler and passions.
On the other hand, the South China spat also shows that despite the booming
trade and economic ties, the Sino-Indian relationship is characterized by
lingering suspicion and mistrust, which can be inflamed at any moment willfully
or otherwise as their competition for influence in South Asia and neighboring
regions or the sheer expansion of their international economic interests and
their military reach acquires bigger momentum - although neither country is
expansionist in territorial terms.
One thing is for sure. All major foreign policy moves and most minor moves in
Delhi are directly handled in the prime minister's office in Delhi with the
foreign ministry taking a back seat in the recent past and confining itself to
articulating policies rather than crafting them. Put simply, the current spat
carries the imprimatur of the Indian prime minister's office.
That brings up a tangential question. It is widely perceived that Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh is currently at the lowest point in his trajectory as a
politician. A sense of exasperation is growing with his government, which seems
to exist for no greater logic than that politics is about power. His trusted
mandarins are keenly looking for ways to put a feather on the boss's cap. A
last-minute decision by Manmohan to attend the United Nations General Assembly
session in New York next week is seen as an exercise in "image-building".
However, he is yet to get an okay from US President Barack Obama for a
"one-on-one". The Americans apparently plead "scheduling difficulty", which is
often a diplomatic metaphor for disinterest. Would the fables streaming in from
the South China Sea in the past 48 hours incentivize a last-minute change of
heart in the White House?
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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