SPEAKING FREELY Asia and the sea powers, 1911 and 2011
By Alan G Jamieson
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As the Chinese navy goes on exercise in the Pacific Ocean, it seems that US
naval hegemony in the waters off Asia is about to be challenged. Today the
United States dominates the seas of the world in a similar fashion to when
Britain ruled the waves a century ago. Dominion over the seas brought both
these powers to the shores of Asia and both the great sea powers have sought to
project their power from the sea and into the interior of the Asian "world
island".
Yet this is no easy task and generally the United States, like Britain a
hundred years ago, has not been able to establish dominance over more than the
maritime periphery of Asia, even when the Americans can now add hegemony in the
air to hegemony at sea. To appreciate the difficulties faced by these
powers, it is useful to compare Britain's position in Asia in 1911 with that of
the United States today.
Viewed on one level, British domination of South and East Asia had never looked
greater than in 1911. India had been ruled by the British for more than a
century, and the subcontinent provided the British with a large army that was
invaluable for enforcing their will in other parts of Asia. In China the
revolution of October 1911 had just brought an end to the "Celestial Empire",
but the new Chinese state seemed no more capable of successfully opposing the
foreign imperial powers that controlled most of China's ports than the Chinese
emperors of the past. Indeed, China would soon collapse internally into the era
of the warlords, making resistance to foreign intervention even more difficult.
For most of the 19th century, Britain's principal rival in Asia had been
Russia. Successive British governments had worried that the ever-expanding
czarist empire would soon reach the northern borders of India. The prospect of
a Russian invasion of the subcontinent seemed very real to British politicians
and generals, although in reality it was never likely because of logistical
constraints. However, by 1911 the Russian threat had suddenly disappeared. In
1904-05 Russia had been defeated in a war with Japan, which was followed by
revolution inside Russia. The czar kept his throne, but a weakened Russia now
looked for a settlement with Britain of their imperial disputes. This occurred
in 1907 and involved recognition by both sides of their respective spheres of
influence, for example in nominally independent Persia (Iran).
With Russia no longer a threat in Asia, Britain might seem to have won
predominance in the region. However, to achieve the humbling of Russia, Britain
had been compelled to become the first European power to make an alliance with
an independent Asian nation, in this case the 1902 treaty with Japan. With its
naval and military forces overextended in East Asia, Britain was ready to
accept Japanese assistance. Although Britain did not join Japan in its war with
Russia, the British derived many benefits from Russia's defeat. Nevertheless
the Japanese were not just British lackeys. They had imperial ambitions of
their own in Asia, and these would become increasingly obvious from World War I
onward.
Britain needed support for its position in Asia because it was being
increasingly distracted from the affairs of that region by the rise of two new
economic powers that were challenging British world dominance. These powers
were the United States of America and Germany, neither of which was an Asian
state or had important interests in Asia, although the Americans had recently
taken possession of the Philippines. The British hoped to preserve friendly
relations with the United States, but relations with Germany were by 1911 far
more difficult. Although with close economic links as major trading partners,
Britain and Germany clashed repeatedly as Germany sought to win a wider role in
the world. In particular, the expansion of the German navy had led to a naval
arms race with Britain. The British had been forced to reduce their naval
presence in Asian waters to concentrate more ships against Germany in European
waters, and this was one reason to seek naval support from Japan.
Thus in 1911 Britain seemed dominant in Asia, but in fact the rise of new
powers outside that region was causing Britain to focus its attention on other
areas of the globe, especially Europe, where Germany seemed to pose a direct
threat. The Japanese alliance was supposed to underpin British power in Asia,
but it was soon to become clear that Japan had its own imperial ambitions in
the region and would eventually see Britain as an obstacle to these.
Today, in 2011, the United States of America is not just the world's leading
naval power, but it is also the leading air power. Militarily the Americans are
far more powerful than the British were in their imperial heyday, yet the
United States still has problems in dominating more than the maritime periphery
of Asia. A century ago Britain faced a challenge to its worldwide supremacy
from a rising North American power and a rising European power. Today America's
main rivals are two rising Asian powers, India and China, with Russia also
seeking to bolster its position in Asia. Britain's rivals took its attention
away from Asia; America's rivals concentrate its attention on that continent.
India became independent from Britain in 1947 and for the next 50 years largely
followed a non-aligned foreign policy. Since 2000 India has increasingly moved
into the American sphere of influence. Certainly many Americans see India as a
potential future ally whose increasing power can be used to counterbalance the
rise of China in the same way that the British sought to use Japan to curb the
growth of Russian power in Asia. Whether the Indian government will be happy to
occupy such a position is another matter.
Although American attention today is concentrated on Asia in a way that British
attention was not in 1911, this does not mean that the US is free of major
distractions elsewhere. Most important is the United States' continuing
involvement in wars and interventions in the Islamic world. Although much of
this is taking place in Southwest Asia, it also spills over into Africa, and
has further ramifications both in Europe and even within the US itself. Nor
does any end to these struggles seem to be in sight, and they may continue to
absorb US military resources for years to come.
Despite the Islamic distractions, US attention seems bound to be focused more
and more on the rise of China, both within Asia and in the wider world. US
relations with that emerging superpower remain deeply ambivalent. Still
supposedly a communist state and a longtime Cold War enemy of the US, China has
embraced a form of capitalism with great success. China and the US are close
trading partners, but so were Britain and Germany in 1911, and that did not
prevent a war between them three years later.
In 1911 Britain ruled India, China was on the verge of collapsing into further
internal chaos, and Russia had given up its old rivalry with Britain in Asia.
British domination in Asia seemed secure, with Japan still an ally rather than
a rival. The US position in Asia in 2011 seems both stronger and weaker. On the
one hand US military power is much greater than Britain could deploy a hundred
years ago and the United States can concentrate on Asia in a way the British
could not. On the other hand Asia in 2011 is much stronger and more resistant
to outside pressure than it was in 1911. China, India and, to a lesser extent,
Russia are all strong economic and military powers, and are likely to grow
stronger in the coming years.
The Americans may hope to bring India over to their side, but it seems unlikely
that Indian governments will want to surrender all their freedom of action.
China and Russia, already loosely connected through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, are more likely to resist the United States' attempts to maintain
its domination of the maritime periphery of Asia, and they will certainly hope
to prevent further extension of US influence into the interior of the
continent.
The United States has more potential military power to dominate Asia today than
Britain had in 1911, but in one important way the military giant has feet of
clay. In 1911 Britain was still the world's principal creditor nation,
receiving income from investments all around the globe. Only the cost of
participation in World War I would set Britain on the road to financial ruin.
Today the United States is the world's biggest debtor nation, largely kept
afloat by foreign investors buying US government bonds. One of the main foreign
investors is China. Thus China provides money to the US so that the US
government can build up its armed forces to protect its Asian allies, such as
Japan and South Korea, from a supposed Chinese military threat.
This is a truly bizarre situation. The equivalent in 1911 would have been
German investors buying British government bonds to allow the British
government to finance the construction of battleships to oppose the expanding
German fleet. This did not happen in 1911 because Britain could still finance
its own naval expansion. How the current situation of China financing the
construction of US warships to oppose the expanding Chinese navy will end is as
yet unclear, but it seems to be a situation without a previous historical
parallel.
Thus in 1911 British domination of Asia seemed assured, but it was underwritten
by Japanese support and British attention was shifting increasingly to Europe
to oppose Germany. In 2011 the US faces a more challenging situation if it
wants to preserve its leading role in Asia. It still has vast military power,
but increasingly not the financial resources to pay for it. Today Asian states
are strong and their power is growing. They are able to resist outside pressure
in a way scarcely possible in a century ago. Although the United States will
continue to try to maintain its dominant position in Asia, one thing is
certain: in 2011 Asians will decide the future of Asia in a way they never
could have done back in 1911.
Alan G Jamieson received his doctorate in history from the University of
Oxford and currently lives in Canada. His most recent publications are Faith
and Sword: A Short History of Christian-Muslim Conflict (2006) and the novel
Crossroads of the Years (2008). His new book Lords of the Sea: A History
of the Barbary Corsairs will appear in February 2012.
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