SINOGRAPH China and the shadow of German history
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - The momentous rise of China continues to lead many historians and
political scientists to draw parallels with the rise of Germany in the late
19th century and beginning of the 20th. Anyone who underscores the differences
and highlight the distance between those times and now seems doomed to be
simply brushed off.
China's current development has no precedent in history, but we may simply need
to compare it to something in the past in order to comprehend and handle this
extraordinary phenomenon. So perhaps this very imperfect comparison can be used
as a starting point for coping with China. If this is the case, we may see in
today's Germany a small-scale projection of what we will see in
China 100 years from today.
Now, Germany is dominating European politics and economics more than it was a
century ago. Actually now the whole world wants Germany to step up to its
European responsibilities, and contrary to the requests, Germany - scared of
itself and of its past - is dragging its feet.
British Historian Niall Ferguson makes this point eloquently in trying to
understand what went wrong with European and British history and how Britain
lost its empire.
It would have been infinitely better if Germany could
achieve its hegemonic position on the continent without two world wars. But it
was not only Germany's fault that this did not happen. True, it was Germany
that forced the continental war of 1914 upon an unwilling France (and a not so
unwilling Russia).
But it was - as the Kaiser rightly said - the British government which
ultimately decided to turn the continental war into a world war, a conflict
which lasted twice as long as and cost many more lives than Germany's first bid
for European Union would have, if it had gone according to plan. By fighting
Germany in 1914, Asquith, Grey and their colleagues helped ensure that, when
Germany did finally achieve predominance on the continent, Britain was no
longer strong enough to provide a check to it. ("The Kaiser's European Union".
Virtual History. Ed: Niall Ferguson.)
These conclusions are
very interesting as they argue that it was useless to try to stop Germany then.
In the end, as present history proves, Germany was not stopped: it still is the
main political player in Europe, but British power came to a halt. Does this
sound like a recipe for what the world - or Europe and America - should do with
China today?
Definitely, the combination of over 100 years of massacres, from those of the
Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) to those of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976),
plus a sudden liberalization of the markets with Deng Xiaoping's reforms
launched in the late 1970s, have released social and economic forces of
unparalleled strength. The primeval drive for personal improvement in China
managed to withstand many political and social tsunamis, from the Tiananmen
crackdown in 1989 to the Falungong repression ten years later in 1999.
Any of these events would have broken the back of another country - but not
China. This resilience, ingenuity, and endurance are elements drawing China and
Germany together. The defeat in two world wars didn't subdue Germany's drive.
Similarly, if the world were to take on China, would this manage to put down
the Chinese?
Or the plan could be, as some advisers to former Taiwanese president Lee
Teng-hui put it in the mid 1990s, [1] to break China in four or five
independent states, as happened with the Germans, split into four German states
until 1990 - West Germany, East Germany, Austria, and Switzerland - and which
succeeded in partially withholding their European prominence.
Then, similarly to Germany, we can expect that even if America or the West were
to take down China now, this force of nature would come back with a vengeance
over and over again in the coming decades while the West would have exhausted
its own energies. So, we might be better off coping with China now and avoiding
sapping the West.
There is certainly some truth in all of this, and still differences are very
important in drawing loose historical comparisons.
Firstly, China is in no way a dominant country in Asia or in the world in the
way Germany was at the end of the 19th century. Besides its undoubted
industrial and military might, Germany was a cultural and technological dynamo,
with possibly the most democratic political system and the most comprehensive
welfare system in Europe and the world. All of this is unrivalled by present
China in Asia or in the world.
Moreover, the defeats in the wars left wounded Germany a changed nation. The
first German defeat created the conditions for the rise of Nazism, and while
there is debate about the possibility that Britain and Germany could have come
to an agreement, or whether Wilhelmine Germany could have been accommodated one
way or another, there is no debate surrounding the idea that Nazism had to be
defeated.
Moreover, present Germany is very different from Wilhelmine Germany in a
fundamental aspect: it does not want to take the lead, it does not want to take
political initiative, and it now hides in France's shadow. Yet for this
modesty, it is now pushed on to the forefront. Wilhelmine Germany, for all its
successes in every field, was very arrogant, consciously or not claiming more
living space, "lost" territories, and political equality (ie, primacy) in areas
where it was still behind, such as colonies and the navy.
Then, at this point in history for China, a useful but counterfactual question
about history could be, what if Germany at the turn of the century had not
embarked on a policy of arrogance toward other countries? What if the Kaiser
had stepped back? It would have been unnatural, against conventional wisdom:
Germany was doing wonderfully in every field, and the Kaiser was the heart of
the system. Why should the system be changed for some then-imaginary threats
and dangers to Germany and the world?
The same could be said about China now. It is doing well in many fields.
Despite its present problems, there is room to argue that China is faring
better than Europe or America, which are both in the throes of a difficult
economic and political transition. Then, what has China got to learn from the
preaching of places unable to cope with their own situations? Yet, only the
shadow of the history of Germany could be a severe warning for China now.
There is mounting internal criticism of China's doctrine of "Peaceful
Evolution". There is strong resistance to projects of political reform and to
the idea of cutting back on state-owned enterprises and giving more freedom to
private companies. These actions are normal, and they follow the basic idea
that China has been doing well so far with this model, so why should it change?
But this position ignores the fact that China's model, while working well until
recently, is now creating a growing misalignment of interests between China and
the rest of the world, and this is bringing mounting friction on a number of
issues between China and many countries.
This in turn threatens the community of interests that China has created around
the world with its economic and social development and that underpins a new
theory promoted by Zheng Bijian, the inventor of the idea of Peaceful
Development.
Here perhaps there is another lesson from German history. German Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck is widely credited with creating a political network of
alliances and pacts propping up every German expansionist move.
Moreover, conservative Bismarck promoted revolutionary political reforms that
gave more freedom and democracy but ultimately buttressed the German monarchic
system. Possibly, it was thanks to Bismarck's alliances and reforms that a
concentration of forces against Germany didn't start earlier and that Kaiser
Wilhelm II had enough power in his hands with the support of a parliament full
of Marxist social-democrats, his potential enemies.
Bismarck was able to expand German power in Europe ultimately because every
push was accompanied by a broad political initiative that first reestablished a
new political order in the continent and at home. Some Bismarckian traits are
visible in Chancellor Angela Merkel's hand, as she is actively pushing for
political reforms in Europe while constantly moving restive domestic and global
consensus in her direction without showing off.
Both domestic and international public opinion, for different reasons, are and
could be very opposed to Merkel's political initiatives.
But Merkel, possibly inspired by Bismarck, has so far proved able to move ahead
in very difficult waters, aligning German future broad interests with those of
the world and its neighbors. She thus creates a vast consensus around her
domestic and foreign thrust.
Maybe China should look more into this history and depart with the dangerous
logic taking hold of the Western strategic minds. This is very difficult, as
strategy mastermind Edward Luttwak believes, but it is necessary for the good
of China and the world. China needs to save herself, but America and the West
need it too, perhaps more, in order not to follow the destiny of the British
Empire.
Note
1. See interview with Taiwan's ambassador at the Holy See:
La Cina un Giallo. Limes 1995. (In Italian).
Francesco Sisci is a columnist for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore and
can be reached at fsisci@gmail.com
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
