The apparently peaceful
resolution of the "land grab" crisis in the
Guangdong village of Wukan has been hailed as
Beijing's new model for tackling dissent.
Last September, 15,000 peasants in Wukan
in southeastern Guangdong province, began staging
protests against cadres who had illegally sold
their land to a real estate developer. No
compensation was paid to the residents. After Xue
Jinbo, a respected village representative, died in
police custody on December 11, Wukan residents
booted out the local party and police officials
and set up barricades on roads leading to the
fishing village.
Guangdong authorities
responded by surrounding Wukan with a few thousand
public security and People's Armed Police (PAP)
officers. Food, water and electricity supplies
were cut off. Yet on
December 22, Guangdong
deputy provincial Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
secretary Zhu Mingguo, the province's
third-ranking cadre, negotiated a settlement with
Lin Zuluan, the newly elected chief village
representative.
While the full details of
the agreement had not been disclosed, Lin and
other village representatives indicated Zhu had
affirmed the villagers' right to protests. The
"provisional administration" headed by Lin was
recognized. Several Wukan activists who had
clashed with the police were released. The law
enforcement officers withdrew. The villagers
removed their barricades and let off firecrackers
in celebration.
Many questions, however,
have been raised about the Wukan incident. Has
justice been done to the villagers? What lies
behind the Guangdong authorities' decision not to
use force against Wukan's singular act of
defiance? More importantly, is there a consensus
within the CCP's top echelon that the conciliatory
approach represented by the so-called Wukan model
will be adopted for future cases of confrontation
between disaffected social elements and the
authorities?
Given that some 65% of
China's "mass incidents" are due to
misappropriation of land, has the CCP
administration come up with effective measures to
curb the malpractice?
One day after his
successful negotiation with Wukan's self-elected
leaders, Zhu revisited Wukan. "We shall adequately
handle Wukan's problems according to laws and
regulations, and in a fair and open manner," said
Zhu. He noted the authorities in Guangzhou, the
provincial capital, had sent special "work teams"
to Wukan to investigate the misappropriation and
illegal use of land as well as corruption amongst
cadres.
Zhu disclosed that several Wukan
officials had been detained for questioning.
Moreover, Wang Yemin, head of one of the work
teams, said last week that the elections in Wukan
in February 2011- which produced the corrupt and
now ousted village heads, - had been declared
invalid. Polls for a new village administrative
committee (VAC) will be held in early 2012.
Yet chief village representative Lin was
skeptical about the outcome. He told the Hong Kong
media that "more than 100,000 square meters of
land have been taken away from us and it is not
sure when the land will be returned". Moreover, it
is not clear whether the five or so "hooligans"
temporarily "released on bail" by the police might
face retribution. It is not uncommon for police to
nab the alleged ringleaders of disturbances after
peace has been restored and media attention has
drifted away.
Moreover, misgivings remain
regarding the motives behind Guangdong party
secretary and politburo member Wang Yang's
decision to use placatory instead of iron-fisted
strategies against Wuhan. It is true that Wang,
56, nicked-named "Young Marshal" for his brisk
decision-making style, has a relatively reformist
reputation.
Yet commentators in both the
Hong Kong and foreign media have pointed out his
anxiety to prevent the Wukan incident from
worsening to the point where it might have
jeopardized his chances of promotion to the
Politburo Standing Committee at the upcoming 18th
CCP Congress.
This concern was compounded
by the few dozen reporters from Hong Kong and
foreign media that descended on Wukan in the week
leading to the December 22 breakthrough.
It is noteworthy that in another recent
confrontation between Guangdong residents and
police - inhabitants of the town of Haimen
protesting against the expansion of a power plant
that has caused serious pollution - public
security officers used traditional tactics to deal
with the crisis. PAP officers used tear gas to
disperse the demonstrators. Several protestors
were badly beaten up, despite the pledge by
Guangzhou that a temporary moratorium had been put
on future plans of the plant.
Does the
Wukan case indeed mean that central- and
local-level officials will henceforward lean
toward relatively conciliatory and non-violent
means to tackle protests by peasants and other
disaffected elements in society? At least on the
surface, Wang Yang's handling of Wukan has won the
support of the state media.
The People's
Daily hailed Guangzhou's efforts as an example of
"accommodating and defusing contradictions and
conflicts in a good way". It praised Guangdong
leaders for "grasping well the aspirations of the
masses". The commentary noted whether officials
could satisfactorily resolve questions regarding
the masses' malcontents was a "yardstick of
cadres' ties with the people as well as their
leadership ability".
The Global Times
praised Guangdong leaders for "putting the
interests of the public in the first place when
handling land disputes".
The Wukan model
also won plaudits from members of the remnant
liberal wing of the party, a reference to the
followers of radical, pro-West modernizers
represented by the late party secretaries Hu
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. "I hope that the Wukan
incident can push society to establish a system
which is based on democracy and the rule of law,"
said Hu Deping, the respected son of Hu Yaobang,
"I hope that when we are faced with similar
problems in the future, we can resort to the rule
of law and negotiation."
A national
meeting on law and order recently convened by the
CCP Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission
(CPLAC) seemed to endorse the conciliatory
approach. CPLAC secretary and Politburo Standing
Committee member Zhou Yongkang called on cadres in
the police, prosecutor's offices and courts system
to "cultivate a harmonious and stable social
environment".
"We must enthusiastically
prevent and defuse contradictions and disputes and
promote social harmony," Zhou said. "We must
enhance and come up with innovative ways in social
management, and boost the level of public
services." Zhou's dictums squared with a series of
instructions given by other politburo members
about promoting "large-scale reconciliation" so as
to preempt and lessen the impact of
socio-political contradictions.
However,
it is important to note that Zhou and other
members of the ruling elite have not given up the
CCP authorities' time-tested strategy of tackling
dissent: to switch between soft and tough tactics
in accordance with the requirement of different
circumstances.
In the CPLAC conference,
Zhou made reference to having "planned and
implemented various types of operations to ensure
stability and to counter emergencies, which have
succeeded in safeguarding national security and
social stability".
Apart from cracking
down hard on subversive and "anti-state" elements
in Tibet and Xinjiang, law enforcement units have
pulled out all the stops to muzzle and even
imprison dissidents, including non-governmental
organization activists and human-rights lawyers
who have represented disenfranchised urban and
rural residents in hundreds of land-grab cases
nationwide.
Foremost among activist
lawyers harassed by state security are
internationally-renowned attorneys Gao Zhisheng
and Ni Yulan. Last month, Gao was put back in
prison on charges of "inciting subversion of state
power".
In 2006, he was given a three-year
jail term but was later granted a five-year
probation, during which he was subjected to tight
surveillance and occasional beatings by
plainclothes police officers.
Last week,
the Beijing municipal court started proceedings
against Ni, a female lawyer who had frequently
acted on behalf of victims of illegal land
appropriation. Ni, who was charged with fraud and
causing civil disturbances, had to be carried to
the court on a stretcher due to injuries
reportedly caused by heavy beatings by police.
At the same time, the National People's
Congress has proceeded with the revision of the
Criminal Procedure Law. One change is to empower
public security officers to detain people
suspected of threatening state security in secret
locations for indefinite periods - and without the
need to inform their family members or legal
representatives.
While national- and
local-level cadres seem to be debating the best
methods to handle dissent as well as
"destabilizing social incidents", the State
Council has made new pledges about protecting the
rights of farmers.
At a national
conference on rural work held last month, Premier
Wen Jiabao pledged national and regional cadres
would try their best to safeguard the economic and
legal interests of peasants. "We can no longer
sacrifice farmers' land ownership rights to reduce
urbanization and industrialization costs," Xinhua
News Agency quoted Wen as saying. "We must
significantly increase farmers' gains from the
increase in land value."
Wen also said
peasants should not be forced to give up their
land even if they move to cities. "No one is
empowered to take away such rights." The premier
added that "we must also pay attention to
expanding the parameters of village
self-government".
At least in theory,
there are enough statues on the law books that
forbid cadres and developers from forcing
urbanites and peasants to leave their properties
and land without the payment of adequate
compensation. However, land and related
transactions account for at least half of the
revenues of regional administrations.
In
2010, for instance, local governments raked in
about 2.9 trillion yuan (US$460 billion) worth of
income from land sales. Unfortunately, most local
administrations are heavily in debt partly due to
misguided investments in infrastructure and
property-related ventures.
Especially
after the global financial crisis broke out in
late 2008, sub-national cadres are anxious to
embark on infrastructure and other job-creation
programs both to provide employment and to jack up
the gross domestic product (GDP) expansion rate.
Satisfactory economic growth is seen as
indispensable for officials' promotion prospects
given the importance that GDP statistics figure in
the assessment procedures of the Chinese cadre
system.
In mid-2011, the State Auditing
Administration estimated local governments,
together with government-related urban development
investment vehicles, had run up debts totaling
10.72 trillion yuan. Western credit agencies
reckoned that the figure could be as high as 14
trillion yuan.
Since income from land
sales are a principal means for local governments
to service their debts as well as pay the salaries
of civil servants, Beijing is prone to turn a
blind eye to their property-related deals.
In light of central authorities' anxiety
to uphold socio-political stability, it also is
not difficult for regional cadres to justify their
employment of police and PAP officers to quell
protests of whatever nature. Unless, as Hu Deping
pointed out, the CCP leadership is ready to uphold
the rule of law - and allow activist lawyers to
defend the rights of the victims of land grab and
official corruption - deep-seated social
contradictions will remain despite a couple of
cases of the apparently fair and transparent
resolution of "mass incidents".
Dr
Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The
Jamestown Foundation. He has worked in senior
editorial positions in international media
including Asiaweek newsmagazine, South China
Morning Post, and the Asia-Pacific Headquarters of
CNN. He is the author of five books on China,
including the recently published Chinese
Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New
Challenges. Lam is an Adjunct Professor of
China studies at Akita International University,
Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong.
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