SINOGRAPH Rebels quashed by New
Year gift By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - It was for a few weeks the
symbol of rebellion in communist China, the sign
of the crippling of the state power, and the
glaring signal of a coming revolution in Beijing.
For weeks, the people of Wukan, a former fishing
village in the southern province of Guangdong,
fought against authorities who had allegedly
seized common land, turned it into real estate
while pocketing most of the proceeds, and rigged
local elections.
The Wukan people, who had
been left with no money and no land, rose up
against the corrupt party chief and his minions,
kicked them out of the village, and held their
ground against the officials. For weeks,
authorities tried a violent crackdown on the
rebellion, which eventually became national and
international news.
Eventually, in the
middle of January, shortly before the Chinese
New Year, when
traditionally all accounts have to be settled,
provincial and national authorities decided to
step in, making an unexpected decision. The leader
of the rebellion, Lin Zuluan, 67, the age when
leaders in China retire, was appointed secretary
of the local branch of the Communist Party. He
will be responsible for organizing a new local
poll. Most of the press saluted the event, arguing
that it marks a potential breakthrough in the way
Beijing deals with dissent.
However, aside
from that, there are several other important
lessons to learn from the Wukan case. First, the
objective reasons: revolutions are very hard by
themselves in China (see
China: The impossible revolution Asia Times
Online, October 2005 ).
Moreover, Chinese
leaders are much smarter, more adaptable, and more
nimble than some of the caricatures commonly
traded abroad and also in China. They can sense
the direction of the wind and can change their
ways. If they do not change, it may also be an
indication that the wind does not blow very
strongly.
In other words, political
reforms in China are possible, and the leaders may
lend their ears to it, but they must be first
fully convinced it is the solution that will give
peace to the country, not bring chaos to it. In
fact, the communists are good at accomplishing
what every power does when challenged: co-opt the
rebels.
In this case - because this is
often the way in China - it is very likely that
Lin had ties and discussions with provincial
authorities long before his appointment as party
chief.
This solution, from the rulers'
side and the side of the common people, proves
that rebels do not want to topple the Communist
Party, but just want to have concrete advantages -
less corruption and more money distributed. The
Chinese rebels, so far at least, do not have an
ideological and overwhelming project to change the
political system.
That would make goals
more complicated to achieve for the rebels (it is
hard to change a political system especially in a
large country like China), and also it would make
it harder for the rulers to compromise (how can
they compromise with someone who wants them out of
power and suddenly change the system used to run
the country?).
In fact, this attitude,
which is not ultimately confrontational, could be
the basis for a healthy political dialogue between
the people and political leaders, and it could
serve as a vehicle for the recruitment of a new
class of cadres who could bring new energy to the
party.
This is a long-term trend, however.
One more immediate consequence of this solution in
Wukan is that local party chiefs have been warned
- they only have the conditional support of
Beijing. They have to manage the situation well;
otherwise, Beijing will intervene and dismiss them
by siding with the people who are rebelling.
This - being China, the land of plotters
and schemers - could kindle new political
dynamics. Local ambitious people - or even gangs -
could start to blackmail local authorities: give
me a piece of the cake, or I will start a riot
because of which you will lose your post. The
influence of gangs in some local elections is not
a new phenomenon in China or elsewhere, and in
southern Italy (where this writer comes from), it
is an established pattern of influence.
From this, there may be developments in
China leading to more sophisticated political
mechanisms. Higher authorities may want to have
greater representative powers vested in them (by
being elected by a greater number of people),
which could allow them to investigate and crack
down on cases where gangs and local mafias attempt
to use the new freedom to move up the political
ladder.
Yet the long-term solution to this
cannot be reverting to Maoist-style crackdowns:
people will simply not tolerate the massive loss
of freedom that goes with those old fashion
anti-mafia campaigns. The rule by small abuses of
small gangs can't be resolved by substituting the
rule by large abuses of a large government.
After some brief relief, eventually people
will regret accepting the small abuses of the
small gangs. Many in the party may realize that
from the point of view of greater political
stability, more widespread elections are more
easily controlled and cleaner than smaller
elections where small amounts of money and a few
thugs can bend results one way or another.
On a very immediate level, Wukan is a huge
boost for Wang Yang, the Guangdong party chief;
and his immediate mentor, President Hu Jintao.
Wang Yang, formerly the Chongqing party chief, had
been under pressure since Bo Xilai took over
Chongqing. A dialectic between the two models
(roughly: more state-controlled with Bo, a more
free-wheeling market with Wang) started a huge
debate in China about the future direction of the
country.
Now, the fact that Wang Yang had
to face this challenge in Wukan and came up with a
brilliant solution puts him in a very good
position for an important spot on the Standing
Committee of the Politburo, which should be chosen
at the Party Congress this autumn. Here we also
have an indication of the Wang Yang political
agenda.
On January 4, shortly before the
solution of the Wukan case, when talks with rebel
leaders were likely underway, Wang said at a
provincial party plenum, "30 years ago, the reform
focused on shaking off the shackles of ideology;
today's reform must focus on breaking the
constraints of the existing pattern of vested
interests. If the direction of reform is decided
only by this interest structure, the reform can no
longer proceed." [1]
Breaking the shackles
of existing interest groups (see China's
misread property 'bubble' Asia Times Online,
October 27, 2010 ), which are thwarting change in
the country, and relaunching reforms, now, 20
years after Deng Xiaoping's trip to the south,
which restarted reforms after the 1989 Tiananmen
crackdown, is an important theme being discussed
in China at the moment.
Wang, certainly
with Hu Jintao's support, is stating his position,
which becomes much stronger after the Wukan
solution and the result of the Taiwan elections,
which went also according to Hu's wishes (see Ma's
re-election rings loudest on the mainland Asia
Times Online, January 19, 2012 and Hu
Jintao the real Taiwan election victor Asia
Times Online, December 11, 2011 ).
The
last element in the Wukan case, the consequences,
is still a very open issue. Can the Wukan
experience help Beijing in confronting protests in
places like Tibet or Xinjiang, where local
grievances are compounded with religious and
ethnic differences, and where prejudice on both
sides plays a role?
Here the situation is
far more complicated because forces outside of
China, such as the Tibetan people surrounding the
Dalai Lama and Tibetan youth organizations, may
have a hand in this. However, again there is a
lesson: Chinese leaders have opened a season of
creative political thinking, which can be riskier
but can also bring greater results.
Note 1. See Nanfang
ribao, January 5, 2012, Wang Yang canjia
xiaozu taoloun: shenhua gaige yao ganyu dapo liyi
geju.
Francesco Sisci is a
columnist for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore and
can be reached at fsisci@gmail.com
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