SPEAKING
FREELY Rising tide of conflict in South
China Sea By Elliot Brennan
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Sovereignty over the
Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
is continually cited as one of the most important
security issues for the 21st century. That body of
water is believed to contain significant reserves
of deep-sea minerals and hydrocarbons; some
estimates compare the quantity of gas to that of
Qatar.
Additionally, and perhaps more
importantly for the wider region, the waters
around the potentially resource-rich islands is
one of
the most heavily
trafficked Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in
the world, making them a key concern for the
region and the world economy. If access were
inhibited, maritime trade - a key component of 90
percent of all international trade - would meet
with costly delays. The result would be a
devastating ripple effect on the wider global
economy.
Similarly, any conflict in the
South China Sea could draw the navies of the world
to the brink of war. The increasing militarization
of the region is a growing concern for Asia and
the international community at large.
As
well as the immediate claimants in the sea -
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and
Malaysia - other countries in the region have
entered the dispute to ensure the security of
trade flows through the sea and the stability of
the region. Further, the key claimants, as well as
Australia, Japan, and India, have all recently
contracted significant improvements to their naval
capacities and many have engaged in large-scale
joint naval exercises with the US and India.
Concern over the South China Sea and the
rise of China has led to a significant
recalibration of US foreign policy and has shifted
the scales of power in the region. As US President
Barack Obama stated in an address to the
Australian Parliament in November 2011, the US has
"made a deliberate and strategic decision, as a
Pacific nation, [that] the United States will play
a larger and long-term role in shaping this region
and its future".
Marines, submarines
and the regional response In November, as
part of this re-engagement, the US opened a naval
base in Darwin, Australia. Some 2,500 US marines
will be stationed there. The move increases the US
presence in the region, adding to the
approximately 30,000 US personnel currently based
in Japan, 28,000 in South Korea and 38,000 in
Hawaii. According to official US Department of
Defense figures, almost 22,000 marines were
stationed in the East Asia-Pacific region in
September 2011, a 20 percent increase on the
previous year. US Navy personnel in the East
Asia-Pacific region also increased by 80 percent
to 18,302.
Japan, the regional naval
powerhouse, has also become more active and begun
military cooperation with the Philippines and will
stage joint naval exercises this year with India.
This is not surprising given that almost 90
percent of Japan's energy passes through the South
China Sea.
Vietnam last year announced the
purchase of six diesel-electric Kilo-class
submarines from Russia that should be operational
by 2014. India made a similar purchase some years
ago and has agreed to share its operational
know-how of the vessels with Vietnam, which also
purchased eight Sukhoi Su-30MK2 fighter jets.
Indonesia is also increasing its naval
capacity. In December, South Korean company Daewoo
agreed to build three diesel-powered
1,400-ton-class submarines for Jakarta, which had
been searching for a contractor since 2007.
Australia is contracting the design and
construction of 12 new submarines to replace its
aging Collins-class fleet of six vessels. If
European off-the-shelf submarine designs are
contracted, the fleets could operate together,
seeing Australia's submarine fleet trebled.
The Future Defense Submarine Project will
mark Australia's largest-ever defense initiative,
indicating current concerns in its defense elite.
In 2010, after the release of an Australian
defense white paper, Defense Minister Stephen
Smith emphasized the importance of US cooperation
in future naval exercises.
The 2013
release of the Boeing-built P-8 Poseidon, a
surveillance aircraft with anti-submarine-warfare
capabilities, may also have a wide impact on the
security of the region. India has ordered 12 and,
after an initial expression of interest, a
decision from the Royal Australian Air Force is
pending.
In January, Chinese Assistant
Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin urged Asian countries
to do away with "Cold War mentalities" in dealing
with complex regional issues. Yet despite this
request, alliances are being formed in the region
and they will likely present future problems.
A 'core national interest' The
strategic importance of the South China Sea for
Beijing is twofold - control of a crucial SLOC and
the capability for maritime-access denial, as well
as access to significant energy resources for a
hungry Chinese economy.
Many analysts
indicate that the US re-engagement in the region
is in response to Beijing's 2010 declaration that
the South China Sea was of "core national
interest". Previously, the use of such rhetoric
has been reserved solely for Taiwan and Tibet. It
is therefore not surprising that many see this as
a significant recalibration of Beijing's foreign
policy. Recent posturing by China, and a string of
international maritime incidents, would indicate
this to be the case. This policy shift has been
bolstered by the sexcentenary celebrations of
China's most famous sea voyages by Zheng He, one
of world's first great seafarers.
Articles
in the government-run daily newspaper Global Times
have demonstrated more bellicosity. One example is
the September 2011 article titled "Time to teach
those around South China Sea a lesson". As a
result, it is becoming increasingly difficult for
China to back down in the territorial dispute
given the rising nationalist sentiments over the
issue in the country.
To avoid conflict,
military confidence-building measures (as defined
in Beijing's white paper "China's National Defense
in 2010") between the US and the People's
Liberation Army need to increase, as well as
greater regional dialogue. These measures are not
in themselves solutions to rising tensions, but
they are nonetheless productive in averting open
conflict.
Some agreement has occurred over
the past 12 months, most notably the signing of an
accord between China and Vietnam to create a
hotline for emergencies and twice-yearly meetings
to discuss issues relating to the South China Sea.
However, to be effective, these agreements need to
be inclusive and regional rather than exclusive
and bilateral. Unfortunately this approach is
unlikely, as the bilateral negotiations give China
the upper hand.
Some analysts are now
discussing the "Finlandization" of the region. The
likeness of this exists - China's strategy in the
region is that of any burgeoning power; it asserts
its influence through divide and rule, sticks and
economic carrots (such as described in a Policy
Brief No 78 on China's near-monopoly of rare-earth
elements, published by the Institute for Security
and Development Policy, Stockholm). It has led
Asian states to bicker among themselves, further
weakening their positions. Smaller Asian states
are simply unable or unwilling to front up to
China in a David-and-Goliath battle.
This
has been a catalyst for US re-engagement in the
region and for growing regional militarization,
but also indicates the possibility of a new
cold-war scenario as the US and China lock horns.
Greater attention by the US in the
Asia-Pacific region, at least in the short term,
has reset the chessboard, one previously dominated
by China. However, it also has the potential to
destabilize the region further. Should the global
economy fall back into recession, Beijing may be
forced to increase nationalist rhetoric to stave
off the unrest that mass unemployment would
inevitably bring. The South China Sea dispute
offers perfect fuel for this rhetorical fire.
While open conflict does not appear
imminent given current Sino-US economic
co-dependence, these escalations - naval buildups,
tense dialogue, and an uncertain economic outlook
- coupled with the lack of confidence-building
measures merit the issue ever closer attention
from the international community.
Elliot Brennan is editor at the
Institute for Security and Development Policy
(ISDP), Stockholm, Sweden. This piece is a revised
version of a Policy Brief for ISDP. The opinions
expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of ISDP or its
sponsors.
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