SPEAKING
FREELY Wukan: Democracy or crisis
management? By Gene Q
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
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The first ever
"free, transparent and democratic election" in the
People's Republic of China's short history ended
smoothly on Saturday. But will the vote's outcomes
meet the high expectations surrounding it?
Expectations are way too high among
international observers. One critical point seems
to have been missed: the Chinese state is still
powerful, while Wukan is just one village.
Key to understanding the vote's
significance lies in not seeing this poll as a
milestone of grassroots democratic movement, but
rather as an example of
crisis management by Beijing.
Observers
need to wonder whether the government really
wanted to "solve" or to simply "get rid of" the
Wukan confrontation.
Since September 2011,
Wukan residents have had three main complaints: Of
extremely unfair land acquisition and
compensation, of a unlawful Village Committee
election in 2011 - which led to non-transparent
and unaccountable village governance - and over
the "natural" death of Xue Jinbo, a protest
leader, in police custody in December 2011.
Beyond the chain of cause and effect, it
is not difficult to find the key issue: unfair
land-grabbing and meager compensation by the
unlawfully elected and thus unaccountable Village
Committee.
However, are Village Committees
really so powerful in China? No, obviously not,
these are errand-runners and scapegoats. The
essential reasons behind the Wukan confrontation
are better attributed to:
1. The current
developmental model of Chinese economy, which
heavily relies on investment and construction,
driving the land-grabs.
2. The current
system of tax distribution between central and
local governments, which makes land selling an
indispensable part of local revenue;
3.
the dual system of land ownership between urban
and rural populations created by the Hukou system,
which is the ultimate reason for such unfair rural
land-grabs all over China.
For rural
control and to symbolize a socialist/communist
feature of the Chinese regime, the Hukou system
divides land ownership into two kinds: rural lands
belong to the collective, and urban lands to the
nation.
Under this system, when taking
urban lands, you need to consult every land user;
while taking rural lands, you only need to go
through the collective owner, namely the Village
Committee. So a joint-interest group of bureaucrat
capitalists has been taking rural land cheaply in
recent years, while villagers who are taken
advantage of mostly target their ire at Village
Committees.
Putting aside institutional
restraints, such as the Hukou system, which are
difficult to reform in a short period of time,
observers are left with one straightforward
question: will the taken land in Wukan be
returned, or will compensation reach satisfactory
levels and fair trade standards?
The
answer is negative, as the governments are both
unwilling to and incapable of returning the land
acquired or paying Wukan villagers off.
Under the current system of tax
distribution between central and local governments
set up in 1994, the central government is
responsible for nearly 50% of all public revenue,
while almost 90% of fiscal investment is carried
out by local governments. It is acknowledged
widely among local government officials that
without revenues from land selling they could not
even pay staff adequate salaries.
Huge
debts carried by local governments after many
years of ill-considered duplicate investments
aimed at improving Gross Domestic Product figures,
has not only result in excess production
capacities but also massive government defaults.
It has become almost impossible for local
governments to give up the land-grab based
economic development model at this stage, no
matter how many social protests it causes (There
were 180,000 social protests in 2010, with 65%
aiming at unfair land-grabs and related
compensation).
Will the "natural" death of
Xue Jinbo in police custody be investigated? No.
The reason is simple, to hold the Lufeng city
government responsible is too high a price to pay
to ease this small village's dissent. Actually, it
has been reported that a deal including a pension
of 900,000 Chinese yuan (US$143,000) has been for
the family's silence.
Will any officials
dealt poorly with this incident be held
responsible and punished? Also, no. It seemed to
the public that the previous Party Sectary of
Lufeng city, Chen Zengxin, had been removed as a
punishment, but the truth is he was promoted to be
the head of Committee of Law and Politics in
Shanwei Municipal (one level higher than Lufeng
city in the administrative hierarchy), in charge
of currently most popular movement in Guangdong,
eliminating crimes, also known as "Dahei".
So the price the current government paid
to get rid of the Wukan incident is actually only
to "remove the scapegoats", and probably elect
some new ones at the Village Committee election.
To ensure this was successful example of
crisis management, the election seemed transparent
and even democratic. But so what? This is just one
village, with now very limited land to sell.
Will Wukan become a model in dealing with
future incidents then? It remains to be seen,
since this was a unique case in many aspects:
Firstly, given the active involvement of young
netizens and close location to Hong Kong, this
case saw quick and accurate reporting.
Secondly, the rational and courageous
leader of the movement, Lin Zulian, has shown that
such movements can be united and media savvy.
Thirdly, the reformist-minded official
involved, Wang Yang, also known as the "Young
Marshal", has shown how international media
coverage can be shaped to a certain extent.
This crisis management will help Wang and
President Hu Jintao's group send a signal to the
public, especially liberal-minded intellectuals
who can be crucial in shaping online opinion. We
can read the support for Wang’s handling of Wukan
incident from the reports on various state media,
such as the People's Daily, the Global Times, and
the Xinhua News.
It is also noteworthy
that in other recent confrontations between
villagers and governments after Wukan", such as in
Haimen of Guangdong, and Cangnan of Zhejiang, when
media attention was limited and controlled at an
early stage, the governments almost unanimously
chose traditional iron-fisted strategies instead
of the placatory and praised moves in Wukan.
Besides, nearly all village elections are
somehow illegal, in terms of electoral committee
formation, candidate selection and vote buying,
but almost nowhere else such as Wukan has ever
been granted a fresh election. These factors deny
the emergence of a Wukan model and support the
fundamental proposition to view Wukan incident as
a crisis management.
Nonetheless, despite
all uniqueness and irreproducibility, some general
implications can be read from this incident.
First, as China's economic development
continues and social inequalities grow, social
consciousness is continuing to rise, particularly
among netizens.
Second, via the
"authoritarian resilience" by the government
versus the "rightful resistance" of the people,
the state-society power balance is shifting
dramatically. The inevitable emergence of a more
and more independent civil society will gradually
change the incentives, behavior and values of the
elites.
It is fair to say, although there
is no meaningful political reform nearing in
today's China, it must be noted that the
pre-conditions for democratization are growing
ever more mature by the day.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
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