SINOGRAPH China's Ides of
March By Francesco Sisci
It is the biggest scandal to hit China in
nearly a decade, but it is much more than that.
The fall of Bo Xilai, Communist Party chief of
Chongqing (a megalopolis of more than 30 million
inhabitants) and member of the Politburo, who was
removed from office last Thursday - March 15 -
could be the turning point in China's difficult
road to political reform.
His removal
occurred on the anniversary of the most important
"political reform" of ancient Western
civilization. On the Ides, the 15th, of March 44
BC, Julius Caesar was murdered in Rome, paving the
way for the end of the Republic and the beginning
of the Empire.
It is the end of Bo's rule
in Chongqing and of the idea he touted, that China
could still find inspiration of some sort from the
bad old days of Red Guards and the Cultural
Revolution. It is concrete
evidence that China is
really turning the page, as Bo's dismissal came
just one day after Premier Wen Jiabao announced
the necessity of political reforms.
In
fact, in just a few days Hong Kong will experiment
with some form of democratic elections, and as
that city for decades represented China's ultimate
model of economic reforms, it is not unlikely that
it will also be its model for political reforms.
The Bo Xilai affair sheds light on the new
political dynamic within the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), which in some ways marks a departure
from the political struggles of the past.
The rise of Bo in the first place was a
departure from the ordinary path of communist
ascent. When he arrived in Chongqing five years
ago, he seemed to have reached his pinnacle as a
politician. Even his promotion from trade minister
to head of Chongqing had been difficult, and each
additional step, culminating with his ambition to
get into the party's top leadership, the Standing
Committee of the Politburo - the nine most
powerful politicians in China - seemed impossible.
Bo changed the situation, by launching the first
political campaign in the history of
post-revolution mainland China.
He
attacked the mafia gangs that dominated the life
of the metropolis, and returned to the "leftist"
principles and egalitarian spirit of the Cultural
Revolution (the movement launched by Mao Zedong
from 1966 to 1976), and recruited and organized a
number of intellectuals to advise him (see Bo
Xilai focuses multiparty vision, Apr 20,
2011). His initiatives were dangerous because they
involved actions that had not been previously
sanctioned by Beijing. But he had an anchor of
safety because in China the conservative group is
the "left", and it's hard to attack someone for
conservative policies. Even more, he gained
support from common people, something that,
although not paramount, remains important in
Chinese politics. Moreover, anti-mafia campaigns
and addressing social inequalities were and are
among principles advocated by Beijing.
But
he gave them a new relevance, combining them into
a kind of modern neo-Maoism, and in so doing he
created the "Chongqing model" that at one point
seemed destined to spread across the country like
wildfire.
The model, however, also
included elements that seemed bizarre considering
the growth of China over the past 30 years.
Private enterprises in Chongqing did not have an
easy time - Bo preferred state enterprises and
promoted competition between them. As a sign of
the new climate, local television carried no
commercials.
But the country's growth over
the past three decades was driven by private
enterprise. Limiting private opportunities in the
medium and long terms would stifle China's
development, an absolute strategic priority for
the people and their leaders.
Also,
limiting the development of private enterprises
reduces opportunities for social advancement to a
single channel: the bureaucracy, which dominates
both the government and state enterprises. In the
medium and long terms, this would have been
catastrophic, because private enterprise is now
also a form of social promotion. Many outstanding
people, left out of the bureaucracy, would remain
cut off and thus could stir up trouble.
In
the short term, however, Bo's policies won popular
support. In China, ordinary people accept the
dominance of the state or its companies, but
resent the arrogance of the new rich - those who
made a fortune "somehow". Fighting corruption, the
mafia, and the new rich became an attractive
populist platform in a country with growing social
differences and resentment to be fanned, but
undermined the very basis of Chinese growth: a
state that is small and interferes little in
business.
Against this model stood
Guangdong, the southern province that encouraged
private enterprise and led by Bo's predecessor in
Chongqing, Wang Yang. Wang encouraged a growth
model that was more liberal, more pro-market, and
opposed strong state intervention.
Thus
the removal of Bo from Chongqing's government
highlights an important aspect of economic policy,
because his replacement is Zhang Dejiang, a deputy
premier who was in charge of industrial policy and
was the Guangdong party secretary before Wang.
In other words, Beijing is stating that
the fight against the mafia and efforts to reduce
social differences cannot undermine the market and
the reforms that further it. On the contrary, the
leadership believes that these should be expanded
and supported. That is why Bo had to be
eliminated, as the political figure who - along
with the Chongqing model - had become a threat to
the reforms themselves.
However, this
decision brings China to a conundrum. Bo was
popular, and pro-market political reforms are in
some sense dictated against popular sentiment.
That is, the liberal system of economy and
politics beloved of the West is promulgated in
China to some extent against the will of the
people. In fact, if there were free elections in
Chongqing and Bo could freely campaign, he
probably would win.
China faces the
problem of demagoguery through democracy, leading
to the well-known trade-off in Western systems
between short-term gains (in this case, a more
equitable system) against long-term advantages (in
this case, China's rapid development). This
trade-off in the West, when it doesn't find a
suitable compromise and balance, can stall
political decision-making or fuel regressive
policies. In the Chinese case, political reforms
may in the short term run up against the will of
the majority, as Chongqing already regrets Bo's
departure, according to some local observers.
As in the case of Julius Caesar more than
2,000 years ago, the biggest danger is a
conservative backlash. The death of Caesar
provoked a new civil war in Rome and in the end
didn't guarantee the survival of the republic, but
instead brought Caesar's nephew, Augustus, to
absolute power. In Rome the historical trend led
to a dictatorial concentration of power,
anticipated by the vicious civil wars before
Augustus' rise. Today in China, and in the world,
the trend is for liberal and democratic reforms.
But this can't protect the country from political
backlash, especially since democracy and a
backward-looking, leftist populism are closely
linked.
The next test for China's
political reform - Hong Kong's chief-executive
election next weekend - thus becomes crucial as an
indication of how the mainland wants to move
toward democracy. The selection of three
candidates by Beijing can not only be a way to
make sure the city government doesn't become the
hotbed of opposition to Beijing, but also a way to
curb populist tendencies that could undermine the
local liberal and pluralistic atmosphere. That
seems the ultimate irony, from a superficial
perspective - liberal reforms could be imposed
against popular, democratic will.
It could
also be the lesson to draw from all of this. As
economic reforms are creating greater social
differences and conflicting interest groups with
different agendas, these interests are trying to
find a political expression. Although the
situations in Chongqing and Hong Kong are
different, they are both occasions of following
some kind of experiment. As Sun Liping said, there
were real issues raised in Chongqing, although the
solution offered was deeply unsatisfactory.
This delicate moment of transition will
test the maturity of the CCP. For the Chongqing
affair to lead to more reform rather than less,
the side that trumped the leftists should not
gloat, and the leftists should not contest their
defeat. A liberal system works only when an
ethical agreement underpins it - all parties
accept the rules of the game.
No political
system is totally fair and square. In the 2000 US
presidential election, Al Gore could have pressed
ahead with his request to recast the Florida
ballots, but this would have undermined America's
political system. He gave up and conceded defeat
because he cared for his country more than for his
political career and because he realized he had
too much to lose if he went ahead with his
requests.
In a similar way, the Catholic
Church differentiates between Francis of Assisi
and Martin Luther in their approaches to the unity
of the Church. Both were right, Catholic
theologians now admit, but when pressed to bow to
Rome, the first agreed the second rebelled. At the
moment of controversy with the pope, Francis
didn't want to break the unity of the Church and
thus nuanced his positions; Luther didn't care to
uphold the unity of the Church and made his ideas
even stronger.
They were two different
historical times and with different social and
political forces behind them. But the first case,
Catholic theologians believe, brought a huge
renewal to the Church and Western society, while
the second broke apart Western Christianity
forever. The interest in and the significance of
holding together a system can be more important
than affirming one's righteousness.
On the
other hand, as Sun Liping underscored, the victor
has to recognize the true issues of the defeated
agenda. Now, a break in its solidarity is the
biggest danger for the CCP, and for a country
beloved of stability. This is especially so if, as
Wen announced, China is embarking on a difficult
voyage in the uncharted waters of political
reforms.
One is worried whether a unitary
spirit exists in China's politics.
"When
asked which of the other two candidates [for the
post of chief executive in Hong Kong] he'd vote
for, if forced to choose, Mr [Albert] Ho paused.
'Both are unacceptable,' he said. 'If I really
have to make a choice [between them], that's like
putting a gun to my head. And I'd say, 'Shoot.'"
Albert Ho, chairman of the Hong Kong
Democratic Party, certainly knows he has no chance
of victory in next Sunday's election for chief
executive. So what is he suggesting, that Hong
Kong people should kill themselves, or that he
will commit suicide after the ballot? Either
choice goes against the very grain of liberal
democracy, which often picks not the best option
but the least bad one, and accepts a loss to
uphold the unity of the system.
China's
political and economic transition seems too unruly
and is occurring in a country too big and at same
time too old (the thousands of years of
civilization separated from the West) and too new
(the true renewal of the country started only 30
years ago) for democracy to produce reliable
outcomes. Democracy could devolve into
demagoguery, as has happened many times in
history. Then the ruling party has to act as the
leader in a republic in the absence of popular
democracy, to guide the country eventually to
democracy by fostering a liberal society.
The task is huge and very delicate. Many
things can go wrong. The choices of men and policy
to be made at the next party congress in the
autumn will show to China and the world whether
this leadership is up to the mission.
Francesco Sisci is a columnist
for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore and can be
reached at fsisci@gmail.com
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