SPEAKING
FREELY After the storm in the South China
Sea By Nazery Khalid
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
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The recent stand-off
between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the
South China Sea has once again sent the political
temperature in this strategic sea lane soaring to
worrying heights. The prospect of a lull in
tensions has ebbed and given way to choppy seas.
Sparks flew again when the biggest ship in the
Philippines' naval fleet, Gregorio del Pilar came
across eight Chinese fishing vessels in the
disputed waters near the Scarborough shoal.
As the Philippines navy, which claimed
that the Chinese vessels
were trespassing the
Philippines' waters, prepared to board the fishing
vessels and arrest the crew, two Chinese
surveillance vessels dispatched to the area
positioned themselves between the Gregorio del
Pilar and the fishing vessels. Each side then
traded accusations of trespassing and ordered the
other to leave the waters.
The incident
triggered a frenzy of diplomatic efforts by
Beijing and Manila to prevent the situation from
deteriorating further. This however was peppered
by volleys of strongly worded condemnations and
the exchange of warnings between the two nations.
At the point of writing, vessels from both sides
are still in a tense face-off.
Manila said
the incident was "a clear violation of Philippine
sovereignty" and described the Scarborough shoal
as an "integral part" of its territory. This was
matched by Beijing's description of the incident
as a "harassment of Chinese fishermen" by armed
Philippine naval personnel, while emphasizing that
the shoal, a mere 124 nautical miles off Luzon
Island in the northern Philippines, is in China's
"territorial waters".
High
voltage The standoff did not happen in a
vacuum. The Scarborough shoal incident is the
latest in a long line of confrontations between
China and the Philippines in the Sea.
Tensions between the two states have been
building over the last few years. The Philippines
accused Chinese vessels of harassing its fishermen
in waters Manila claimed to be within the State's
territory. China protested a Philippines vessel
undertaking exploration activities in disputed
waters in the Sea.
Adding to the tension,
the Philippines has called upon the United States
to come to its aid in the event of a naval
conflict in the South China Sea. This has greatly
upset China since it rejects any intervention from
outside parties in what it insists is a regional
matter to be resolved on a bilateral basis by the
disputed parties.
Through the infamous
"nine dotted lines", China stakes a claim that
stretches well into the territorial waters of the
littoral states of the sea. The claim is devoid of
any legal basis and has been flatly rejected by
other claimant states. China's increasingly
aggressive acts toward enforcing this claim have
unnerved the other claimant states and stoked
tensions in the region.
Standing in the
middle How will the post-Scarborough shoal
incident pan out? Will it fizzle like previous
spats or will it get out of hand and come to an
ugly, bloody, deadly conclusion? Will China and
the Philippines take a deep breath and live up to
their pronouncements of seeking diplomatic
solutions to the dispute?
These are
questions that other claimant states are
particularly keen on finding out. Nations such as
Malaysia and Brunei, which have not experienced
the kind of face-off with China that the
Philippines and Vietnam have had, will be closely
observing the dynamics of such a confrontation.
They will surely keep a close watch on
post-Scarborough shoal developments to prepare
their options well in advance. The progression of
events that unfold between China and the
Philippines will provide a crucial indication in
how China will act and react in the future, and
consequently, how the party in dispute should
respond.
The Philippines' inability to
safeguard its interests in the Sea was cruelly
exposed during the Scarborough shoal saga. The
fact that China only dispatched ships belonging to
paramilitary units to face off with a Philippine
Navy ship is telling. This should provide plenty
of food for thought for other claimant states on
the need to back their posturing to defend their
interests at sea with the capacity and capability
to do so.
This does not mean other
claimant states could give the might of China's
navy a run for its money in a conflict, or even
attempt to confront China militarily. They must
walk the fine line of telling China it is wrong to
act like a big bully while at the same time
maintain harmonious relations with this regional
giant and safeguard their other national
interests.
Can the likes of Malaysia and
Brunei expect their relations with China to remain
cordial over their overlapping claims in the Sea?
Would China continue to view its relations with
these claimant states favorably if disputes in the
Sea mount and those countries find themselves in
China's crosshairs? Given Beijing's stern
declaration that the South China Sea is an area of
"core interest", one should assume that China will
be just as adversarial with other claimant states
if they threaten its interests in the Sea.
Cure for the itch The fact that
the incident occurred over fishing underscores the
need for an agreement or joint-development between
the Philippines and China - and for that matter
among other claimant states - to explore fishery
resources together and to agree on the conduct,
regulations and jurisdiction of fishing
activities. This is crucial to avoid the kind of
situation like in Scarborough shoal from
reoccurring.
Cooperation breeds
understanding and confidence. It is a key aspect
to peace that is currently needed in abundance
amid the tense times in the Sea to prevent the
parties in dispute from doing anything rash.
There is an urgent need for claimant
states to engage one another at very high
diplomatic levels to ensure such a stand-off does
not reoccur. For them to hope that there will be a
binding Code of Conduct appearing soon to save the
day would be rather unrealistic.
To this
end, it would be helpful for the parties involved
to explore other modalities to ensure that
situations like the Scarborough shoal incident do
not escalate into something more serious. A model
like the Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement
(INCSEA) may be worth considering as an interim
measure to prevent conflicts.
Over and
above these operational remedies, the disputing
parties must address situations arising from
unresolved claims and counterclaims. While we can
be encouraged by the progress made between ASEAN
and China to implement the Declaration of Conduct
(DOC), it would be far-fetched to expect the DOC
to be the magic wand that can resolve rifts among
ASEAN and China. They must no longer shy away from
discussing the issue on existing regional
multilateral platforms such as ASEAN Regional
Forum and East Asia Summit. While ASEAN and China
continue to work together to implement the DOC,
more pressure must also be exerted on China to be
transparent and clarify its claims in the Sea
based on international law and principles.
Breaking the habit It is
certainly not in anyone's interest to see a
further escalation of the situation in the
Scarborough shoal, although the possibility of a
full-blown conflict breaking out is rather
distant. Nevertheless, it would be lazy of us to
simply shrug off the incident and believe the
disputing parties will move on and be nice to each
other again until another incident happens.
This approach has not helped in avoiding
maritime tensions in the past and it does not
appear that it will work in untangling the current
knot between China and the Philippines. Even if
the tension dies down - as we all hope it does -
there will surely be another incident in the Sea
between them. Something more concrete than wishing
the tension to subside without resolutely
addressing the root causes of the problem needs to
be done to avoid reoccurrences. We cannot just
accept the periodic outbreak of incidents in the
Sea as a given.
One wonders that if push
comes to shove, will the parties in the dispute
fire shots at one another? This possibility cannot
be dismissed, judging from the rhetoric used by
both sides immediately following the incident at
the Scarborough shoal. Beijing condemned Manila's
conduct as "beyond tolerance" and a "blatant
challenge to Chinese territorial integrity", while
Manila stressed that it would be "prepared to
secure its sovereignty" if it was "challenged".
There seems to be little attempt by both
sides to temper their language with diplomatic
niceties. Their pronouncements indicate that both
sides are willing to show some teeth in order to
safeguard their interests, despite diplomatic
maneuvering to calm the tension.
Further
escalation could draw the involvement of the
United States, which has thrown its support behind
the Philippines in its disputes with China.
Although Washington has declared that it does not
side with any of the claimant states and has
denied that it is out to "contain" China, many
analysts believe that the "pivot to Asia" policy
of the United States is designed to rein China's
growing influence in this key theater.
It
is easy to understand China's grievances
concerning diplomatic and military actions by the
United States in the region, which Beijing
believes are targeted towards China. Washington's
support towards the Philippines, its declaration
of having a 'national interest' in the South China
Sea, its stationing of Marines in northern
Australia, and its conduct of naval exercises with
the Philippines and Vietnam in disputed waters
have irked China that rejects the "intervention"
by external powers in maritime disputes. It is
important to understand Manila's verve in standing
up against Beijing in the context of these
developments. No doubt the Philippines is
emboldened by the presence of the United States in
the region and by the latter's support in Manila's
disputes against China. Whether or not Washington
would come to Manila's aid in times of conflict is
quite another thing, yet its public support has
added a worrying new dimension to the South China
Sea saga.
To be sure, not everyone in the
Philippines or China supports the hawkish
positions taken by those countries. However,
should the spat turn ugly, nationalistic
sentiments on both sides could hit fever pitch.
Already there were public protests in the
Philippines condemning China's actions. Goaded by
the vociferous protests and the angry local
constituencies, Beijing and Manila could take a
course of action that may result in a dispute
spiraling into military conflict.
Such is
the logic of unintended consequences. This could
unleash similar sentiments in other claimant
states should they find themselves in a similar
situation. An already tense situation would be
made even more unnerving if parties in dispute
assume an increasingly adversarial stance against
one another.
This of course would not be
desirable at all. While tough talk may satisfy
domestic constituencies, it will not be helpful to
finding a diplomatic solution to disputes in the
Sea.
One step closer One wonders
how united the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) members will be when they meet
with China in Phnom Penh later this year to push
forward an agenda for establishing a legally
binding code governing their conduct in the South
China Sea. Given the difficulty for them to come
up with an 'ASEAN position', taking into account
that not all members are claimant states and some
are considered close allies of China, the prospect
of a finalized Code of Conduct between ASEAN and
China in the near future is rather dim.
China has thus far not shown any signs of
wanting to change its stance on discussing
disputes in the sea on a multilateral platform. On
this basis, one should not put too much hope on
the 2011 agreement in Bali between ASEAN and China
to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea (COP), which was
signed in 2002 to settle disputes in the Sea
peacefully. While the agreement to implement the
COP was a positive development, it has to be
emphasized that the COP has failed to prevent
incidents in the Sea among the parties in dispute.
Following this latest incident with the
Philippines, it would be hard to imagine China
wanting to be tethered to a binding code of
conduct that will limit its strategic options. Add
Vietnam's equally strong stance against China in
maritime disputes and one is even more reluctant
to wager on China agreeing to engage ASEAN on the
matter anytime soon.
One hopes for reason
to prevail in the Scarborough shoal and other
disputed areas of the South China Sea for the sake
of regional peace, prosperity and stability. The
Sea hosts so much economic interests and strategic
importance to the littoral states as well as the
international community, and it is imperative that
the stakeholders ensure it remains peaceful and
accessible to all. However, when evaluating the
facts based on past and recent developments, one
cannot help but feel very worried that a
full-blown conflict is only a short fuse away.
Despite the current tensions, this most
recent maritime dispute is not unfamiliar. If and
when the tension cools off, many are optimistic
that the parties concerned will come away from the
Scarborough shoal incident with a renewed sense of
realization that any shots fired would only
disturb the peace that they and others cherish and
need. This may spur efforts to work towards
establishing long-lasting peace in the South China
Sea.
Nazery Khalid is a Senior
Fellow Malaysia-based policy research institute.
This piece is a revised version of a Policy Brief
for the Institute for Security and Development
Policy, Sweden. The opinions expressed in this
Policy Brief are the personal opinions of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Institute for Security and Development Policy
or its sponsors.
Speaking Freely is
an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
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