Peace
lies beyond the South China Sea
horizon By Jingdong Yuan
SYDNEY - The ongoing standoff between
China and the Philippines over the Scarborough
Shoal (Huangyan Island in Chinese) is again
focusing the international spotlight on the
long-standing territorial disputes between China
and a number of claimant states in the South China
Sea.
The latest tension began in early
April when a Philippine naval frigate confronted
Chinese fishermen and attempted to place them
under arrest under the charge of illegal fishing
and poaching in what Manila claims as its
territory.
Beijing responded by sending
its maritime surveillance vessels to the area to
block the Philippine warship. The two countries
subsequently entered into discussions with each
side standing
firm on its territorial
claims while pledging a diplomatic way out. At the
time of writing the Chinese maritime vessels and
fishing boats have reportedly left the Scarborough
Shoal. But the maritime disputes are far from
over.
Territorial disputes in the South
China Sea emerged in the early 1970s when it was
discovered that the region could contain
significant deposits of oil and natural gas. China
and Vietnam were embroiled in military clashes in
1974 and 1988 and in 1992 Beijing promulgated
legislation making territorial claims to the South
China Sea based on historical discoveries.
The 1990s saw an escalation of tensions
between China and the other Southeast Asian
claimants - Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei,
and the Philippines, with the 1995 Chinese
occupation of the Mischief Reef the most
controversial development. Since then, Beijing and
Manila, and subsequently China and the 10-member
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
entered into a series of dialogues and
negotiation, paving the way for the signing of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea in 2002.
Over the past few
years, however, some of the key claimant states to
the territorial disputes in the South China Sea,
principally China, Vietnam, and the Philippines,
have sought to reiterate and strengthen their
claims both through stating their positions
publicly and and by taking more assertive and at
time aggressive actions to stake out their claims
based on their own interpretations of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).
These include more active
maritime surveillance and exploration activities,
tussles over fishing grounds, arrests and
harassment of fishermen by each country's maritime
authorities, and threats and endangerment of
foreign navigation. These developments have caused
serious concerns over the potential escalation of
disputes into major maritime and military
conflicts.
This is in sharp contrast to
the relative peace and tranquility since the
signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 by China
and ASEAN countries. What happened?
The
Scarborough Shoal dispute is a reflection of the
underlying tension and competition between China
and its neighbors over sovereignty, resources, and
security in the South China Sea and has deeper
strategic drivers beyond the immediate zone of
potential conflict.
One is the growing
need of all the claimant states for energy and
resources in order to sustain growth and achieve
prosperity against shrinking land-based resources
and growing dependence on critical production
inputs imported from the Middle East, Africa, and
the Persian Gulf. This recognition of the
potential limits to future growth highlights the
importance of the South China Sea.
Second,
while none of the claimant states is unrealistic
enough to believe that it can secure its
territorial claims against the others short of
using military force and risking significant
diplomatic backlash and serious economic
consequences, each has strong incentives to stand
on and strengthen its claim, hoping to be better
positioned in future negotiations on the final
resolution of the dispute.
Rising
nationalism and the revolution in communications
provide accessible and increasingly influential
platforms for public opinions that in turn affect
foreign policy formulation and implementation,
making conciliation difficult. Witness the highly
nationalistic rhetoric in China's blogosphere and
anti-China demonstrations on the streets of Hanoi
and Ho Chi Minh City.
Third, for rising
powers such as China, a growing debate and
emerging consensus have informed leaderships that
sea power, even for continental countries, is the
key to commanding the global commons and an
essential ingredient of great powers in the
future. And finally, growth and prosperity over
the past two decades in East Asia provide the
financial wherewithal for military modernization,
in particular in the naval patrol and power
projection capabilities.
The geostrategic
ramifications of the ongoing territorial disputes
in the South China Sea go beyond their geographic
confines and affect US interests and its relations
with China. To begin with, the growing Chinese
assertiveness, whether misperceived or real,
raises serious questions about US interests and
staying power in the region, as well as the
credibility of its alliance commitments.
First, the re-emergence and
intensification of territorial disputes are taking
place during a period of perceived US retraction
from the region in the aftermath of the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars and the global financial
crisis of 2008, which have left Washington
increasingly focused on domestic issues and
budgetary woes. In contrast, the past decade has
witnessed the phenomenal rise of China, in
economic power, political influence, and military
capabilities.
Second, China's sovereignty
claims and its growing assertiveness directly
challenge what Washington has always regarded as
its fundamental right - freedom of navigation in
the South China Sea. This allows the US to carry
out its diplomatic and military missions and
fulfill its alliance commitments, including joint
military exercises, search and rescue, and
humanitarian assistance.
However, while
Beijing maintains that it does not challenge the
principle of freedom of navigation, it does raise
serious concerns over and publicly objects to the
military intelligence gathering and surveillance
close to China's naval installations. The Hainan
Island incident in 2001 and the USS
Impeccable incident of 2009 are reflection of
this growing tension between China and the United
States.
Third, being the smaller and
weaker parties to the South China Sea disputes,
Vietnam and the Philippines, and indeed other
ASEAN claimant states, naturally have strong
incentives to get US support to counter China. In
recent years, Hanoi and Manila have sought out and
engaged Washington in ever expanding military, as
well as diplomatic and economic ties, with defense
exchanges, naval port calls and joint exercises,
and purchases of US equipment. Manila in
particular has sought to secure firm commitments
from Washington with regard to the latter's
obligation to the 1951 mutual defense treaty
should the country get into military conflicts
with China.
This presents serious
challenges for the Barack Obama administration -
not least how to manage China's rise and not be
entrapped in the territorial disputes in the South
China Sea. The administration's "pivoting" or
"rebalancing" to East Asia is clearly driven by
its geo-strategic calculations against the
changing power relations in the region. But this
hedging does not preclude engaging China and
certainly does not preordain direct confrontation
between the world's two largest powers.
Clearly, the right approach for Washington
is to remain impartial while encouraging dialogue
among the claimant parties. To strengthen its own
case in maritime navigation, the US has to
seriously consider its legal status within the
framework of UNCLOS. But most importantly,
Washington and Beijing need to discuss and/or
implement existing and new bilateral mechanisms to
manage and prevent future incidents at sea that
could drag the two navies into open conflict. The
next round of Strategic and Economic Dialogue may
be the right platform to begin serious discussion.
Proper management and eventual resolution
of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea
requires both bilateral (China vis-a-vis its key
claimant states and US-China) and multilateral
efforts (ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN plus one,
plus three, East Asia Summit) for crisis
management, conflict control, and confidence
building. None is easy and requires strategic
vision and diplomacy, which are in critical
demands at a time of rising nationalism,
leadership transition, and the growing importance
of maritime resources for national economic
development.
Dr Jingdong Yuan is
Acting Director of the Center for International
Security Studies and an Associate Professor at the
Department of Government and International
Relations, University of Sydney.
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