The
'illogic' of China's North Korea
policy By Ralph A Cossa and
Brad Glosserman
BEIJING - Discussions in
Beijing about North Korea are always frustrating.
It's not so much due to the sharp divergence in
United States and Chinese thinking about how to
deal with Pyongyang; the two sides differ on many
issues.
No, the real problem is the
illogic of the Chinese position - at least from a
US perspective. Indeed, it would be hard to create
a policy toward North Korea that does more damage
to Chinese national interests than Beijing's
current approach toward Pyongyang.
The
standard explanation for Chinese policy goes like
this: while denuclearization is desired, stability
comes first. There is little chance that North
Korea can be persuaded to give up its weapons - at
least for a long time - as its arsenal is seen as
a form of
legitimacy and a
deterrent to regime change.
Moreover,
Beijing has limited influence in Pyongyang and
North Korea's real aim is a relationship with the
US, hopefully one that sidelines Seoul as well.
This logic produces a policy of minimal pressure
on Pyongyang, calls for good behavior by all
parties, demands that the US soften its position
and be more accommodative, and the fending off of
demands for Beijing to do more to bring Pyongyang
around.
Recent discussions in Beijing made
plain the ways that this policy undermines Chinese
interests.
China enables Pyongyang's
misbehavior. When dealing with North Korea, China
walks softly and has discarded the stick. Whether
motivated by ties once as close as "lips and
teeth", the desire to maintain whatever leverage
China has in Pyongyang, or the fear that pressure
might destabilize the North or prompt it to act
out, Beijing refuses to crack down on North Korean
misdeeds.
Instead, it offers diplomatic
cover and minimizes any punishment that might be
agreed upon by the international community. For
example, while Beijing quickly agreed to a United
Nations Security Council presidential statement
condemning the North's recent missile launch, it
quickly whittled down the list of North Korean
companies to be sanctioned from the 40 proposed by
the US, European Union, and others, to three.
The result is a feeling of impunity in
Pyongyang that leads to precisely the
destabilizing behavior that Beijing says it fears.
It has also bought China precious little goodwill
in the North; Beijing is insistent on the need to
give "face" to Pyongyang; with its antics,
Pyongyang shows little regard for China's "face".
China antagonizes its neighbors. The
readiness to back Pyongyang infuriates South
Koreans. Beijing's fear of offending North Korea
by even expressing condolences for the deaths of
South Korean citizens after the sinking of the
Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong
Island has hardened South Korean feelings toward
China.
Nearly 92% of South Koreans were
dissatisfied with Beijing's response to the
shelling incident and more than 58% wanted Seoul
to strongly protest, even if it meant damaging the
economic relationship with China. More than 60%
now consider China the biggest threat after
reunification, almost three times as many as
identified Japan.
South Koreans are
visibly offended by Beijing's call for "all
parties" to act responsibly when it is North Korea
that is the offender - and taking South Korean
lives in the process. In informal trilateral
discussions in Beijing last week, South Korean
frustration was palpable. We have long heard
similar views from Japanese.
China
contributes to the strengthening of the US
alliance system that it considers a tool of
encirclement. Pyongyang's provocations, combined
with China's refusal to do more to stop them, has
driven Seoul and Tokyo to consolidate military
relations with the US. Eager to strengthen the
deterrent, US alliances in Northeast Asia are
being modernized and reinforced, amid calls for
enhancing US extended deterrence.
Some in
Seoul (and even more foolishly in the US Congress)
are even calling for a redeployment of US tactical
nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. Their
common concern regarding the North is such that
South Korea and Japan are even stepping up
bilateral coordination among themselves, a
long-sought US goal, but one that has been
hindered by historical animosity between Seoul and
Tokyo.
China tarnishes its image as a
supporter of international law and norms and
undermines those norms. International law is
hollow if it has "no teeth". The protection
afforded Pyongyang and the refusal to see that UN
sanctions have consequences undermines attempts to
stop North Korea's misbehavior, encourages other
governments to act in similar ways, and makes a
mockery of international laws and institutions.
Countries that would prefer to rely on
international law instead develop ad hoc
mechanisms to prevent illegal behavior. Beijing is
seen as supporting international norms,
principles, and laws that are ineffectual and have
little impact on state behavior. China would be
hard-pressed to more strongly signal support for
an anarchic international system in which states
are largely free to act as they please.
Put more bluntly, the more Beijing -
frequently aided and abetted by Moscow - renders
the UN Security Council useless in dealing with
the real challenges to international security, the
more it encourages, if not necessitates, the
creation of "coalitions of the willing" to deal
with such problems.
China reinforces the
US role in Northeast Asia and supports its
international legitimacy. The reinforcement of US
alliances more deeply embeds the US in the region.
The growing role of those alliances signals their
worth and value - and that of the US more
generally - to other governments. The claims that
China has marginal influence in North Korea and
that the US is the real target of Pyongyang's
activities highlights the significance,
importance, and centrality of the US to regional
diplomacy and affairs.
China blocks
contingency planning that can keep a crisis from
occurring or worsening. We are repeatedly warned
that attempts to discuss North Korea in trilateral
or multilateral settings would send the wrong
signal to Pyongyang and spur it to act out. So,
while experts concede that we need to prepare for
a range of crises and contingencies, actually
doing so isn't done for fear of antagonizing North
Korea.
In fact, such planning takes place
without Beijing - this is part of the alliance
strengthening. But China has interests in North
Korea and is likely to intervene in the event of a
crisis. Advanced discussions of how that might
occur could minimize the risk that Chinese forces
might reach a standoff - or worse - with allied
forces in a crisis.
We could be snarky and
say we're pleased that China is helping the US
achieve its foreign policy objectives. But it is
more accurate to say that we, like our South
Korean and Japanese colleagues, are frustrated by
the consequences of Beijing's self-defeating
policies.
North Korea continues to act
out, endangering lives, risking the
destabilization of Northeast Asia, and forcing
other governments to divert resources that could
be better used elsewhere. China is not the only
country that seeks a stable Northeast Asia so that
it can focus on economic development. Yet Beijing
continues to pursue misguided, illogical and
self-defeating policies.
There is some
potential good news on the horizon, however. More
and more frequently during our visits to China and
during international conferences with Chinese
scholars and even some officials, we witness our
Chinese colleagues seriously debating one another
over the logic behind Beijing's current policy.
Many are truly embarrassed to be seen as
Pyongyang's best (only?) friend and protector.
They question whether you can actually have
stability - China's primary objective - as long as
the North has nuclear weapons. And, they
acknowledge all the downsides highlighted above
and an even more important one for the long term.
No one can predict when it will occur, but
it is becoming increasingly clear that the
peninsula will one day be reunited, under the
political, economic and social system that exists
today in Seoul. The longer Beijing keeps the North
on life support without insisting on the openness
and reform that will set the stage for eventual
peaceful reunification, the deeper will be the
resentment of the Korean people and the greater
will be their suspicion regarding China's
long-term motives.
How this serves
Beijing's interests remains beyond our ability to
comprehend. At some point, one hopes that logic
will finally prevail.
Ralph
Cossa (racpacforum@cs.com) is president
of Pacific Forum CSIS.Brad
Glosserman [brad@pacforum.org] is
executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS.
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