SPEAKING
FREELY False flags on China's rocky
road By Hilary Wong
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
China's political
development has long been regarded as an exception
to conventional political theory. Not only is its
dramatic economic growth is simply unprecedented,
its unique construct of socialist market economy
with Chinese characteristics has resulted in a
seemingly unpredictable comparable political
trajectory, due to the lack of obvious comparative
historical examples.
However, amid the
increasing activity of the Chinese 'netizens', the
vitality of the Chinese blogosphere, and the
recent sagas
involving Bo Xilai and
Chen Guangcheng, there seems to have been relative
progress in a Chinese movement toward a more open
polity, suggesting that perhaps China can be just
as well on its way to democratic development as
any other state.
The surfacing of Bo's
scandal and Chen's epic recently underscores the
existence of two narratives in China: two
narratives that demonstrate the dualistic nature
of China's political development. On one hand, the
murderous tale of the former Chongqing mayor and
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) high-flier speaks to
the impunity of the elites and continued opacity
in Chinese politics. On the other, the saga of
Chen, the disabled defender of human rights,
represents an undercurrent of positive energy in
the midst of the CCP's strict control over civil
society in China. It is a spotlight on the
grassroots movement that is strong and growing in
the face of CCP oppression and autocratic rule.
While one can never be certain about the
dynamics behind closed doors of the Chinese
government, Bo's recent suspension from the
Politburo and Chen's touchdown in the United
States suggest China's greater commitment to
transparency and openness. The call for change has
echoed through the Great Hall of the People - the
party leadership meanwhile is considering delaying
the 18th Congress, suggesting that the two
incidents have caused significant disruption to
the central leadership.
Bo is unlikely to
be the only official in China who took advantage
of his position and networks to further his
personal power and wealth. The party's crackdown
on Bo and his associates was in part fueled by the
magnitude of the situation and in part due to the
widespread attention given by international media.
It may have also been an attempt at saving face or
a combative move from other party camps.
Regardless, his dismissal could also speak to
CCP's greater commitment to tackling corruption
and maintaining discipline.
The nexus of
power and money is not unique to China. It is an
age-old phenomenon that has been observed in any
society where there are little to no restrictions
on elites, especially amidst rapid
commercialization when there are plentiful
resources and opportunities up for grabs.
Oligarchs rose like phoenixes out of the ashes of
the Soviet Union. Aristocracies in
pre-industrialized Europe perpetually asserted
their dominance over both state politics and
wealth.
There has always been a natural
marriage between power and money, anyone with the
former will utilize it to secure the latter, and
vice versa. The observation is not foreign in
democratic societies either. Lobbyist and interest
groups are more or less instruments of such
forces. Thus, it should not be shocking that the
same tendencies have been witnessed among the
princelings of China. It is not that all
princelings have pursued such paths, nor is the Bo
situation at all acceptable, but given the lack of
restrictions, we should not be in awe at those on
a ruthless quest for prosperity by means of power.
We may not necessarily have combated human
nature and tendency towards greed, but the nexus
of dominance can be broken when checks and
balances are established and the system is
transparent, observable, and enforceable.
Dismissing Bo alone will not be sufficient; the
issue is not only about a corrupt individual but
an inherent systemic flaw. For China to truly
tackle the problem and root out its cronies, there
needs to be systemic reforms that puts check on
its leaders and guarantees accountability
throughout the government.
The Carnegie
Endowment for Peace estimated in 2007 that the
economic cost of Chinese corruption total to about
US$86 billion annually, and has unlikely declined
since. For a nation whose national stability is
contingent upon continued growth of 7% or more
annually, China is fully aware that it cannot
afford to bleed billions of dollars each year in
bribes and corruption. In the twelfth five-year
plan, the Chinese government has already pledged
to intensify anti-corruption measures.
While party elites' puppeteering and
autocratic control has been successful in ushering
astounding rates of industrialization and growth
in the past three decades, Beijing is conscious
that next generation of leaders under Xi Jinping
is likely to face greater popular challenges in
sustaining national stability and economic growth.
As unconventional a path as the last 30 years has
been for China with its unique political economic
model, it will soon come to the same crossroad and
face challenges from civil society and demand for
democracy.
Chen's saga has certainly
sparked hope for the nation's political activists.
While China was able to fairly successfully
suppress the news about Chen's story across
national media and the blogosphere, China's
booming online civil society is fertile breeding
ground for popular reform that Beijing ought not
to underestimate. In comparison to notable
successful popular movements throughout world
history, China has not seen a democratic movement
that has posed serious threat to the government
since the founding of the People's Republic in
1949.
The country under the Maoist regime
witnessed anti-class warfare until the craziness
culminated into the conflagration that was the
Cultural Revolution, which left a generation
disillusioned and broken. Per Moore's law, "no
bourgeoisie, no democracy": a country that has
been doing everything to prevent a rise of a
middle class for decades, China did not have
sufficient demand for democracy when Deng first
announced the liberalization of the economy.
Thirty years have past since and China is now
witnessing a booming middle class around China;
their demands for legal protection and
representation maybe temporarily suppressible but
will undoubtedly grow.
For all the dragon
analogies and the metaphors of looming doom as the
Chinese autocratic state rises, a dive into the
six-decade-old history of the People's Republic
would reveal that its great political transition
has not even begun. The country has seen
progression but also undercurrents of regression
with regards to open polity. The government's
management of the Bo and Chen affairs highlight
moments of progress, but whether they are steps of
improvement or just isolated cases remain a
mystery.
Hilary Wong is an
International Politics major at Georgetown
University, School of Foreign Service.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards
of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.
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