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2 SCO:
Coping with changing times By
M K Bhadrakumar
The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) has always been the sum total
of the concord available in the relationship
between China and Russia. This is also where the
grouping's strength and weakness would lie. The
SCO's summit meeting in Beijing last week bears
this out.
Ten years on, the identity of
SCO - which includes China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan - is
still evolving. It is far less than a formal
alliance but is much more than a mere "talking
shop". It still has no "leader" as such and it
takes pride in being a novel form of
multilateralism, but then, nothing can move on the
SCO agenda without China and/or Russia nodding
assent.
Thus, Russia would favor India's
admission as a full member but
China wouldn't;
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan would favor
Iran's admission, but Russia and China wouldn't;
China wants Turkey in as "dialogue partner" and
Russia wouldn't mind; most certainly, both Russia
and China want Afghanistan in as an "observer" and
Kabul is indeed "in".
The SCO has no
"implementation" agencies but its voice is
increasingly getting heard. Its primary focus used
to be Central Asia but it is beginning to cast its
net wide in Eurasia as a whole and in neighboring
regions. It has a focal point of cooperation in
anti-terrorist activity but has no unified
"command and control" structure and ultimately it
is up to the member countries individually to
follow through. It is not a military bloc but its
military exercises are all the same enhancing its
strategic cohesion and deepening its defense and
security cooperation.
On the whole, it may
still be possible to muster arguments to show the
SCO is inconsequential on a practical plane, but
the fact that a critical mass has formed and the
grouping is gaining traction also needs to be
conceded.
This year's SCO summit in
Beijing (June 6-7) drew extra attention. Four
factors could be attributed to this high level of
interest.
First and foremost, Vladimir
Putin's return to the Kremlin as president has
"electrified" regional and world politics. The
jury is still out whether he will "tilt" toward
the "orientalists" among the Russian foreign
policy elites and distance himself from the
"Westernists" who tend to dominate the scene; or
whether he will have merely selective use for
"orientalism" in order to gain leverage vis-a-vis
the West which is where Russia culturally belongs;
or even whether he would navigate a middle course
between the East and West so as to optimize the
gains for Russia out of China's rise as well as
any rift that may ensue in China's relations with
the West, while Russia concentrates on its own
political, social and economic regeneration as an
independent world power and a great "balancer" in
the international system.
Second, a
certain haziness also prevails about the prospects
ahead in big-power relations until there is
greater clarity regarding the new leaderships in
Washington and Beijing. This will have to wait for
another year or so. Russia, in a manner of
speaking, arrived a little too early for the party
and has to wait in the ante-room for the moment
while the night is still young and the US and
China are still searching their cavernous
wardrobes to make up their mind what appropriate
party attire to wear.
Meanwhile, Russia
and China's respective relationships with the
United States have come under the weather lately
(for different reasons), which necessitate that
the two countries reach out for each other and are
seen holding hands. Third, the geopolitical
reality in the SCO's home ground is that the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) are in the final stages of
establishing a long-term military presence in
Central Asia.
Neither the SCO (which has
been around for a decade already) nor Russia and
China individually, has been able to stop the US
and NATO on their tracks. The emergent reality
calls for big adjustments on the part of SCO.
Plainly put, the wolf-whistle by the newly arrived
sailors in the harbor is becoming louder and more
penetrating, and Russia and China sense they would
have a hard time keeping the Central Asian damsels
occupied at home.
Fourth, no matter the
tortuous course of the Afghan endgame, the race
for Afghanistan's natural resources has begun.
China and India are scrambling for that country's
untapped mineral resources, but these are early
days.
The US's New Silk Road is a barely
disguised attempt at establishing a lead role for
Washington - in tandem with India - in integrating
the resource-rich Central Asian region with the
world market through the development of
communication links via South Asia. New Delhi is
shortly hosting an international conference of
business groups involved or interested in
Afghanistan, which is purportedly an Indian
initiative, but the formal announcement on the
event was first made in Washington.
Raising heads above the parapet How these undercurrents are going to play out
is anybody's guess at the moment and China and
Russia are probably doing the right thing by
positioning the SCO as a coordinating body for the
regional states in the sphere of economic and
security cooperation. That is to say, China and
Russia have found greater need and use of the
grouping than at any time to counter the US's
"containment" strategy toward them.
In
turn, the unprecedented display of Sino-Russian
partnership during Putin's state visit to China
just before the SCO summit gave the regional
grouping's proceedings event much verve. The
summit was, under the circumstances, destined to
"succeed" and the only point of debate could be
about the tangible substance of the success story.
The United States forced the pace for the
SCO by a series of provocative moves against
Russia and China. The US extended an ambivalent
welcome to the Putin presidency, driven by a nave
belief - or wishful thinking, depending on one's
point of view - that the Russian political system
is facing a terminal illness; this notion has
prompted Washington to cross the red lines in
inter-state relations and interfere blatantly in
Russia's domestic politics, often taking an animus
against Putin's political personality.
It
is hard to believe that the antics by the US
ambassador in Moscow Michael McFaul ever since his
arrival in Moscow on the assignment were solo acts
by an innocent, well-meaning erstwhile academic
who simply didn't know the ABC of the code of
conduct in the regimented world of diplomacy.
(After all, he held a senior position in the White
House before being assigned to Moscow.)
These tantrums might not have dealt any
body blow at the US-Russia reset, but they were
compounded by the US administration's decision to
go ahead with the deployment of the anti-ballistic
missile defense system (BMD) in NATO countries,
ignoring Russia's protests. Also, the old game of
egging on Georgia against Russia has resumed. (US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's latest visit
to Tbilisi coincided with Putin's arrival in
Beijing last Wednesday.)
Most important,
the US has done all it could to undercut Russian
efforts to commence an intra-Syrian political
dialogue by covertly encouraging Saudi Arabia and
Qatar to incite violence and systematically
debunking the mission by the joint UN envoy Kofi
Annan.
On Afghanistan, Washington
continues to selectively involve Moscow -
primarily as regards the functioning of the
Northern Distribution Network that facilitates
supply routes for the US-led coalition forces in
Afghanistan - while spurning the Russian overtures
for across-the-board political cooperation.
Moscow's sense of indignation is evident from its
rejection of the NATO appeal at the recent Chicago
summit to contribute $10 million to the alliance's
kitty for financing the build-up of Afghan armed
forces.
Equally, friction has increased in
the testy US-China relationship following
Washington's decision to "rebalance" its forces in
terms of the "pivot" to Asia-Pacific. With regard
to China also, a more robust US policy of
interfering in its internal affairs is visible.
Again, China is also getting concerned
about the deployment of the US missile defense
system in the Asia-Pacific. Russian commentators
have pointed out that China's limited nuclear
forces would be "neutralized" much earlier than
Russia's vastly superior strategic capability,
with the deployment of the US's ABM system.
Suffice to say, the SCO (read Russia and
China) decided it was about time to step out of
the domain of regional problems and raise its head
above the Eurasian parapet. A Russian commentator
noted, "Times have changed, and the SCO has
changed along with them. The crisis in the Middle
East, including those triggered by the Arab
Spring, the role that Western countries played
there, and the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq,
and more importantly, from Afghanistan, called for
a major revision to the SCO's approaches and
prompted the organization to step up its foreign
policy efforts."
But that is overstating
the point. For the present, what is happening is
that thanks to the SCO's consolidated stance on
certain international issues of direct concern to
Russia and China, the two countries have decided
to mutually strengthen each other's hands in
opposing the US machinations - be it on missile
defense or Asia-Pacific security.
Creating security space What
does it mean? Putin declared in an article in the
People's Daily: "Without the participation of
Russia and China, without considering Russia and
China's interests, no international matter or
issue can be discussed and implemented."
In fact, this is already happening over
Syria where Russia and China have drawn the bottom
line: no external intervention with the agenda of
regime change in Damascus; continued support for
Annan's mission; an end to violence by all sides
leading to the "establishment of a comprehensive
political dialogue"; and a "peaceful and fair
settlement" without outside interference."
Quintessentially, what is happening is, to
quote from an editorial in the Chinese Communist
Party daily the Global Times,
The shift from adversary to
comprehensive strategic partnership creates
valuable security space for these two powers
[China and Russia]. Given the uncertainty of the
future international environment, this is a rare
security guarantee, from which the two can play
influential global roles.
Meanwhile,
both are open to the West. Their economic
engagement with the West is bigger than business
exchanges between each other. The West also has
a cultural influence on both and there are
elites from both sides advocating prioritizing
ties with the West.
The West is indeed
important to Beijing and Moscow ... These are
not contradictory policies. On the contrary, the
closer China and Russia are, the more
opportunities they can have for developing an
equal relationship with the
West.
Evidently, China prefers a
visible embrace of Russia that pledges no
commitment, leaving great flexibility to act
elsewhere. What emerges is that the Chinese
political expectations at the moment happen to be
much lower than how Russia would like to see the
SCO become. In the words of Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov, "The SCO is now a
closely-knit group of like-minded people, firmly
bent on developing actively a trustworthy
political dialogue, equal and mutually
advantageous economic and humanitarian cooperation
as well as on expanding international relations."
Whereas, on key issues such as missile
defense or Afghanistan, Russia and China will
continue to act independently. There seems hardly
any scope for Russia to coordinate with China on a
practical plane while planning its "asymmetrical"
response to NATO's deployment of the US's BMD
system.
Conceivably, the last word hasn't
been spoken yet on Russia's missile defense
cooperation with the West. The truth is that time
hasn't yet run out to settle the differences
between Russia and NATO, because there is a
gestation period of years before full deployment
and improvement of the system will happen, during
which the two sides will also be working on other
areas of cooperation that help enhance mutual
trust and confidence.
A leading German
analyst on Russia, Alexander Rahr, said, "I think
Russia will do everything to strengthen
trustworthy relations with the West. Maybe, after
this operation of NATO troops' withdrawal from
Afghanistan through Russia is over, the election
campaign in America is over, with [US president
Barack] Obama staying in power, it will be
possible to revisit cooperation
matters."
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