Page 2 of
2 SCO:
Coping with changing times By
M K Bhadrakumar
Indeed, there are similar
voices of cautious optimism on the Russian side,
too. To quote an influential voice in the Russian
strategic community, General Viktor Yesin, who
used to be the chief of the Russian Strategic
Rocket Forces Staff, "The problem cannot be
resolved straightforwardly. The
"we-want-it-all-and-we-want-it-now" principle is
fraught with a deadlock at the negotiations and
consequent confrontation. That would not meet the
interests of Russia, NATO and the world at large,
because that would undermine strategic stability
and international security. "A way to a
mutually acceptable solution based on a reasonable
compromise goes through a Russia-NATO missile
defense cooperation agreement. The agreement must
include a roadmap, ie step-by-step progress toward
a joint or at least inter-connected European
missile defense infrastructure alongside building up
mutual trust,
predictability and transparency, and that is
possible only if the sides shift from words to
deeds."
Yesin suggested that it is
possible for Russia and NATO to begin with the
establishment of joint centers, which will
exchange information and conduct joint planning,
in the development of missile defense cooperation.
Tread softly in the Hindu Kush
Afghanistan is going to be the single
crucial test case of the efficacy of the SCO in a
changing world. If the single biggest statement is
to be culled out from the Beijing summit, it
undoubtedly has to be Chinese President Hu
Jintao's profoundly meaningful reference to
Afghanistan: "We will continue to follow the
concept that regional affairs should be managed by
countries in the region, that we should guard
against shocks from turbulence outside the region,
and that [the SCO] should play a bigger role in
Afghanistan's peaceful reconstruction."
What attracted such huge attention to Hu's
statement is that China has never before spoken of
the idea of playing a political role in the
settlement of the Afghan problem. Unfortunately,
Hu didn't elaborate on what he meant and the
impression that he leaves behind is that he
probably strove to express a shared opinion of the
SCO leaders voiced in their sequestered
cogitations with China, giving vent to their deep
disquiet about the shape of things to come in
Afghanistan.
In the final analysis, it is
unclear what role SCO can play as a regional
grouping. Both Russia and China have ruled out
direct intervention in Afghanistan. On the other
hand, NATO hasn't shown any interest in working
with the SCO in Afghanistan and, in fact,
consistently viewed the latter as a pretender that
was propped up on the regional landscape in the
first instance to counterbalance the influence of
the Western alliance - and of the US - in Central
Asia. At any rate, the prospect of Afghanistan
coming within the orbit of China or Russia will
remain deeply distasteful for Washington and its
NATO allies.
The entire New Silk Road
strategy enunciated by Washington at regular
intervals aims at bringing to the fore the two
countries in the region that have been
historically the major counterbalances - India and
Pakistan. But the US project has run into
headwinds. On the one hand, China has strong ties
with Pakistan (and Russia is also building up its
relationship with Pakistan), while the US' ties
with Pakistan lie in tatters.
Besides,
India will never act as the US's proxy, given its
obsessive desire to retain its strategic autonomy
on the core issues of foreign policy such as
issues that impact its relations with Russia or
China. During the visit of the US secretary of
defense Leon Panetta to Delhi last week, the
Indian side suggested a rethink on the US's
strategy to "rebalance" its forces in the
Asia-Pacific. The Indian defense ministry
statement said:
"With regard to the
security concerns the Asia-Pacific, [Indian
Defense Minister] Mr [AK] Antony conveyed that
India supports unhindered freedom of navigation in
international waters for all. At the same time,
with regard to bilateral issues between countries,
he stressed that it is desirable that the parties
concerned themselves should settle contentious
matters in accordance with the international law.
Mr Antony emphasized the need to strengthen the
multilateral security architecture in the
Asia-Pacific and to move at a pace comfortable to
all countries concerned."
Again, NATO
insists on directly negotiating with the Central
Asian states its transit routes for the withdrawal
of war materials and equipment from Afghanistan.
It is also abundantly clear by now that the US
(and NATO) will keep tens of thousands of troops
in Afghanistan even after 2014.
They
aren't running away from the region.
Unsurprisingly, Central Asian states are inclined
to drive a hard bargain with the US and NATO, and
the latter, in turn are also favorably disposed to
accommodating the "wish list" as much as they
could. The Central Asian countries are obviously
expecting additional financial assistance from the
NATO countries, but while erecting the bedrock of
a mutually beneficial long-term partnership as
well. But over and above, they have also
raised demands that NATO leaves behind some of
their military equipment. Kyrgyzstan has
specifically voiced interest in the drone
aircraft. Russia has been left guessing what is
going on and how far the US will accommodate these
Central Asian requests.
In essence, an
enduring relationship of military cooperation
between the NATO and the Central Asian states
could just about be commencing for the first time
in the post-Soviet era. The NATO weapons being
left behind will need to be repaired and serviced
and the Central Asian forces will need to be
trained to handle them. The sequential steps could
well include the stationing of the NATO's Special
Forces at some stage once the relationship
consolidates.
As things stand, NATO
countries have already begun encroaching into the
SCO's preserve by setting up the Central Asian
Regional Information and Coordination Centre for
Combating Drugs (CARICC). It is obvious that there
is only a thin line separating the fight against
drugs and the counterinsurgency war or
narco-terrorism as such.
Yet, CARICC keeps
China at arm's length. While Russia has been
included, Moscow feels uncomfortable and lonely
inside the CARICC tent. Russia helplessly watches
while the NATO countries - especially the
countries funding the center, including USA, UK,
Italy, France, Turkey, Czech Republic - which form
part of the CARICC process merrily network with
the security agencies of its partner countries in
the region - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - and are
dipping into the resource base of sensitive
intelligence, making a mockery of the matrix that
the SCO built up painstakingly for its exclusive
purpose.
Arguably, Russia has created much
of these dilemma for itself. The point is, Russia
cannot demand that the Central Asian states should
keep off NATO as if the Western alliance is a
pariah crowd, when it is creating a so-called
Transit Alliance of its own in Ulyanovsk on the
Volga for acting as a transportation hub to meet
NATO's logistical needs.
Moscow justifies
this act saying it is a mere commercial
proposition with a lucrative business turnover of
US$1 billion annually. But then, the Golden Rule
in such situations is that what is sauce for the
goose should be sauce for the gander as well.
That, at least, is how the Central Asian capitals
are viewing Russia's dalliance with NATO in
Afghanistan. They also feel tempted to create an
Afghan template to enrich their overall strategic
engagement with the US.
In sum, NATO is
already drawing the SCO member countries -
including Russia - into selective engagement over
Afghanistan, but strictly on an individual basis
and scrupulously ignoring the prerogative of
Moscow or Beijing to represent the region's
collective voice on security issues. Does Hu's
statement at the Beijing summit suggest that the
SCO is shifting gear and going to take on NATO and
the US frontally?
The past pattern shows
that China is particular about keeping its role in
Afghanistan limited to advancing its economic
interests and has fought shy of vetting its toes
in the political arena, although Beijing never
tires of underlining that it is a stakeholder in
Afghanistan's stability and security. Is this
going to change?
For argument's sake, even
if China's Afghan policies are poised for a
dramatic change, how far will Beijing push to
ensure that the SCO secures a greater role in
assembling the building blocks of peace in the
Hindu Kush? Trust NATO to play rough. As a leading
Afghan pundit Waliullah Rahmani, director of the
Kabul Center for Strategic Studies, put it,
I believe that in the next two
years, although there might be goodwill from the
SCO member states to have a greater role in
peace-building, the atmosphere of peace-building
and reconciliation in Afghanistan and the NATO's
overwhelming role will make it extremely
difficult for the SCO to get engaged ... the
reality on the ground is that I don't believe
the NATO member countries would really have the
goodwill for such big players [read Russia and
China] to overshadow the situation and the
NATO's rule [grip] in Afghanistan.
Put
differently, the SCO would need to ponder
carefully first what the Afghan people expect of
the regional grouping. Quite obviously, the
mainstream Afghan opinion desires reconciliation
with the Taliban in political terms, while the
majority opinion remains skeptical whether
stability and security could be sustained without
a long-term foreign military presence, especially
US military presence. (Russia's top Afghan hand,
ambassador Zamir Kabulov, by the way, is on record
as having told the media that Moscow sees nothing
objectionable in the US-Afghan security pact that
provides for American military presence in the
post-2014 period.)
In this situation, SCO
will be hard-pressed to identify a common
denominator for its member countries to get
engaged in Afghanistan. (Obviously, Central Asian
states or Russia do not have the surplus cash
reserves to put on the table in Kabul, as China
has.) Again, Russia may be inclined to work on the
political element, but it is the economic
advancement that China has so far regarded as
important. Incidentally, China is also better
placed than its SCO partners insofar as it has the
added advantage of tapping into its "all-weather
friendship" with Pakistan to safeguard its vital
interests on the Afghan chessboard.
Besides, one has to be extraordinarily
clairvoyant to know at this point what is going to
happen in Afghanistan, leave alone how to handle
the situation. The SCO will be called upon to
react almost on a continuous basis if the push
comes to shove in Afghanistan and it seems rather
ill-equipped as of now to meet such an eventuality
both in institutional terms and politically. To
take the two key SCO players - Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan - if a real crisis situation develops
in Afghanistan, they are bogged down in a quagmire
of their own.
The two countries'
persistent feuding debilitates the SCO's capacity
to play a role in Afghanistan. Of late,
Uzbek-Tajik ties, which were always testy, have
taken a nasty turn with Tashkent ordering an
economic blockade of Tajikistan. There is even
talk that Tashkent is pursuing a calculated
strategy to bring about a "regime change" in
Dushanbe. US commentator Stephen Blank couldn't
have put it better than when he wrote recently:
"The Tajik-Uzbek spat acts like sand in the Silk
Road's engine ... Tajik-Uzbek feud is even more
vexing for Russia, creating a major security gap
that could be exploited by narcotics traffickers
and Islamic militants."
As long as these
two "frontline states" keep fighting with each
other, how could there be a collective SCO effort
to contain drug trafficking and Islamic militancy?
Both Russia and China face the dilemma of not
squandering away their political capital - more so
in Tashkent - which is needed for safeguarding
their national interests first and foremost. The
two regional heavyweights would know that at the
slightest inkling of any pressure tactic from
their side, Tashkent would play the "American
card".
The Uzbek-Tajik feud is in many
ways a test case for the SCO. The regional
grouping's capacity to act in Afghanistan is
directly linked to the cohesion within the
grouping and the political commitment of the
member countries to actually line up behind a
common Afghan strategy. It is much more than a
matter of words. Thus, when the dust settles down
on the summit in Beijing, the impression it leaves
behind is that the SCO has taken the easy way out
with yet another statement regarding the Afghan
situation while the NATO-US caravan rolls on.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a
career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His
assignments included the Soviet Union, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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