Page 3 of
3 Russia
and China Mull Syria ... and Saudi
Arabia By Peter Lee
Then
in 1966 the Ba'ath Party split into Syrian and
Iraq factions, and the separate cells came to rule
their respective countries. The murderous,
outsized ambitions of Saddam Hussein then
compelled Hafez al-Assad to ally with that
traditional b๊te noire of Arab nationalism and
Sunni religion, Shi'ite Iran. With pan-Arabism in
the dustbin, Assad carefully and cannily pursued a
Greater Syria agenda by serial meddling in
Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia assumed
leadership of the Sunni states by virtue of its
stewardship of holy sites, its gigantic oil
revenues, and its inclination to project its power
throughout the Middle East by means of richly
endowed Islamic initiatives in the conservative
Salafi vein.
In Syria, Bashar al-Assad
attempted to migrate to a concept of
Syria as a viable
nation-state and good neighbor both to Turkey and
his Sunni Arab brethren to the south and an west,
an ally to Iran and the Shi'ites of Lebanon, and a
useful black intelligence and interrogation asset
to the United States, but has learned to his
bitter disappointment that the role of regional
linchpin is not to be afforded to "Lesser Syria".
Today, there is no international consensus
and a shrinking domestic commitment to sustaining
Syria - a diminished, artificially constructed
rump with almost no oil and no atomic bomb (with
hindsight, Assad's failed clandestine attempt to
get Syria into the nuclear business appears wise
instead of reckless) - as a successful
multi-ethnic state.
Instead, the role of
regional Sunni lawgiver is being fought over the
prostrate hulk of Syria by two regional powers:
Saudi Arabia, backed by its outsized petroleum
reserves, and Turkey, which is beginning to feel
its Ottoman oats thanks to a successful program of
political and economic reform, superimposed on a
local struggle between liberal reformists and the
authoritarian regime.
Turkey dashed out on
a limb, expecting to midwife a quick and easy Arab
Spring victory and a grateful liberal-minded,
pro-Turkish regime on its southern border.
However, the Assad regime has not gone quietly and
the burgeoning violence has made Turkey think
twice about tossing more gasoline on the flames.
Saudi Arabia apparently has no such
qualms. Together with its regional ally, Qatar, it
has been employing the maximalist rhetoric in
public while secretly funneling money and arms to
opposition forces, thereby driving the
international response.
The hostility of
these two autocracies toward Assad, of course, has
nothing to do with the illiberal shortcomings of
his regime and everything to do with his alliance
with Iran.
Not neighboring on Syria and
relatively indifferent to the consequences, Saudi
Arabia sees the opportunity to consolidate a
bulwark of anti-Iranian Sunni states by seeing to
it that Assad does not survive to dilute the
anti-Iranian fervor of whatever successor regime
emerges from the Syrian chaos.
The
question that should be asked is, should the
events in Syria be driven by an opaque, insecure
kingdom that seeks geopolitical influence by
exacerbating sectarian and ethnic divisions?
That is a question the United States is in
no position to ask, since the aggressive
unilateral Saudi push against Iran and Shi'ism is
in large part driven by the recent memory of the
United States allowing the regime of another
heavyweight Middle Eastern ally (and unsavory
autocrat) go down the tubes in the name of
democracy: President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt.
It is a question that China and Russia
have answered, to their own satisfaction at least,
in the negative.
Their vision for the
Middle East includes Iran somehow emerging from
the morass of US-led sanctions and assuming its
rightful place near the heart of central and south
Asia, and a major, secure economic partner and
ally for Moscow and Beijing.
As for Syria,
Moscow treasures its Mediterranean port-of-call at
Tartus, and Beijing has deep qualms about enabling
continued Western experiments in externally
promoted regime change. Certainly, if the Saudis
bought into a more peaceful, negotiated transition
- per the Russian proposal for a conference on
Syria that would include both Saudi Arabia and
Iran and protect Russian and Chinese influence and
interests - it would be welcome. [5]
But
it is also likely that Russia and China would
acquiesce to the sacrifice of Bashar al-Assad's
regime if Saudi Arabia made it clear that a pickup
in Syria would serve as a satisfactory exclamation
point to the anti-Iranian campaign and everybody
could just go back to pumping oil and making
money.
However, Saudi Arabia has yet to
give such a signal. The trend seems to be going
the other way. Recently, the Saudi government went
out of its way to insult Russia by giving a low
level reception to a visiting Russian commercial
delegation on account of Russian support for the
Assad regime while darkly muttering than the
Kingdom would have no problem turning elsewhere
for "iron and wheat". [6]
Parsing Saudi
intransigence, Putin and Hu probably see little
incentive to throw Assad under the bus and,
effectively, give a free hand for continued
mischief to the Middle East's richest but least
competent, most backward, and perhaps most
extremist hegemon…one that might run out of oil
before it runs out of spleen.
At the end
of their summit in Beijing, Putin and Hu issued a
statement condemning outside interference in the
Syrian crisis and called for all interested
parties to put their efforts into support of the
Annan ceasefire initiative.
An op-ed by
the Chinese pundit Tian Wenlin in People's Daily
laid out China's case against regime change in
Syria. It is not, in my opinion, doing any
violence to his meaning if one substitutes "Saudi
Arabia" for "the West" as the target of his
statements:
Obviously, the Western nations have
considered it more beneficial to overturn the
current Syrian regime than to retain it. …
The West is ambitious about the Syrian
issue at present, but actually they have been
blinded by its expanding hegemonic desire to
promote regime changes: Libya is followed with
Syria. And subsequent to the Syrian collapse,
they will target Iran. The unlimited greed and
shortsightedness will only widen the gap between
its ability and intention, and between its means
and objectives. [7]
In other words, if
Saudi Arabia, the homeland of 15 of the 19 9/11
hijackers, could pause from beating up Bahrain
long enough to look in a mirror, it might see an
overreaching, overfunded theocracy that is more
the cause than the victim of the instability it
reviles.
WithPutin at the reins again,
Russia will probably be less interested than ever
in yielding to Western moral suasion over Syria.
China, which is reaping oil, opportunities, and
profits on the Shi'ite side of the fence will have
a strong inclination to follow the Russian lead.
As for the people of Syria, the
international stalemate will simply prolong their
suffering.
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