China walks tightrope over troubled
waters By Brendan O'Reilly
Geopolitical shifts are upsetting the
waters of the South China Sea, as both China and
Vietnam take a three-pronged approach to
strengthen their claims over the Spratly Islands.
Military posturing, legal maneuvers, and
economic strategies are being used by both sides
to shore up their respective assertions of
sovereignty over the contested islands. The
intensification of the struggle for the Spratly
Islands comes at a politically crucial time for
the region. This quarrel over minor islands could
have major global ramifications.
The
recent escalation of the long-standing dispute
began on June 15, when the Vietnamese air force
conducted a patrol over the
Spratly Islands (called
the "Truong Sa" by Vietnam and the "Nansha" by
China). Senior Vietnamese lieutenant colonel Ngo
Vinh Phuc claimed that such patrols would become a
routine occurrence, saying:
"The regiment decided that after the
first flight to Truong Sa, it will be our
regular duty, and we are always ready for it
once we receive orders…With the flight, we want
to reiterate once again that we will be always
ready to protect the country's sacred
sovereignty over seas and islands." [1]
China (along with Malaysia, Brunei,
and the Philippines) disputes Vietnam's claims of
sovereignty over the Spratlys. In response to the
perceived Vietnamese provocation, Chinese Defense
Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng announced the
deployment of armed Chinese patrols in the
disputed maritime region:
"In order to protect national
sovereignty and our security and development
interests, the Chinese military has already set
up a normal, combat-ready patrol system in seas
under our control…"[2]
Vietnam and
China are inching closer to a possible armed
confrontation, with neither side willing to back
down. Both governments are utilizing political
tactics to complement their military maneuvers.
On June 21, the Vietnamese National
Assembly passed the long-considered "Vietnamese
Law of the Sea". This decree stipulates that the
entirety of both the Spratly and the Paracel
Islands are integral territories of Vietnam. After
the passage of this law, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry announced, "China strongly protests and
firmly opposes such a move by Vietnam." China's
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun further
condemned the Vietnamese move as "illegal, invalid
and detrimental to peace and stability in the
South China Sea."[3]
Within hours of the
passage of the "Vietnamese Law of the Sea",
China's State Council approved plans for the
establishment of a new prefecture-level city,
Sansha, with jurisdiction over the contested area.
The Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, and
Macclesfield Bank now constitute "Sansha"
(literally "Thee Sands"), officially the largest
and southernmost city in the People's Republic of
China, although it has no permanent residents.
The establishment of Sansha is a
significant legal tactic to solidify China's
claims over the islands. The move was described by
a Ministry of Civil Affairs spokesman as an
important step to "further strengthen China's
administration and development" of the disputed
region. [4] The Chinese government is discussing
the possibility of setting up a permanent military
presence in order to protect its newest "city".
There is also a strong economic component
to the current standoff. The state-run China
National Offshore Oil Cooperation (CNOOC) recently
offered tenders to foreign companies to jointly
develop extraction capabilities in the contested
region. Vietnam claims that some of these zones
lie in the undisputed continental shelf of
Vietnam. The Vietnamese government has already has
been jointly exploring some of these areas with
Exxon Mobil, as well as Russia's Gazprom and
Indian ONGC Videh.
Passions are running
high in Vietnam, as authorities allowed a rare
unofficial protest in central Hanoi. Hundreds of
demonstrators marched through the rain to the
Chinese embassy on Sunday. Many were chanting
"Down with China" as local police blocked traffic
and cordoned off the embassy. [5]
The
Strategic background The timing of the
ongoing military, economic, and political
posturing of China and Vietnam is significant for
several reasons. First, the escalation of tensions
between China and Vietnam comes at the same time
as an easing of frictions between China and the
Philippines. The Chinese and Filipino governments
have reached a verbal agreement for both nations
to pull back their naval forces from within the
lagoon of the disputed Scarborough Shoal. Filipino
Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario has confirmed
that Chinese warships have withdrawn from the
area. On the Chinese side, Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Hong Lei confirmed that the trend in the
disputed region is "is overall toward peace."[6]
That tensions between Vietnam and China
are heating up while the rift between the
Philippines and China seems to be cooling off is
noteworthy. China has been accused by some
observers of attempting "divide and rule" tactics
towards its neighbors in the South China Sea.
Regardless of semantics, it seems prudent for
Beijing to focus on one disputant at a time. Taken
individually, rival claimants in the South China
Sea cannot hope to come close to countering
Beijing's political, economic, and military
prowess.
Furthermore, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Foreign Minister
Meeting is scheduled to being July 9 in Cambodia.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is expected
to attend the meeting. Disputes over the South
China Sea are sure to dominate the discussion.
The upcoming ASEAN meeting provides added
motivation for both China and Vietnam to solidify
their legal claims over the Spratly Islands. Both
sides are jockeying for position in order to
strengthen their case before the ASEAN conference
takes place. China has specifically claimed that
the Vietnamese moves are "illegal" in the context
of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea. This Declaration, agreed
upon by ASEAN members and China, explicitly states
"The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their
territorial and jurisdictional disputes by
peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or
use of force…" China considers the Vietnamese air
force flights and unilateral claims of sovereignty
as a violation of this agreement.
Thirdly,
India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) held
their first trilateral "dialogue" in New Delhi on
June 29. Although disputes in the South China Sea
were not specifically mentioned, Indian External
Affairs Secretary Sanjay Singh stressed: "There is
common commitment to maintaining freedom of the
seas, combating terrorism and promoting inclusive
economic growth. India, Japan and ROK depend
heavily on the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs)
for their energy security."[7] Clearly the
reference to "maintaining freedom of the seas" is
a reference to concerns over conflicting claims of
sovereignty in the South China Sea.
That
India, Japan, and South Korea have jointly
reaffirmed their commitment to the free flow of
maritime traffic as tensions mount between China
and Vietnam is extremely relevant. China
increasingly views India as a strategic factor in
the South China Sea. Furthermore, South Korea and
Japan (as well as China itself) are both
enormously reliant on the imported energy that
goes through the disputed maritime region.
Clearly, India, Japan, and the ROK have an
interest in keeping the South China Sea from
becoming a Chinese lake, while at the same time
avoiding open conflict.
Finally, the
ratcheting up of tensions between China and
Vietnam is taking place at the same time as the
annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises
off the coast of Hawaii. Twenty-two nations are
participating in this year's RIMPAC, including
regional US allies such as Australia, Japan, and
South Korea. Even Russia is sending a vessel to
join in the massive coordinated training mission.
China is notably absent, while Vietnam is
conspicuously present as an observer of the
exercises.
The 2012 RIMPAC exercises
brought together a host of Pacific powers, which
are to various degrees wary of a rising China. The
United States and its allies are keeping a close
eye on the potential flashpoint of the South China
Sea. For years the US has been trying to
"internationalize" the South China Sea dispute by
offering to help negotiations. In 2010, Clinton
announced in Vietnam "The United States has a
national interest in freedom of navigation, open
access to Asia's maritime commons and respect for
international law in the South China Sea."[8] One
can expect further expressions of concern over the
issue from Clinton at the upcoming ASEAN meeting.
Cold War in warm waters? Despite
the ongoing tensions, it is in both China and
Vietnam's interest to avoid open conflict over the
Spratly Islands. China has little to gain from
starting a military struggle that could threaten
its spectacular economic rise, and Vietnam can't
rely on external intervention to sufficiently
balance China's military edge. Neither country
wants a repeat of their bloody 1979 border war.
Although tough talk on both sides has
international implications, such rhetoric is meant
primarily for domestic consumption.
It
should be noted that military forces from the
People's Republic of China (PRC), the Taiwan-based
Republic of China (ROC), Vietnam, the Philippines,
and Malaysia have been stationed in the Spratly
Islands for some years, without a single
combat-related casualty.
There does remain
the possibility of a miscalculation or a
miscommunication leading to a major military
clash. In this eventuality, the geopolitical
ramifications could be enormous.
Washington views the South China Sea
impasse as an important lever from which to
extract geopolitical leverage from Beijing. The US
government is examining all contingencies for how
to handle or possibly thwart the rising clout of
China. The United States has strong military,
economic, and political ties with the Philippines,
and is keen on developing closer relations with
Vietnam. For their part, the Philippines and
Vietnam see American power as a possible
counterbalance to China's regional superiority.
The United States is seeking to win
international sympathy and prestige by portraying
itself as an honest broker seeking to establish a
"rule-based mechanism" for dealing with the South
China Sea disputes. The American government is
also trying to shore up alliances with regional
countries uneasy of China's profound and
continuing rise. Furthermore, a cornerstone of the
much-discussed US "pivot" towards Asia is a plan
to base 60% of the US navy in the Pacific.
Meanwhile, the Chinese government is
engaged in a difficult balancing act. On the one
hand, the People's Republic of China must play a
strong hand in order to solidify its claims over
the resource-rich South China Sea. Domestic
politics are important - the Communist Party of
China cannot appear weak, especially regarding
perceived provocations from smaller nations. It
should be noted that the governments of both the
People's Republic of China and the Taiwan-based
Republic of China have long asserted total Chinese
sovereignty over the disputed area.
On the
other hand, it is in China's long-term interests
to avoid a military clash for two important
reasons. First, China's economic rise could be
threatened by the unpredictable effects of open
military conflict, especially in the vicinity of
vital shipping lanes. Second, China does not want
to frighten its neighbors into the open arms of
the United States.
It should be noted that
China did not initiate the latest round of
tensions with Vietnam. Rather, China retaliated
for each Vietnamese move, both militarily and
politically. This policy of retaliation, rather
than instigation, is indicative of the Chinese
balancing act in the region.
Chinese state
media often complains of a "Cold War mentality"
polluting the political landscape in the United
States. Indeed, despite claims to the contrary,
the US strategic pivot towards Asia is almost
certainly aimed primarily at containing China.
Sixty percent of the US fleet is rather overkill
for containing the regional ambitions of a
half-starving North Korea.
The problem
with a "Cold War mentality" is that such thinking
is profoundly outdated. The United States may be
the longstanding strategic ally of Japan and South
Korea, but China is their largest trading partner.
Even India, the much-touted "lynchpin" of the
United States' Asia-Pacific strategy, does more
trade with the People's Republic than it does with
Uncle Sam. America's Asian allies are increasingly
moving into China's ever-growing economic orbit.
Furthermore, the United States and China are so
economically mutually dependent as to render open
conflict profoundly unwise.
The Chinese
government is unlikely to risk their long-term
strategic interests with overly aggressive
military adventurism. China will retaliate in kind
for any military, political, or economic moves by
other disputant states in the South China Sea.
However, China will not initiate an unpredictable
conflict that could threaten the Middle Kingdom's
ongoing economic rise and encourage her trading
partners to seek a greater American presence in
the region. China knows that, in the long term,
economic development and trade will have greater
geopolitical weight in the region than 60% of the
American fleet.
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