HONOLULU - China's as yet
unnamed aircraft carrier will soon begin another
round of sea trials before its planned
commissioning in August. It has yet to conduct a
full range of flight operations and its fixed-wing
air component remains largely in the prototype and
testing phase.
It will be several months,
if not years, before it can fulfill many of the
key roles attributed to a modern aircraft carrier
and will not achieve full operational capability,
including a complete fixed-wing and helicopter
equipped air wing, nor full integration into fleet
operations before 2016-2017.
Commissioning
of the carrier nonetheless will mark a major
milestone in China's progress towards becoming a
major ocean-going naval power. The carrier will
significantly improve the fleet's
air defenses and broad
ocean strike capabilities, but its full strategic
significance cannot be understood without
examining its role within China's increasingly
aggressive posture in the South China Sea and
complex fleet force structure.
Beijing's
fleet modernization program has involved the
patient acquisition and development of the
surveillance, sensor, command and control, and
weapons systems integral to a balanced, modern
ocean-going fleet. The People's Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) has introduced these new systems
incrementally, building primarily upon technology
acquired openly from Europe, Israel and Russia as
well as incorporating American systems obtained
from a variety of sources.
As a result,
the latest Chinese surface ships and submarines
are equipped with an array of first-rate sensor
and weapons systems. The former have area
air-defense systems not unlike America's
Aegis-system, albeit with capabilities more akin
to earlier rather than the latest models. The
Luyang-II class guided missile destroyers are a
formidable platform equipped with the HHQ-9 area
air defense surface-to-air missile (SAM) system
and both YJ-82 anti-ship (ASCM), and more
ominously for neighboring Southeast Asian nations,
HN-2 land attack cruise missiles (LACMs).
With those high-end platforms entering
service in growing numbers, China's new carrier
will extend the fleet's reach, reinforcing its
strike power and providing a command, control,
communications, computer and intelligence (C4I)
platform for an embarked fleet commander. The
question moving ahead will be which roles dominate
and under what conditions.
All militaries
balance their plans and structure against two
often competing mission requirements: the most
dangerous situation they will face and the most
likely one. For the PLAN, the sea denial mission
is perceived as countering the most dangerous.
That is, denying a hostile fleet from controlling
its most critical waters as defined in China's
2008 Defense White Paper, starting from the
referred to "first island chain" stretching from
the Yellow Sea down to the eastern and
southernmost reaches of the South China Sea.
For that strategic concern, the carrier
can play a forward command role, extend the
fleet's and nation's air defense umbrella by an
additional 200 nautical miles, and protect
reconnaissance platforms flying out from shore
bases. The embarked admiral can command all the
naval and forward air forces involved, including
coordinating with the 2nd Artillery Corps in its
employment of China's DF-21D anti-ship ballistic
missiles (ASBMs). With ASBMs targeting enemy
carriers, China's aircraft carrier could be used
as a quick reaction strike platform against the
enemy's other surface combatants.
The
carrier will be able to perform a similar mission
under what Chinese leaders probably see as a more
likely conflict scenario: a limited regional war
under high technology conditions. China's recent
emphasis on defending its "territorial
sovereignty" in the South China Sea is of growing
regional concern due to the extensive nature of
its maritime claims.
China's recent
confrontation with the Philippines at Scarborough
Shoal is the latest example of its growing
assertiveness over the contested area. Beijing's
elevation last month of the South China Sea
islands of Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha to
prefecture status is indication of Beijing's
hardening political commitment to these claims.
The 2011 White Paper reiterated China's strong
commitment to defending its claimed national
territory and Beijing is increasingly employing
military forces to fortify related maritime
claims.
Although the sea denial scenario
would still apply in a limited regional war, the
carrier's role against China's weaker neighbors
would focus more on sustaining air and maritime
superiority. China's fleet will likely rely on the
carrier's air wing to intercept any enemy
ASCM-carrying aircraft and attack any surface
ships that move into position to threaten China's
surface units or island garrisons. Chinese leaders
probably view this last mission - the enforcement
of maritime sovereignty over the South China Sea -
as a likely scenario, especially should its
growing coast guard prove insufficient to the
task.
Learning by doing For now,
the carrier is more significant strategically for
what it portends than what it is. China's leaders
say they built the carrier primarily for
experimentation and study and those roles will
certainly dominate its early operations. However,
China does not possess a pool of experienced
aircraft personnel to fulfill the carrier's crew
requirements. Although China has studied aircraft
design and operation for over 20 years, the crew
will still have to learn largely by doing. Based
on its large number of sea trials, including at
least eight since last August, the PLAN is taking
a cautious and incremental approach to preparing
the carrier and its crew for August's
commissioning.
Carriers are the world's
most complex warships, involving the simultaneous
operation of dozens of systems and hundreds of
personnel at very close quarters. That is
especially true during flight operations, the most
dangerous of military activities outside of
combat. Simulations and pier-side drills can help
crews to prepare, but there is no substitute for
actual operations. China's carrier is expected to
begin simple one-two plane flight deck operations
later this year, starting with "touch and goes"
where planes simply touch the deck before resuming
flight and later daytime landings and launches.
Notwithstanding those exercises, China's
carrier will enter service without a fully
composed air wing. Its primary fixed-wing
aircraft, the Shenyang J-15, has not entered
production and is not expected to before 2014.
China's Russian-built Sukhoi Su-33MKKs are
reportedly carrier capable, but only J-15
prototypes have been seen flying off the carrier's
deck. It appears that the Sukhoi aircraft were
acquired specifically to build a pool of qualified
aviators to facilitate the establishment of the
carrier's air wing once its fixed wing component
was operational.
If the J-15 follows
traditional aircraft development and production
patterns, China will commission its first fully
operational squadron by either late 2015 or early
2016. Several months of carrier workups will
likely follow. Until then, the carrier's primary
air wing components will consist of helicopters,
primarily the Z-9 anti-submarine and Z-8 logistic
models. There is no indication so far that China
is developing a ship borne airborne warning and
control system (AWACS), aerial refueling tanker,
electronic warfare capability or maritime patrol
aircraft.
Those shortcomings mean China's
carrier must rely on shore-based aircraft for
those missions. Although jet aircraft can carry
"buddy stores" to refuel their mates on long
missions and carry electronic countermeasures pods
or anti-radiation missiles to defeat enemy air
defenses, their inclusion comes at the expense of
ordnance and other payloads.
The carrier's
accompanying guided missile destroyers (DDGs) can
also use their land attack cruise missiles against
key enemy air defense centers and sites to clear
the way for the air wing.
There has been
speculation that China is developing an airborne
early warning (AEW) version of the Z-8, China's
license-built model of the French SA-320 Super
Frelon. While that helicopter has the lift and
endurance to carry a long-range surveillance
radar, it cannot service the command and control
systems required to conduct AWACS missions. It
can, however, detect and warn of incoming
low-altitude cruise missiles and provide
outstanding just-beyond-the-horizon surveillance,
warning and targeting. But in a high intensity
naval operation there is no substitute for an
AWACS with its battle space management and
long-range surveillance capabilities.
To
be sure, China's Z-9 ship borne helicopters are
outstanding close-in surveillance and
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms, but they
are no substitute for long-range or long endurance
fixed-wing ASW search and localization aircraft.
Perhaps China's military planners believe unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) can fill its AWACS and
long-range ASW and maritime surveillance roles.
Given the carrier's long incubation
period, that seems quite plausible - although such
platforms will not be combat-ready and integrated
into fleet operations before the end of this
decade. Until then, the carrier's capabilities
against a conventional takeoff or landing (CTOL)
carrier or fully integrated enemy air and fleet
defense system will be limited.
Missions beyond war At the same
time, aircraft carriers have significant uses
beyond their war potential. With a likely eventual
air wing of 20-30 fixed wing fighters and 12-18
helicopters, once fully operational, China's
carrier will offer a full range of surveillance,
helo-borne transport and fighter capabilities to
support various combatant and non-combatant
contingencies.
China's maritime trade now
stretches around the globe and requires ever
rising levels of protection, a fact that has been
driven home to China's political and naval leaders
over the last four years. Indian Ocean piracy has
hit China's trade hard, driving it to deploy small
naval contingents to conduct anti-piracy
operations; its 12th anti-piracy contingent
recently departed for the western Indian Ocean.
However, meeting the small surface action groups'
needs without a forward base has provided
challenging lessons and significant on-the-job
logistics training for China's naval crews.
The PLAN has already negotiated a series
of access agreements reaching from the shores of
Pakistan down to Djibouti to facilitate these
missions. Regional media have speculated that
China is also seeking an access arrangement, if
not a permanent basing agreement, with the island
nation of Seychelles. Although costs and
geopolitical considerations will probably preclude
China from seeking a permanent base in the Indian
Ocean within this decade, anti-piracy missions and
related logistics requirements will remain a key
PLAN focus.
Over the last three years
China has needed to rapidly evacuate its citizens
from three far-flung countries - Libya, Kenya and
Yemen - which have suffered from violent political
turmoil. With over 5.5 million of its citizens
officially working overseas, many in countries
facing stability challenges, Beijing has likely
given thought to expanding its capacity to
evacuate them on short notice. The domestic
political pressure for readiness will grow in the
years ahead, driving the political leadership to
at least consider a naval presence in waters near
those areas. With its large helicopter contingent,
the soon-to-be-commissioned carrier is second only
to an amphibious task group in its ability to
evacuate or assist large numbers of people in
distant lands.
Looking beyond the
evacuation of its citizens, Beijing cannot have
missed the important role America's carriers
performed during the massive international relief
effort that followed the 2004 Asian tsunami
disaster. China's carrier will be able to perform
similar missions, though humanitarian assistance
operations rarely receive much notice in Beijing's
budgetary or military planning debates. The return
in diplomatic and public goodwill, however, could
help to mitigate neighboring countries' threat
perceptions associated with the carrier.
Beijing has long wanted a carrier force
and for decades is known to have studied closely
carrier operations, design and technology. The
prohibitive costs and political implications of
acquiring a carrier made it the subject of much
internal debate throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
With those financial and political obstacles now
overcome, military planners will gain intimate
knowledge of a carrier's uses, costs and
challenges. The latter should not be
underestimated as carriers require significant
logistical support, far beyond that needed for
guided missile destroyers and lesser combatants.
Discussions about China's carrier have so far
seemingly overlooked issues related to integration
with the PLAN's existing operations and
coordination with its growing submarine force.
Coordinating surface fleet and air
operations with submarines adds yet another level
of complexity to an already complicated military
operation. By building and commissioning a
carrier, China has signaled it aims to become a
great naval power. How the PLAN employs its
carrier-bolstered fleet over the next two to five
years will largely shape regional and global
perceptions of China and its intentions. Even the
carrier's name, once christened, will carry
political significance outside China's shores.
With growing power comes growing responsibility -
the world will be watching how Beijing responds to
both challenges.
Carl O Schuster
is a retired United States Navy Captain based in
Honolulu, Hawaii. The views expressed here are his
own.
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