Japan
tests China's eastern flank By
Brendan O'Reilly
As tensions continue to
swirl in the South China Sea, pressure is also
building on China's eastern flank. The recent
escalation of a long-standing dispute between
China and Japan over a group of islands highlights
significant regional and global changes in the
balance of power. Waves from the stormy waters
between China and Japan are being felt throughout
the world.
Both China and Japan claim the
uninhabited Pinnacle Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese
and Senkaku in Japanese). These islands are
currently under Japanese control, but both the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and the
Taiwan-based Republic of China (ROC) dispute
Japanese claims to the islands. The Japanese
government "rents" the Pinnacles from a private
citizen, and has
prevented landings on the
islands in order to avoid a diplomatic crisis with
China.
The intensification of the
longstanding dispute can be traced back to April.
Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara announced plans
for the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase
the islands from their private titleholder. A
fundraising campaign was launched to raise capital
for the planned purchase, which brought in over
US$16 million. This put Japan's central government
in the awkward position of dealing with a local
government influencing an international dispute.
On June 8, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
weighed in on the issue with a call to
"nationalize" the islands, telling his cabinet:
"There is no question that the Senkakus are an
integral part of our country's territory…From the
viewpoint of how to maintain and manage the
Senkakus in a calm and stable manner, we are
making comprehensive studies on the matter by
keeping in touch with the owner…". [1]
The
Chinese government reacted with predictable
outrage. An official complaint was lodged the same
day as Noda's speech. Foreign ministry spokesman
Liu Weimin stated, "We cannot allow anyone to buy
or sell China's sacred territory."[2] Chinese
patrol vessels have neared the islands, initially
refusing to leave after Japanese orders to vacate
the area. This incident prompted Japan to summon
the Chinese ambassador. The Chinese foreign
ministry insisted the islands are Chinese
territory, and "does not accept Japanese
representations" over the issue.
The
foreign ministers of China and Japan met on the
sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Minister's Meeting in
Cambodia in order to discuss the issue, but
neither side was willing to compromise claims of
sovereignty.
On Wednesday, Japan described
the entry of three Chinese vessels into
Japanese-controlled waters near the Pinnacle
Islands as "unacceptable". Uichiro Nira, the
Japanese ambassador to China was recalled to Tokyo
during the weekend for high-level consultations
with the central government. Nira has warned of
the potential for an "extremely grave crisis"
between the Asian giants. Risky
strategy The timing of the ongoing row is
particularly interesting. China has recently faced
an intensification of maritime disputes with the
Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea.
The Japanese government may be seeking to put
pressure on Beijing at this juncture in order to
make common cause with smaller Asian neighbors who
are also troubled by China's rapid expansion of
economic and military clout.
Indeed, Japan
has announced plans to host a special security
summit with ASEAN next year. Although Japan holds
meetings with ASEAN on an annual basis, this will
be the first conference with a particularly focus
on "maritime security". [3] Clearly, Japan is
trying to shore up allies in order to put joint
pressure on Chinese territorial claims.
However, this strategy could be a mistake.
China has consistently resisted calls to settle
its disputes with rival claimants in the South
China Sea on a multilateral basis. The Chinese
government is well aware that it can exert greater
influence on other countries using a bilateral
approach. Furthermore, ASEAN itself is divided on
the issues of South China Sea sovereignty.
Cambodia, a strong ally of China, is very
reluctant to address the issue in an ASEAN versus
China context. Thailand has expressed a desire for
disputes in the South China Sea to not effect
ASEAN cooperation with China. Furthermore,
although Vietnam and the Philippines contest
China's claims of sovereignty in the area, they
also contest each other's.
The timing of
Japanese moves to "nationalize" the Pinnacle
Islands also comes at a crucial period for
Japanese domestic politics. Noda recently enacted
controversial policies such as restarting nuclear
power plants and raising Japan's sales tax. Former
Democratic Party of Japan chief Ichiro Ozawa,
nicknamed the "Shadow Shogun", has abandoned the
ruling DPJ in protest, bringing 48
parliamentarians with him into his new "People's
Life Comes First" party.
Noda may be
hoping to shore up domestic support by playing the
nationalist card. The Japanese public is highly
wary of a rising China, which has recently
overtaken Japan as the world's second-largest
economy and shares a troubled history with the
island nation. Orchestrating a limited
confrontation with China could be useful for
Noda's political ambitions.
It is
important to note that Beijing did not initiate
the current escalation. Although this maritime
dispute is at least several decades old, Beijing
has been content to diplomatically protest
Japanese claims while accepting the status quo on
the ground. The Japanese government has
intensified the longstanding dispute for
geo-strategic and political reasons, forcing China
to react. Chinese political and military responses
to the perceived Japanese provocation closely
mirror recent Chinese strategies against
Vietnamese claims in the South China Sea.
The motivation for both China and Japan to
control the Pinnacle Islands comes less from the
islands themselves, and more from the potential
for commercial fishing, as well as oil and gas
reserves in the area. Sovereignty over the islands
would allow for exploration of these natural
resources. China and Japan are highly dependent on
imported energy, and the ability to tap reserves
in the East China Sea would lessen reliance on oil
and gas transported through the highly contested
South China Sea.
However, the guaranteed
drawbacks of open conflict would far outweigh the
potential benefits of controlling the islands.
China is Japan's number one trading partner, and
as the global economy continues to falter, the two
nations need each other's markets to stay afloat.
The mutual benefit of trade and investment between
the two nations far exceeds the value of oil, gas
and fish in the region.
Japan's regional
ambitions are further restrained by her troubled
history. The recent Japanese failure to reach a
military pact with South Korea largely stemmed
from the tragic historical legacy of Japanese
colonialism. China may appear to some as
belligerent in its disputes with the Philippines
and Vietnam, but Japan will have a much harder
time garnering regional sympathy in the unlikely
event of military conflict.
Eagle eye
on troubled waters The United States is
closely monitoring the political and diplomatic
struggle over the Pinnacle Islands. Historically,
US involvement in the area is extensive. The
islands were occupied by the United States from
the end of World War II until 1972, when they were
"returned" to Japanese control. Both China and
Taiwan dismissed this transfer of authority as a
violation of Chinese sovereignty.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stopped
in Japan on her way to the recent ASEAN meeting in
Cambodia. She inquired about Japanese plans to
"nationalize" the islands, with apparent concern
for Sino-Japanese relations. She then met with the
Chinese foreign minister at the sidelines of the
ASEAN summit, with Clinton stressing that the US
won't "take sides in disputes about territorial or
maritime boundaries". [5]
This is a
pointed change in tone from earlier that week,
when a State Department official said that the US
would be required to come to Japan's aid in case
of attack by a third party on the disputed
Islands: "The Senkakus would fall within the scope
of Article 5 of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security because the Senkaku
Islands have been under the administrative control
of the government of Japan since they were
returned as part of the reversion of Okinawa in
1972," said the unnamed official. [5]
Article Five of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty
is essentially a mutual-defense clause. It is a
cornerstone of US Asia policy, cementing the
alliance between the US and Japan. However, its
application in case of skirmishes over the
Pinnacle Islands could lead to disastrous
consequences.
The US neither wants to
appear as an ineffective ally, nor to risk World
War III over a small maritime clash. Clinton's
efforts to reach out to the Japanese and Chinese
governments, as well as her claims that the US
does not favor one territorial claimant over
another, are part of a concerted effort to disuse
a potential powder keg.
China is wary of
American intentions in the region, especially
given the US "strategic pivot" towards Asia. Any
attempts by the US to openly back Japan in the
ongoing maritime dispute will be seen as
interference in China's internal affairs, and
could push the mainland and Taiwan even closer. As
evidenced by the failed South Korea-Japan pact,
nationalism can still trump traditional
geopolitics in the region.
The Chinese
government is highly sensitive to the possibility
of the US developing a regional alliance to
counter China's growing influence. Although China
has no strategic interest in initiating a conflict
while its economic power continues to rise, the
Chinese leadership cannot back down from
territorial disputes for political and strategic
reasons. China wants to be treated with the fear
and respect that a superpower deserves, and some
hawkish elements within the Middle Kingdom believe
that a military show of force may be the only
method of earning such respect.
The
conflict over the Pinnacle Islands will in all
likelihood remain a political war of words.
Neither Japan nor China has enough to gain from an
open clash to justify the enormous risks that such
a conflict would entail. At the same time, neither
government wants to appear weak in front of a
historic enemy and current rival.
Japan's
slow-motion political crisis, the leadership
transition in Beijing, and the upcoming election
in the US nearly guarantee the perpetuation of a
purely symbolic conflict. Global economic woes are
an additional incentive to avoid unpredictable
adventurism. Nevertheless, symbolic conflicts are
an important window into real shifts in the
balance of power. The violent currents in the East
China Sea reflect a change in tides as China
continues its rapid expansion of economic and
military clout.
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