Page 2 of
2 'Occupy' with
Chinese
characteristics By Peter
Lee
Activism was couched in the politically
privileged and crowd pleasing term of NIMBY (Not
In My Back Yard) environmental activism. Activists
used social media and carefully prepared
educational and propaganda materials to organize a
mass demonstration. Again, high school students
were in the vanguard.
The local government
refused a permit for the demonstration but quickly
announced that the project was "on hold". This
standard leaf from the dissent-sidelining playbook
of both authoritarian regimes and liberal
democracies was brushed aside by the
demonstrators.
The demonstration went on
as planned on July 28 before the
municipal government
offices, and then morphed into confrontation and
occupation as some activists went in and trashed
the place, followed by hundreds of demonstrators
who subsequently filled the balconies surrounding
the structure.
Given the abjectly
conciliatory performance of the government, party,
and security officials in Qidong during the
ruckus, one can infer that the occupation was
planned ahead of time by at least some activists,
and was not an outburst of spontaneous indignation
against unendurable establishment excesses or
insolence during the demonstrations.
The
Nantong City government followed the precedent of
the Shifang government and capitulated promptly.
The announcement posted on the Qidong municipal
website on July 28, the same day as the
demonstrations, stated:
After careful considerations, the
Nantong City Government has decided to halt the
implementation of the Nantong Large-Scale
Project for Expelling Standards-Meeting Water
into the Sea in Qidong. [3]
An
electronic billboard in Qidong displayed a less
nuanced, more crowd-pleasing message on the same
day, even as demonstrators were gathered in the
city center:
After careful consideration, the
Nantong City Government has decided to cancel
this project for ever.
However, the
people power message has been muddied by a number
of factors.
First of all, there was a
suspicion that the government's low-key response
did not represent an outbreak of democratic
reasonableness. Perhaps risk-averse government
officials were in a state of temporary politically
induced paralysis brought on by the impending
leadership transition in the central government
and the perceived need not to make any
controversial moves until it was clear what
leaders and what policies would have the upper
hand.
Once clear guidance and support from
above materializes, in other words, offended city
governments and their manhandled mayors will
revert to standard operating procedure and strike
back instead of turning the other cheek.
Secondly, it appears that, as a matter of
tactics by both the government and the protesters,
the Qidong action has become confounded with the
current trend in anti-Japanese nationalism
percolating through China.
Oji Paper
Company of Japan is the hapless owner of the pulp
and paper mega-plant in Nantong, with a total
planned investment of US$2 billion. Oji Nantong is
the main projected user of the pipeline (which was
to be funded and constructed by the Chinese
government).
The billion-dollar paper mill
is already in operation using imported pulp; the
pulp mill would consume Brazilian eucalyptus chips
and Yangtze River water and provide pulp to the
paper mill as well as the lion's share of effluent
to the pipeline.
The Nantong plant is a
world-scale plant (an Asian consortium has
constructed a plant similar in size and operating
philosophy - but no public rumpus - at the
Shandong port city of Rizhao) and represents Oji's
big bet on the China market (including the
rocketing demand for high-end toilet tissue) and
its own future. The cost savings provided by an
integrated pulp and paper operation are an
important factor in the profitability and perhaps
even the viability of the Nantong project.
In an apparent effort to deflect
accusations of anti-government and anti-party
activism, the demonstrators framed their protests
in terms of blocking Oji's plans to sully the
pristine coastal waters of Qidong.
Pre-printed placards declared: Stop Oji;
Protect Our Homes and Gardens.
For its
part, the state media was also happy to
characterize the protests as "anti-Oji", gliding
past the awkward part of the story where hundreds
of demonstrators occupied and trashed a local
government headquarters in a calculated expression
of anti-regime anger.
The decision to hang
the Qidong albatross around Japan's neck was
undoubtedly made easier by the prevailing
atmosphere of Sino-Japanese tension brought about
by renewed confrontation over the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands.
In the echo
chamber of China's Internet, crude anti-Japanese
sentiments became something that both pro- and
anti-government posters could all agree on, and
calls went out for a boycott of Oji's popular
Nepia toilet paper.
After the furor dies
down, Nantong City may very well try to
resuscitate the pipeline project in a different
form. The official announcement that
implementation "in Qidong" would be terminated
leaves open the possibility that the government
will find a new way and/or new place to make it
work.
The central government, mindful of
the damage done to the PRC's reputation as an
investment destination if a billion-dollar
foreign-funded project can be undone in one
weekend by a few thousand demonstrators, will
probably also search for a way to protect Oji's
interests in Nantong.
Judging by its July
30 press release, Oji is anxiously hopeful:
The Nantong municipal government has
indicated that the current plan to build a
pipeline to the sea via Qidong may be
permanently shelved. We are investigating the
impact this could have on our project to build a
paper plant in the province and will announce
our conclusions as soon as we reach them.
[4]
However, the lethal combination of
Japanese investment, environmental fears, and the
precedent of government capitulation would seem to
provide a gigantic and irresistible target for
political activists if there was an attempt to
revive the pipeline project in any form.
For the Chinese government, in the wake of
Shifang and Qidong, the key issue is not how to
placate victims of government misbehavior and
environmental abuse; it is how to handle local
unrest when it involves projects that haven't even
started yet, and is driven by educated, alienated,
and ever more proficient, confident, and militant
young activists who are always looking for ways to
push the regime's buttons and are never content to
take "Yes" for an answer.
If similar local
protests with student/citizen synergies continue
to ignite, and Occupy China shows signs of
becoming a nationwide trend, the Chinese Communist
Party will be forced to contemplate some
interesting and unpleasant alternatives.
And it may not have the luxury of waiting
until after the leadership transition to make some
decisions.
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