Politicking curbs Bo family
punishment By Willy Lam
The impending trial of Gu Kailai, the wife
of disgraced Politburo member Bo Xilai, on murder
charges says a lot about the latest developments
in Chinese politics, particularly Beijing's
renewed determination to put stability and
"harmony" ahead of political and legal reform.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Politburo under President Hu Jintao is giving top
priority on preserving a fa็ade of unity in the
run-up to the pivotal 18th Party Congress this
autumn. This is despite Hu's much-publicized
speech last month in which, as CCP general
secretary, he pledged that efforts would be
redoubled to push forward reforms, stating "the
party must put its house in order".
On
July 26, the official Xinhua News Agency announced
that power lawyer Gu had been charged with the
"intentional homicide" of British businessman Neil
Heywood in a Chongqing hotel last
November. Xinhua stated
"The facts are clear, the evidence is irrefutable
and substantial" about the crime, which allegedly
was perpetrated with the help of Zhang Xiaojun, an
aide of the Bo family. There was, however, no
reference to the widely reported fact that, prior
to his fateful trip to Chongqing, Heywood had told
close friends he had helped the Bo couple launder
huge amounts of funds overseas.
This
intriguing development has two major implications
regarding the Hu leadership's strategy to handle
the Bo case. Firstly, as noted Beijing-based human
rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang pointed out, "if Gu has
not been implicated with corruption-related
offences, it is likely that her husband Bo will
also not be accused of a similar crime."
In other words, since Bo, the 63-year-old
son of revolutionary elder Bo Yibo, has only been
cited for a "serious breach of party discipline"
by party authorities - and not for
corruption-related offenses - he need not even
appear in a court of law. According to CCP
regulations, cadres suspected of breaking party
discipline may only be investigated by the Central
Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) -
and such proceedings are usually not publicized.
The possible kid-glove treatment of Bo
contrasts sharply with two similar cases of a
Politburo member and regional party boss being
disgraced as a result of factional infighting in
the CCP's top echelons. In September 2006, 13
months before the convention of the 17th CCP
Congress, then Politburo member and Shanghai Party
Secretary Chen Liangyu was dismissed from all his
party and government posts.
At the time of
his initial detention, the official media was
replete with information about his "economic
crimes" - for example, how he had helped several
business cronies illegally obtain cheap loans from
the metropolis' social-security funds. Chen was
given a jail term of 18 years for alleged
corruption-related crimes. Chen, a stalwart of the
Shanghai Faction led by ex-president Jiang Zemin,
had run afoul of President Hu and Premier Wen
Jiabao for reportedly refusing to carry out the
instructions of the two senior PBSC members.
In 1995, then Politburo member and Beijing
Party Secretary Chen Xitong was arrested for
graft-related crimes, which resulted in a 16-year
sentence after a court trial three years later.
Again, the propaganda machinery at the time of
Chen's detention in 1995 provided the public with
a barrage of reports about multifarious bribes and
kickbacks that the Beijing chief had allegedly
received from his business associates.
A
major cause of Chen's downfall was a power
struggle with then-president and CCP general
secretary Jiang. That precious little information
about Bo's misdemeanors has been allowed to appear
in public is an indication that the authorities
may not want to build a big criminal case against
the well-connected princeling. Moreover, the
possibility that Bo's case need not go through the
judicial system - and the scrutiny of the media -
seems emblematic of severe political and legal
retrogression.
Moreover, focusing
attention on Gu - and the possibility that Bo
might be spared the ordeal of a public trial -
tallies with an earlier decision by the party
leadership to treat the Bo case leniently. As Ong
Yew Kim, a legal expert at the China University of
Law and Political Science, pointed out, "There is
evidence to suggest the handling of the Bo's is
done according to political, not legal
considerations."
Ong noted the
leadership's priority was to ensure a stable
atmosphere for the 18th CCP Congress and not to
pursue Bo's more serious crime of organizing an
"anti-party cabal" together with senior officials
in the party and the People's Liberation Army. [1]
Both Western and Hong Kong newspapers
reported the Hu-led Politburo Standing Committee
(PBSC) had decided in May to characterize Bo's
"crimes" as an "isolated" or "individual" case -
not one involving a conspiratorial clique. The
major reason is that, having made sure that his
foe is politically finished, Hu does not want to
upset party unity by pursuing such Bo backers as
PBSC member Zhou Yongkang and several influential
princeling generals such as Liu Yuan and Zhang
Haiyang, the political commissars of the General
Logistics Department and the Second Artillery Corp
[which controls China's nuclear ballistic and
conventional missiles] respectively.
In
fact, during study sessions on the Bo case
conducted by Chongqing cadres immediately after
the party boss's downfall, cadres were told to
focus on the "individual acts" of culprits such as
Gu and not to pay attention to "rumors and
discordant noises" about the larger implications
of the couple's crimes. Officials in the
metropolis also were instructed to affirm the
"correctness of the central party leadership's
principles and measures used in the investigations
[of the Bo family]".
If the Bo case will
be handled only by CCDI investigators, his
punishment is unlikely to be severe. As things
stand, Bo may be charged with trying to intercept
the phone calls of senior party leaders as well as
failing to maintain discipline among his
subordinates. The ousted "warlord" might need to
take political responsibility for former Chongqing
police chief Wang Lijun's attempt last February to
seek political asylum in the US Consulate in
nearby Chengdu.
Wang, a former prot้g้ of
Bo's, had apparently run afoul of his patron by
exposing Gu's involvement in the Heywood murder.
The results of the investigation, which are
expected to be announced at the 7th Plenary
Session of the Central Committee scheduled to take
place about one month before the 18th Party
Congress, are likely to be little if anything
beyond Bo's expulsion from the party.
In
an editorial following the indictment against Gu,
the Global Times claimed the trial of Bo's wife
showed that everybody was equal before the law.
The paper noted the Gu case had "sent a message to
society that nobody, regardless of his or her
status and power, can be exempt from punishment if
he or she behaves unscrupulously".
"A trial held according to law will
strengthen the Chinese people's confidence in
the country's legal system," the Global Times
said, adding that "the law should be the sole
principle followed in the [Gu] trial."
The editorial also expressed the hope
that "legal departments should disclose enough
information regarding the trial to satisfy the
public's demands".
Doubts raised by
judicial experts about how Beijing may have
politicized proceedings against Gu and Bo,
however, have cast doubt on the CCP leadership's
commitment to legal and political reform. Apart
from Global Times, no less an authority than
President Hu has spoken out in favor of the
continuation of reforms and the imperative of a
CCP housecleaning.
In a major speech to
senior party, government and military leaders on
July 23, Hu vowed to continue the forward-looking
policies laid down by late patriarch Deng Xiaoping
more than 30 years ago. "We will unswervingly go
down the correct path that the party and the
people have put together through long-standing
practice," he said, elaborating that "We will
unswervingly push forward the reform and open door
[policy]".
The party chief also warned the
CCP faced immense challenges in its mission to
remain China's viable ruling party.
"Under
new circumstances, the conditions behind the CCP's
historical role and its rule, as well as the
structure and composition of party members have
undergone drastic changes," Hu said, "Risks coming
from outside the party have become unprecedented."
To mitigate these risks, Hu indicated, "the party
must manage itself in the most stringent manner."
This included beefing up party members'
"ideological construction" and "working style";
firming up organizations and institutions; and, in
particular, fighting corruption and promoting
clean governance.
The way in which the
Hu-led PBSC appears to have decided to put
political expediency above principles of law,
however, shows the CCP leadership has continued to
spurn political reform as well as global norms
about good governance. The top priority for
General Secretary Hu at this point is to ensure
that the maximum number of members of his
Communist Youth League Faction will be promoted to
senior slots at the 18th Party Congress.
This can only be accomplished by striking
deals with leaders of the other factions,
including those who might be Bo sympathizers. For
example, Hu has to win over ex-president Jiang,
who still has a considerable say over high-level
personnel selections. As a protege of Bo Yibo,
Jiang is understood not to favor harsh punishment
for Bo Xilai. Hu, who is keen to remain on the
Central Military Commission for at least two years
beyond his retirement from the Politburo at the
18th CCP Congress, also does not want to alienate
generals who are Bo supporters.
Horse
trading among the disparate cliques has taken
place prior to every party congress in recent
memory; however, the perpetuation of politics as
usual could deal a body blow to the CCP's
legitimacy even as demands for change both inside
and outside the party have risen to unprecedented
levels.
Note: 1.
Author's Interview with Ong Yew Kim, July 29,
2012.
Dr Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a
Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He has
worked in senior editorial positions in
international media including Asiaweek
newsmagazine, South China Morning Post, and the
Asia-Pacific Headquarters of CNN. He is the author
of five books on China, including the recently
published Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao
Era: New Leaders, New Challenges. Lam is an
Adjunct Professor of China studies at Akita
International University, Japan, and at the
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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