Taiwan jumps into South China Sea
fray By Brendan O'Reilly
Until recently, the government of the
Taiwan-based Republic of China (ROC) had remained
fairly quiet regarding heightened tensions in the
South China Sea. This silence has now been broken,
with important diplomatic and strategic
implications for the relevant disputant nations
and concerned world powers. Those who were hoping
for Taipei eagerly to join a nascent anti-Beijing
alliance are likely to be sorely disappointed.
Last week, James Chou, deputy director
general of the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, stressed that the disputed islands of the
South China Sea were the "undisputed territory" of
the ROC. Additionally, Chou expressed a strong
desire for the ROC to take part in any
multilateral mechanism in resolving the
long-standing territorial impasse. He said any
resolution of the conflict that did
not involve the ROC
would be "regrettable".
Chou's assertion
of the "undisputed" nature of Chinese sovereignty
in the area echoed the recurring message of the
Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of
China. Both the mainland-based PRC and the ROC
maintain the same "nine-dotted line" claim to the
vast majority of the South China Sea. It is
important to note that the current official policy
of both Taipei and Beijing is that there is "one
China", and both governments strongly agree on
Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea. The
pivotal disagreement of cross-strait relations
hinges on which of the two governments is the
legitimate ruler of China itself.
Even
more interesting, a high-ranking government
official in Taipei has recently called for a
ROC-PRC economic alliance in the South China Sea.
Chiu Yi, an important member of Taiwan's ruling
Kuomintang (KMT) party and an executive in the
state-owned energy company CPC, has called for
open cooperation between the PRC and the ROC in
extracting resources from the disputed waters:
"The seabed around Taiping Island has abundant
reserves of oil and natural gas ... The merit
would be great if a cross-strait joint development
project is done." [3]
Chiu went on to
condemn Vietnam as the "greatest threat" to
Chinese sovereignty in the area. Taiping Island is
controlled by the ROC, and is near the center of
the South China Sea. For Taiwan and mainland China
to cooperate on development in the region would
signal both a strategic shift in the area and a
major symbolic cementing of cross-strait ties.
Improved relations between Taipei and the
Beijing, strengthened by a joint position in the
South China Sea, would rely heavily on the
often-mercurial politics of Taiwan. While the
ruling KMT has called for closer ties with the
mainland, its rival Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) is more wary of mainland China's rise.
Last week DPP spokesman Lin Chun-hsien
called on President (and KMT member) Ma Ying-jeou
to chastise Beijing's recent decision to garrison
troops permanently in the South China Sea, saying:
"Ma should condemn Beijing's unilateral move,
which jeopardized regional security, as Vietnam,
the Philippines and the US have all expressed
similar concerns." [4]
The KMT, instead of
condemning Beijing's moves, has reiterated the
common Chinese position. This demonstrates the
important division between Taiwan's two main
political parties with regards to the PRC's
ongoing regional assertiveness.
The DPP is
in favor of an official declaration of Taiwanese
independence, while the KMT seeks improved ties
with the mainland and eventual political
reunification (dependent on extensive reforms
within mainland China). Where the DPP sees China's
moves in the South China Sea as a threat to
Taiwanese security, the KMT sees an opportunity to
protect Chinese sovereignty. This difference boils
down to identity politics and two different
nationalistic narratives.
The dynamic
between the Taiwan's two main political parties is
of crucial importance to Asian and global
security. Currently, the KMT has a hold on power,
but recent elections have been closely contested.
Whoever controls Taipei can set the ROC's foreign
(and cross-strait) policy, with significant impact
on the regional balance of power. Taiwan's
political struggles are simultaneously affecting,
and being affected by, the struggle for
sovereignty in the South China Sea.
The
ROC Foreign Ministry's recently stated desire to
participate in any multilateral mechanisms for
resolving the maritime dispute is particularly
telling. Beijing's insistence on a strict "one
China" policy has excluded Taipei from most
international organizations. However, Taipei's
participation in a multilateral, negotiated
settlement to the South China Sea impasse would
likely strengthen the joint Chinese claims of
sovereignty over key islands.
Rumors are
now circulating of a grand bargain being
negotiated between Taipei and Beijing. Joint
PRC-ROC cooperation in the South China Sea may be
exchanged for Beijing's approval of Taipei's
participation in some international organizations.
Issues of sovereignty would need to be carefully
addressed in any deal, but the potential for
mutual benefit is significant.
Taipei's
ruling KMT could score a major diplomatic victory,
while Beijing's claims of sovereignty over
disputed areas would be strengthened. The economic
windfall from extracting oil and gas reserves in
the region is also a key motivation for
cooperation. Most important, a major diplomatic
victory brokered by the KMT might strengthen its
political power in Taipei, to the long-term
benefit of both the KMT itself and to leaders in
mainland China.
The states that contest
Chinese claims in the South China Sea must take
close note of the shifting tides in Taiwan.
Vietnam and the Philippines face the possibility
of a de facto PRC-ROC alliance in the disputed
region. Japan's recent decision to provide a dozen
sophisticated patrol boats to the Philippines
touched a nationalist nerve in both mainland China
and Taiwan.
Joint PRC-ROC cooperation in
the South China Sea would also pose a significant
challenge for US policy. The US government has
been strengthening military ties with the
Philippines and Vietnam with the unstated aim of
containing Chinese ambitions in the area.
Meanwhile, Taiwan has long been a US ally. If
Chinese nationalism remains politically ascendant
in Taiwan, and a joint PRC-ROC alliance is formed
in the South China Sea, the US will find itself in
a very awkward position.
The South China
Sea remains a potential flashpoint for major
conflict. Nationalistic sentiments, historical
animosity, the thirst for energy resources, and
geopolitical interests have fermented into a
potent brew. Taipei is entering the fray with the
expectation of key diplomatic, economic and
political benefits. Open calls for PRC-ROC
cooperation in the region serve as a reminder for
all concerned states to expect the unexpected.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
