Romney's China hand encounters
rough seas By Benjamin A
Shobert
The struggles of Republican
presidential nominee Mitt Romney to define a
coherent China policy continued last week. The
nomination of Robert Zoellick, former World Bank
Group president, to head Romney's
national-security transition team has drawn the
ire of prominent neo-conservatives who take issue
with a variety of Zoellick's foreign-policy
positions, not least of which is his "pro-China"
orientation.
The problems Romney has
encountered speak to the distrust many hardline
conservatives have toward his candidacy: Should
they take his many changes of heart as sincere, or
as political necessities? If the latter, can they
trust him to govern in ways consistent with their
values, or should they expect him to reverse
course? These misgivings explain why many from the
neo-conservative wing of the party are quick to
react when Romney
appears ready to tack to
the moderate middle, as his nomination of Zoellick
suggested.
Thus far, Romney's public
statements about China are noticeably different
from those of past Republican candidates. His
emphasis on China has led many pundits to proclaim
that a Romney-led administration would "get tough"
on Beijing. He has famously declared his
intentions to identify China as a currency
manipulator on "Day 1" of his presidency. All of
these are interesting comments from the otherwise
conventional, pro-business Republican, and
markedly different from those of past Republican
nominees whose emphasis on free trade and access
to China was an all but explicit part of their
platforms.
It is widely accepted that if
elected, Romney's position toward China would tack
to these traditional Republican stances, an
opinion reinforced by Zoellick's nomination. In
nominating Zoellick, it appeared Romney was
signaling to the world an acknowledgement that his
administration would come back to center on
foreign-policy matters.
This past
February, while still at the World Bank, Zoellick
fielded questions from the media while at the
Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing. In response
to a question over the World Bank's "China 2030"
report, a reporter wanted to explore Zoellick's
thoughts on the "pace and direction of reform
now".
His answers embodied classic
realism: "I think what's impressive is that the
leadership is even asking these questions about
structural reform ... what I am picking up from
discussions, not only in Beijing but with
provincial party secretaries, is the recognition
that it's better to undertake structural reforms
while the economy is growing well."
He
expanded on this by adding: "I've also seen at the
provincial level that people recognize that local
governments, for example, might have too much
control, and therefore they stymie the types of
initiative we're going to need in the future."
It would be difficult to find a more
public acknowledgement of classic Republican
realism toward China: Yes, reforms have slowed,
but our frustrations over their slowing should not
overlook the enormous changes they have already
made, or the acknowledgement by local government
that more is needed.
As opposed to
hard-edged ideologues like John Bolton and
Condoleezza Rice, with both of whom has had
reportedly fallen out of favor, Zoellick favors a
classic version of Republican realism, which views
China as a necessary partner, and which elevates
the great good China has done to get this far.
His approach to foreign policy in general
has been deeply shaped by the time he worked with
former secretary of state James Baker. In 2005,
Zoellick spoke at the National Committee on
US-China Relations and introduced his formulation
of China as a "responsible stakeholder" in matters
of national security and global governance.
Beyond his views on China, Zoellick is not
trusted by many hardline neo-conservatives because
of his views on Israel (a supporter, but with
conditions that reflect his concerns about
Palestinian rights) and an approach to foreign
policy in general that stresses diplomacy and
coalition-building over coercion and pre-emption.
Parts of the Republican Party remain
convinced that the only way to prevent another
September 11 or worse is through the singular use
of force wherever and whenever it is deemed
necessary. In contrast to this stand, conservative
holdouts like Zoellick believe the failures of
Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate precisely why
caution, patience, engagement and dialogue are
always preferable to brute force.
Mistrust
of Zoellick also speaks to the way conservative
foreign policy is further regressing: Now, being
"weak" on foreign policy involves more than
misgivings about former president George W Bush's
response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Now, it includes being too soft on China.
Combine Romney's politicizing US-China
trade disagreements and the belief among large
parts of his base that America's approach toward
China should follow similar escalating language
and actions as the US has pursued with Iran and
North Korea, and it becomes very easy to see how
Zoellick's realism appears antiquated.
For
those within the Republican Party who have never
really trusted Romney, Zoellick's nomination adds
to their fears. For them, his presence within
Romney's inner circle supports a narrative that
Romney's true center is best reflected by the
times he has represented the establishment. In
Massachusetts, his approach to health care,
abortion, homosexual marriage and gun control all
reflected the common wisdom of the state he
governed. Consequently, when judged against
today's Tea Party-inspired Republican Party,
Romney's past in Massachusetts provokes deep
misgivings among conservative activists.
He has managed to win the nomination
through savvy campaigning, a disciplined message,
and carefully walking backward from each of these
positions even when doing so robbed him of key
legislative achievements from his past.
Now, confronted with pushback over one of
his first foreign-policy decisions, this same
storyline has presented itself. His conservative
critics have been quick to cry foul by suggesting
that Zoellick's nomination illuminates Romney's
true intentions to govern from the middle,
precisely the sort of compromise neo-conservatives
believe puts the US in jeopardy of another
September 11 and that members of the Tea Party
believe makes a fiscal crisis inevitable.
All of this makes for fascinating
politics, but the question remains what to make of
the dynamic this suggests about the direction of
Republican foreign policy at large, and its
application to China specifically. Overall,
conservative thinking in the United States since
September 2001 has embraced purity and orthodoxy
over pragmatism and consensus.
Whether
analyzing conservative opinions on social issues,
economic matters, or foreign policy, room for
compromise has become all but impossible. Whether
you agree this is good or bad is irrelevant; it is
has become the nature of the modern US
conservative movement to value ideological purity
as a virtue.
This cannot forever be walled
off from US-China relations. At some point, the
brittle orthodoxies that today knit the US
conservative movement together will be applied to
China. It is likely this reorientation will happen
during a period of economic frustration, perhaps
even well after ideas about austerity the Tea
Party believes are key to reigniting America's
economic fires prove unable to do so. Then,
ideologues will begin looking outward for another
actor to blame for America's economic insecurity.
What better culprit than China, whose view on
human rights, freedom, and accountability of
government are diametrically opposite to those
Americans hold dear?
A fire that burns
with the intensity of the Tea Party needs constant
fuel in the form of new ideas to castigate and new
villains to pursue. If this fire runs its course
within the US only to find its solutions did
little to make things better, the movement's
intensity will look for a new actor to blame.
Should it encounter China stalled over the
possibility of future additional reforms - whether
economic or political - it will be difficult to
prevent that country from becoming the focus of
conservative ire.
The role Zoellick would
play in a Romney administration would be
interesting. If allowed to take a leadership role,
Zoellick would likely temper the Republican
Party's neo-conservative wing and bring back a
responsible foreign policy rooted in classic
conservative views. However, if Romney finds
either during the run-up to, or aftermath of,
pursuing the US presidency that he cannot keep
Zoellick, it will signal the ongoing sacrifice of
realism for ideological purity, the outcome of
which will almost certainly lead to conventional
wisdom about the long-term trajectory of US-China
relations being turned on its head.
Benjamin A Shobert is the
managing director of Rubicon Strategy Group, a
consulting firm specialized in strategy analysis
for companies looking to enter emerging economies.
He is the author of the upcoming book Blame
China and can be followed atCrossTheRubiconBlog.com.
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