SINOGRAPH
Maritime disputes expose Asian
fault lines By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - Even in normal times, a quarrel
between the world's second- and third-largest
economies is important. In times of crisis, when
the No 2 power, China, is the largest single
contributor to the economic growth of the rest of
the world, it becomes crucial for everyone.
The current tension between China and
Japan, the third-largest economy, over a group of
islets and rocks called Diaoyu in Chinese and
Senkaku in Japanese runs the risk of shaking
nerves throughout the region, which could then
affect trade and development well outside the
region.
This is not the first time there
has been friction between Beijing and Tokyo over
the islands, but the current situation is
different from in the past.
Earlier
conflicts directly involved fishing vessels or
protesters from
mainland China. That put
Beijing in a weak position in international public
opinion. It was a contest between a democracy
(Japan) and an authoritarian regime (China), so it
was almost a given that the world and the region
would side with the former.
This time,
however, the dispute involves protesters who went
to the islands from Hong Kong and received some
support from Taiwan. Hong Kong, although not a
democracy, is a free territory, and its public is
not controlled by Beijing. In fact some of the
protesters claimed to be patriotic, though not
supporters of the ruling Communist Party. Taiwan,
meanwhile, is a mature democracy.
The
latest moves on these islands then are not an act
of aggression against a democracy, but something
that consolidates pan-Chinese opinion, beyond the
boundary of the People's Republic, on a delicate
territorial issue.
In other words, Tokyo's
position has become weaker than in the past, and
is likely to weaken more as Japan continues to
have border issues, especially with South Korea
but also with Russia, again over some islets.
This may have been a well-crafted plan by
Beijing to mobilize public opinion in Hong Kong
and Taiwan, and then to put pressure on Tokyo. If
so, Beijing appears to have taken a step up in its
ability to mobilize strategic diplomacy and public
opinion, and has now extended its influence to
sensitive national issues in the de facto
independent island of Taiwan.
This
influence over Taiwan plays against Tokyo in
another way as well. Taiwan, where in 1949 the
Nationalist government fled the mainland after
being defeated by the Communists, has always been
a great US bulwark and outpost in Asia. The
Chinese Nationalists were allies of the Americans
against the Japanese during World War II. So
swaying public opinion in Taiwan over the Senkakus
casts some doubt on any support Tokyo may receive
from Washington on the issue.
In this
case, the border dispute with Japan somewhat
paradoxically could shorten the distance between
China and the US.
In truth, the Americans
are extremely wary of all these controversies in
one of the busiest seas in the world, and they are
even more concerned about China's growing military
presence in the region.
But the current
developments create a situation in which
Washington cannot easily take a stand, because it
has to choose between two old allies, Taiwan and
Japan, while a third ally, South Korea, is growing
reluctant to join in another collaboration over a
few islets.
The other possibility is that
Beijing has not hatched a conspiracy but has only
jumped on the bandwagon of protest ignited by
activists in Hong Kong.
In any case, the
whole thing proves that the national question,
particularly with regard to Japan - the enemy of
China in World War II, an old hatred that has
never been put to rest - is crucial to the Chinese
people, even for those outside the control of
Beijing.
If this scenario has created such
a situation with Japan, it could be repeated with
Vietnam and the Philippines regarding other
disputed islands in the South China Sea.
In other words, the defense of territory -
in this case a never-defined stretch of sea -
could have strong popular appeal in Taiwan and
create a pan-Chinese sentiment, even extending to
the Chinese minorities that dominate the economies
of many countries in Southeast Asia. This would
further complicate the already complex political
geography of the region.
For now, in fact,
the real impact of the story has been on trade and
regional economics. But all involved now must try
to rein in public opinion to avoid further
incidents and a spiral of increasing tensions.
But this won't be easy. Even in
authoritarian China, the growing freedom of the
Internet makes "angry young men" (the network of
militant Chinese nationalists) difficult for
Beijing to control.
In addition, in the
absence of some form of compromise, even if the
tension eases this time, as is likely, the next
time it might explode more violently.
Here
there are two issues about Japan. On the one hand,
looking at Japan's territorial issues from a
European perspective, it is strange that Tokyo,
defeated in World War II, a conflict started
because of territorial ambitions, still argues
with its neighbors over territory. It would be
very difficult for Germany or Italy, Japan's
allies in that war, to argue with their neighbors
at this level over territory without arousing a
wall of suspicion and resentment.
But the
postwar Asian and European histories have been
different. Japan was allowed to keep its emperor
and was soon "deployed" as an active base for
America's war effort in Korea in 1950, and many
territorial issues have been left dormant. China
usually distances itself from the common knowledge
that Japan was defeated not by the Chinese but by
the Americans in World War II, and that at the
time of Japan's surrender to the US, Tokyo
controlled territory that was home to two-thirds
of the Chinese population.
These facts
have not translated into real Chinese gratitude to
the US, as China in the meantime became communist
and allied itself to America's Cold War enemy the
USSR, so Beijing had to erase the new enemy's
contribution to victory. This in turn moved the US
to use Japan as a pawn in a broader anti-communist
containment and for decades gave leeway to the
Japanese extreme right to preserve dreams of the
old Japanese empire.
On the other hand,
Japan's neighbors, including China, have routinely
played down Tokyo's huge contribution to peace and
development in the region, often considering it as
some kind of retribution for past war damages.
Amid all these elements, there is no sign
from Tokyo or its neighbors of a massive
reconsideration of them, and they are bound to
complicate issues like the Senkaku dispute. They
could also help make the whole atmosphere more
volatile around the maritime borders. In past days
Chinese media reported that even Russia had
intensified its naval patrols around the islands
it contests with Japan. It is a message meant to
appease angry Chinese youth, as Beijing does not
want to be dragged into a conflict that could hurt
its economic development. The message is: Do not
worry, it is not just us, many other countries are
concerned and getting angry with the Japanese, we
don't have to be the first to start a war.
This also shows that China is the country
with more to lose in protracted friction about
these maritime issues. Beijing needs to get out of
this bind, to build greater trust with the US,
which could help find solutions to these issues,
as some Chinese experts said in August at a
conference in Aspen, Colorado. To this a former
senior US diplomat responded that maritime issues
could after all be not a huge deal, but what about
China lending more help on the delicate issue of
North Korea? This could create more trust between
Beijing and Washington, which could also help
smooth the maritime issues.
Francesco Sisci is a columnist
for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore and can be
reached at fsisci@gmail.com
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