President Mohammed Morsi's historic trip
to Beijing signifies a new direction for Egyptian
foreign policy. The Muslim Brotherhood leader has
sent a clear message by selecting China for his
first state visit outside the Middle East. By
forging closer ties with China, Morsi is warning
the US government not to take Egyptian
acquiescence for granted.
He has
furthermore offered an important opportunity for
China to expand its regional influence. It is
essential at this juncture to forecast what China
expects from the New Egypt in particular, and the
greater Middle East in general. Regional and
international powers should take note: China's
influence and clout will increasingly become a
decisive factor in all Middle Eastern struggles.
China's growing engagement with the Middle
East is structured
around a consistent
three-pronged focus: opportunity, stability, and
sovereignty. China sees post-Mubarak Egypt as a
potential partner for promoting these Chinese
interests in the region. Beyond this essentially
conservative strategy, China is quietly exploring
contingency options in the event of open
antagonism with the United States.
The
primary thrust of contemporary Chinese foreign
policy - be it in Africa, Asia, South America or
the Middle East - is economic opportunity. Beijing
is well aware that the ever-growing importance of
its economy makes China an indispensable trade
partner and source of investment for nations
throughout the world.
This economic
dynamic is the main focus of Morsi's trip to
Beijing. Egypt's economy is hurting badly after
the political upheavals that have rocked the
country since the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak.
China is viewed in Egypt as an indispensable
source of emergency funding and investment.
Egyptian presidential spokesman Yasser Ali
explicitly stated that the main goal of Morsi's
trip was to "attract Chinese investment in Egypt".
[1]
Minister of Investment Osama Saleh,
along with delegation of 80 Egyptian
businesspeople, has accompanied Morsi to Beijing.
Saleh specifically called for more Chinese money
to stimulate the Egyptian economy, saying:
"China's current investment volume in Egypt is
very small. It should be among the top three." [2]
Currently, the dominant foreign investors
in Egypt are Saudi Arabia and the United States.
Beyond traditional investments, the latter
currently bankrolls the Egyptian government to the
tune of about US$2 billion a year - $1.4 billion
of which goes to the military. This money comes
with strings attached - especially regarding
Egyptian policy toward Israel and the
Palestinians. Chinese investments could
counterbalance US influence and help Morsi steer
an independent foreign policy more in line with
the expectations of the Egyptian electorate.
Furthermore, China sees the relationship
with the new Egyptian government as essential to
geopolitical stability - the second focus of
Chinese policy in the Middle East and elsewhere.
The Chinese government wants to avoid
destabilizing conflict while consolidating
political, economic and military power. China's
economy can only consistently grow in a reasonably
stable international environment. War is bad for
business. This is especially true in the
hydrocarbon-rich Middle East.
China is
extremely wary of the potential for open conflict
between the US-backed de facto alliance among
Israel, Turkey and the Arab Gulf states on one
side and the "Axis of Resistance" consisting of
Iran, Syria and Hezbollah on the other. China is
particularly keen on preventing a US or Israeli
strike on Iran's nuclear program, and the
resulting hazards to Middle Eastern oil exports.
Meanwhile, the sectarian undertones of the
conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon contain the
destructive seeds of prolonged instability. A
middle force is needed to contain the potential
firestorm.
By providing funds and
political support to Cairo, China can help to
promote a stability-focused, independent foreign
policy for the Egyptian government. Indeed,
President Morsi, before his trip to China,
specifically promised a balanced foreign policy:
"Egypt is now a civilian country ... with a
democratic, constitutional and modern society.
International relations between all countries are
open and they must be based on the concept of
balance. We are hostile to no one but we are to
defend our interests." [3]
This message is
music to Chinese ears. It should be noted that
China maintains close trade and political
relations with regional rivals Iran and Saudi
Arabia. China would like to see Egypt work the
role as an honest broker in the region -
maintaining good relations with the US, Saudi
Arabia and Israel, while reaching out to Iran,
Hezbollah and the Palestinians. It seems that
China may have found in Morsi the perfect man for
the job. His trip to Iran to attend the
Non-Aligned Movement summit after visiting China
is yet another symbolic gesture of Egyptian
"balance" between the competing camps in the
Middle East.
With the final thrust of
Chinese foreign policy - sovereignty - Beijing
faces some important regional disagreements with
Morsi. The Chinese government is ideologically and
strategically opposed to US-led efforts at regime
change. It views the Western policy of militarized
"democracy promotion" as self-interested meddling
in the internal affairs of other countries
disguised as humanitarian intervention. These
campaigns constitute an indirect threat to the
Chinese government itself. Furthermore, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization military campaign in
Libya cost China billions of dollars in contracts
with Muammar Gaddafi's regime.
China,
along with Russia, has vetoed the possibility of
United Nations Security Council-sanctioned
military intervention in Syria's civil war. Morsi,
on the other hand, has denounced the Syrian
government in unambiguous language, saying, "The
regime that kills its people must disappear from
the scene." [4] He will lobby behind the scenes
for a harder line against Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad during his trips to Beijing and Tehran.
China's disagreement with Morsi over the
Syrian situation could be a political opportunity
for both parties. While the Chinese government
will continue to be opposed to outside (especially
Western) military intervention in the Syrian
conflict, it will maintain close ties with the
pro-intervention Gulf Cooperation Council.
Meanwhile, Morsi's concrete steps to bring about a
more balanced Egyptian foreign policy could help
alleviate Iran's fears of losing its most
important Arab ally. Both the Chinese government
and Morsi himself are fairly well positioned to
bring relevant regional parties together to try to
find a political solution to the crisis while
avoiding (or at any rate limiting) outside
military intervention.
Middle Kingdom
eyes the Middle East Beyond the important
implications of Morsi's China trip for
contemporary Chinese policy in the Middle East,
there lies a long-term potential for Beijing to
assume a much more assertive regional role. As the
US continues to pressure China in East Asia,
Chinese leaders are quietly and carefully
considering global contingencies. The Middle East,
with its vast energy resources, central
geopolitical position, and strong anti-American
sentiment, could be an ideal location for China to
challenge America's pre-eminent global role.
Indeed, Morsi's state visit to China must
have been a calculated message to US leadership:
if sufficiently pressured by the United States or
enticed by China, Egypt could abandon Washington's
camp. During the last Cold War, Egypt shifted from
the Soviet to the US sphere when the political
leaders perceived such a move as being in their
self-interest. As an elected leader, President
Morsi must be sensitive to the will of the
Egyptian people, and the Egyptian people, for the
most part, distrust and fear the US government.
Beyond and above the contemporary
Sunni/Shi'ite and Arab/Iranian political divides,
there remains a strong anti-American sentiment
throughout the greater Middle East. Indeed, while
the rulers of Washington's Arab allies publicly
bemoan Iranian influence and privately plot
against Tehran, a majority of their subjects would
welcome Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. The
2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll found 57% of
respondents to view Iran's achievement of nuclear
weaponry as having a positive effect in the
region, with only 21% viewing this potential
development negatively. [5]
The countries
polled were US allies Egypt, Jordan, Morocco,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (as well
as politically divided Lebanon). Washington
suffers from a serious public relations problem
when the citizens of US ally states wish for
America's arch-regional rival to obtain nuclear
weaponry.
Herein lies an important
geopolitical opportunity for China stemming from
the Arab revolt. If and when Arab governments
become more responsive to their people's wills,
they will drift away from the US and search for
other allies. There were two telling exceptions to
this general trend - Libya and Syria, whose rulers
were already politically opposed to US regional
dominance, and thus found themselves on the wrong
end of advanced Western weaponry (explicit in
Libya and clandestine, so far, in Syria).
Except for these two nations, one can
reasonably expect every single Arab government to
become less reflexively pro-American the more it
democratizes. The Middle East has strong potential
for Chinese power projection as long as issues
that exacerbate anti-American sentiment -
especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -
remain unresolved. Western media analysts who
loudly predicted peril for China's rulers stemming
from the example of the Arab revolt ignored two
vital trends: the primarily economic nature of the
original protests, and the essential peril for US
regional dominance that Arab democracy entails.
President Morsi's visit to China serves as
a stunning example of drastic transformations in
the international system, both in the Middle East
and throughout the world. First, if most Arab
states become more democratic, they will adopt a
foreign policy that is independent of Washington's
dictates. Second, China's enormous,
no-strings-attached financial resources are
increasingly indispensable for nations in economic
turmoil. Finally, as the US economy continues to
stagnate, traditional US allies will be compelled
to look for alternatives sources economic and
political support.
For the time being,
China can take advantage of these trends to
promote a conservative foreign policy focused on
economic opportunity, geopolitical stability, and
protecting the sovereignty of "rogue states"
targeted by Washington. However, as the US
government strengthens its military position in
Asia, China may adopt a more proactive role to
counter US pressure. If Sino-American rivalry
escalates into a new cold war, China may find the
Middle East awash with oil, and allies.
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