Calling the China-Russia split
isn't heresy By M K Bhadrakumar
One way of conveying that things aren't
quite all right in China-Russia relations would be
to say that this isn't as warm a relationship as
it once was. Another would be to quote Ariel's
song about Ferdinand's "drown'd father" in William
Shakespeare's play The Tempest , "Those are
pearls that were his eyes … ."
China seems
to prefer the first option for the present, while
drawing attention to the emerging truth regarding its
"comprehensive strategic
cooperation and partnership" with Russia. "Once
warm Sino-Soviet relationship can be revived" -
this was the intriguing title of an article
featured in the leading Chinese dailies on August
22.
The strange article contained a
synopsis of the rise and fall of the friendship
between communist China and the former Soviet
Union, explaining how the latter's journey on the
"road of revisionism" was the "decisive factor" in
the eventual rift in the relationship."
Even more intriguing was that the article
appeared in the wake of what appears to have been
a round of highly sensitive consultations in
Moscow by China's State Councilor Dai Bingguo on
August 20.
It took a decade for the
Central Intelligence Agency to convince its
consumers in Washington that Moscow-Beijing
relationship had in fact begun to fray badly
already by the early 1950s and a Sino-Soviet break
was appearing, and a significantly changed
strategic situation was developing. Neither the
Soviets nor the Chinese side said a word about
what was going on behind the scenes, although "the
Sino-Soviet heresy in CIA ranks began as early as
1952", as the spy agency later recounted proudly.
Stunning frankness Moscow still
largely keeps that old tradition of evasive
silence when it comes to Russia's relations with
China. But for its part, China has changed. It has
become garrulous - almost like the rest of us -
when it speaks about the problems of life. And it
has begun telling anyone who cares to listen (in
particular, plausibly, the consumers in
Washington), as plainly it possibly could, that
things aren't all that honky-dory as the rhetoric
of Sino-Russian relationship might suggest.
The People's Daily "de-classified" in an
extraordinary article last Friday the nature of
the sensitive mission to Moscow undertaken by Dai
last month. It must have been a considered
decision to do that since Dai reports directly to
President Hu Jintao. It stands to reason that the
stocktaking of Dai's mission to Moscow is over and
important conclusions have been drawn.
The
article pointed out that Dai's consultations in
Moscow took place against the backdrop of the
"worrisome" security situation in China's
periphery following Washington's strategic
"rebalancing act" which is primarily targeted at
Beijing. However, to Beijing's disappointment, Dai
apparently turned out to be "more eager than his
Russian counterpart [Nikolai Patrushev, secretary
of Russia's security council] to discuss mutual
support in "core issues" of national sovereignty
and security."
The People's Daily pointed
out that against the backdrop of the US
containment strategy toward China, Beijing views
Russia "as the only significant country that is
not part of Washington's strategic matrix" and
indeed "many in China urge an alliance with
Moscow" - although "there seems an equally strong
counter-argument [in Beijing] for caution".
In sum, China is drawing some important
conclusions regarding its ties with Russia and the
US. At any rate, the article underlined that
during the talks with Dai, Patrushev "appeared
more evasive as he talked about "consensus" on
many important issues." With a touch of bitter
sarcasm, the commentary adds:
"Russia's posture is understandable,
as Moscow is assessing its relations with
Washington. There is no question that [Russian
president Vladimir] Putin is not liked in the
West but it is in Russia's interests to have a
more stable relationship with Washington. This
is why Putin carefully manages relations with
the US: deflecting critique of Russian domestic
issues, while allowing NATO supplies to go
through its territories to Afghanistan and
participating in the US-sponsored largest-ever
"Rim of the Pacific" naval exercise in July in
Hawaii.
"For a variety of reasons, a
Sino-Russian alliance as seen in the 1950s is
out of the question, unless the core interests
of the two are simultaneously jeopardized by a
third party. This does not necessarily mean,
however, the two should not cooperate
strategically."
The direct reference
to Putin is noteworthy. The commentary concluded
with stunning frankness that even a "normal"
relationship which "allows considerable space
between" China and Russia can be maintained only
with "political wisdom and pragmatic skills",
given the fluidity in "both domestic and foreign
affairs." Simply put, the bottom line is that the
relations based on the so-called strategic
partnership "cannot, and should not, be taken for
granted." For, the ground reality is that the
people in the two countries "seem more interested
in looking to the West than to each other."
Without doubt, it is a word of caution addressed
directly to the Kremlin that the onus is on the
two leaderships to do some course correction.
Separately, while in Moscow, in an
exclusive interview with the Russian government
daily Rossiyiskaya Gazeta, Dai also has pointed
out that the focus of the China-Russia
relationship in the period ahead ought to be on
the two countries extending political support
mutually on "core issues, such as safeguarding
national sovereignty and security," which, he
recalled pointedly, was what Chinese President Hu
Jintao had agreed with Putin at their meetings.
Interestingly, the Kremlin has not put out
to date any account so far of Dai's call on Putin
during his visit to Moscow, breaking its customary
practice after such high-level meetings. However,
perceptive observers couldn't have been surprised.
They could sense for a while already that
something was amiss in the Sino-Russian
relationship notwithstanding the rhetoric over it
or even the wonderful chemistry Moscow and Beijing
displayed in Turtle Bay in the recent months when
they whacked the West twice with double-veto of
the latter's resolution on Syria.
Beijing
seems to harbor a grouse that China went along
with Russia in goose steps on the Syrian issue
although it has no bases in Syria or any special
interests to safeguard, leave alone that it isn't
a stakeholder in the Bashar al-Assad regime by any
stretch of imagination. But when it came to the
Asia-Pacific situation, as tensions began mounting
dangerously between China on the one side and the
US and Japan on the other, Russia was nowhere to
be seen.
Punching above its
weight Not that Moscow was caught unaware
of the rapidly worsening Asia-Pacific situation.
On the contrary, a steady flow of Russian media
reports in the recent months continued to give
highly alarming prognosis of a potential
flashpoint arising in the US-China rivalry. The
Russian official media, in fact, was quite noisily
played up recently the Wall Street Journal reports
regarding the deployment of the US missile defense
system in Japan and evaluated that Washington has
achieved absolute nuclear superiority over China
and the latter's second-strike nuclear capability
no more exists in reality.
But official
Moscow has kept a deafening silence about the
tensions in the Asia-Pacific. Even after Dai's
visit, the silence has not been broken. On the
other hand, Fyodor Lukyanov, Moscow commentator
for the official Novosti news agency, wrote three
days after Dai's visit to Moscow that Russia has a
role cut out for it the Asia-Pacific - that of an
honest broker of the region's territorial
disputes.
He said Moscow could bring to
bear on the Asia-Pacific situation its immense
"European experience" in conflict resolution
during the Cold War era. To quote Lukyanov, "the
majority of these conflicts [involving China, US,
Japan, etc.] are extremely confusing and
intractable, and a decision to support one of the
sides will have less to do with historical truth
than raw politics." He, therefore, rationalized
the Russian policy:
"In light of the global shift of
influence to the east, Russia simply cannot
ignore its position as a Pacific power, and its
presence in Asia as a major payer is vital. The
only way to achieve this status is to use the
advantages of its "transitional" position as a
Euro-Asian power… To boost its influence, Russia
will have to be much more active in Asia and
orientate itself not only toward China, for all
of its importance for Russia, but to the whole
spectrum of interests and opportunities in the
Asia-Pacific region - from Japan, South Korea
and the United States to Indonesia and
Australia."
It may seem to outsiders
that Russia aspires to punch above its weight in
the Asia-Pacific, but on the contrary, Moscow is
in all seriousness on a proactive course,
convinced that "it carries enough weight in Asia
to make a difference." In the last week of July,
in an unusual diplomatic move, Moscow hosted the
Vietnamese President and the Japanese Foreign
Minister in overlapping visits.
The
political symbolism of the Vietnamese president
and the Japanese foreign minister arriving on
Russian soil for talks simultaneously even as the
Asia-Pacific was hotting up couldn't have been
lost on Beijing. While the Chinese assessment is
that the Kurile Islands dispute doesn't offer an
easy solution and will continue to stymie the
prospects of a full-blooded Russia-Japan
partnership anytime soon, the recent Russian
build-up of strategic ties, especially in the
sphere of military cooperation, with Vietnam is
causing concern to Beijing.
China is
particularly concerned about Russia's efforts to
return to the Cam Ranh Bay naval base and
Vietnam's emergence as the "world's second largest
importer of Russian weapons" and the likelihood of
the two tracks reinforcing each other in a
strategic embrace that works to Beijing's
disadvantage in the South China Sea. But Beijing
is deliberately playing down the Russian moves in
Vietnam by choosing to interpret them as directed
less against Chinese interests but more as a
matter of post-Soviet Russia's "return" to the
South-East Asian region - something that ought to
be of greater concern to the US and the ASEAN
rather than to China.
The People's Daily
pointed out that the "Russia connection" enables
Hanoi to negotiate with the US from advantage and
also to assert its leadership role within the
ASEAN, which would have deleterious impact on the
regional alliance's unity. To quote from the
commentary (written after the visit of the
Vietnamese president to Russia),
"The permission to use Cam Ranh Bay
again means Russia gains a foothold to expand
its influence in Southeast Asia; Russian
military analyst believed this may cause US
dissatisfaction and suspicion toward Russian
policies. As a result, US-Russia, US-Vietnam
relations will be affected. "On the other hand,
former Soviet Union had once backed Vietnam to
practice hegemonism on the Central South
Peninsula. So, the return of Russia will
inevitably cause psychological impact on the
Southeast Asian countries… and some countries
may take countermeasures to contain Vietnam's
attempt to "take the lead" in the ASEAN. ASEAN
will once again fall into troubled times."
Trust deficit Clearly,
serious problems are arising in the China-Russia
ties and the fine rhetoric cannot put a gloss over
this growing reality. The bottom line is that if
the innocents abroad had ever thought that a
Russia-China alliance against the US' "imperialist
hegemony" is the natural thing to happen in the
contemporary world situation, they are barking up
the wrong tree.
Reviewing the four months
of the Putin presidency, it becomes apparent that
Gazprom is forever on the lookout to boost its
cooperation with other countries but the deadlock
in the negotiations over the supply of gas from
Russia to China continue and Moscow is not in any
tearing hurry to reach an accord. On its part,
Beijing also seems to be getting the message that
its expectations that Putin will accelerate the
negotiations on the mega gas deal after his return
to the Kremlin were proving unrealistic. Beijing
senses that no matter who occupies the Kremlin,
there is a remarkable consistency in the policy
priorities of the Russian elites, which are
focused on Russia's integration with the Western
world.
Indeed, what it all finally comes
to is that there is a growing trust deficit
between Beijing and Moscow. Russia is caught in a
bind when it comes to the development of Siberia
and the Far East. The logical thing would be to
draw foreign investment from the major economic
powers and integrate the region with the dynamic
Asia-Pacific market. But Japan remains lukewarm
pending the resolution of the Kurile Islands
dispute and South Korea by itself has limitations
to be the locomotive of growth for Siberia or the
Russian Far East.
India lies far away.
Whereas, it is China that is raring to go in
developing trade and investment with Siberia and
the Russian Far East. But the catch is that Russia
doesn't trust Chinese intentions in the long term
and the fear of Chinese migration to the vast
expanse of Siberia and the Far East is only
increasing. In short, Russia is unable to get the
correct mix of foreign investment that would bring
in Chinese capital in large volumes but would
"balance" any towering Chinese presence in Siberia
and the Far East.
An article in the Global
Times - attributed, ironically, to a Russian
businessman based in Beijing - pointed out
recently that Russian media have been
disseminating "horrifying stories" about China
that contribute to negative impressions about it -
"such as that Chinese lied to and beat customers,
Chinese kidnapped their own compatriots, and that
Chinese took away Russia's oil, wood and women."
The article said that nationalism in
Russia has been soaring from the Boris Yeltsin era
and Sinophobia is pervasive. "Ordinary Russians
saw China as the biggest threat, and the
stereotype remains. Many Russians still believe
that Chinese goods are poor quality, Chinese
immigrants are endlessly thronging to Russia and
China seeks to expand into Russian territory. In
ordinary Russians' eyes, typical Chinese is an
uneducated, rustic and sloppily dressed peasant."
Whereas, the article pointed out, the
unpalatable truth, which Russia finds hard to
accept, is that "Russia now needs professional
talent from China" and China's scientific and
technological progress can help production
Russia's capacity "just as the Soviet Union once
helped China build its factories."
The
article said, "If there is any potential risk in
developing ties with China, it lies in Russia's
weakness, rather than any imagined plans by China.
The Far East and Siberian areas have loose ties
with the central regions of Russia" and it is
"very important" for Moscow to develop
relationship with China in the Far East.
On the other hand, "some political forces
[in Russia], largely liberal and nationalistic
parties, call for closing down Russia's Far East
regions to Chinese immigration and investment. But
this isolation would never work. Neighboring ties
with China feed thousands of Russians, especially
those working in fields like transportation,
tourism, wholesaling and retail trade." The
article lamented:
"Many [Russians] are easily
influenced by emotional thoughts and biased
media reports. The historical friendship between
the two countries seems to be fading, especially
with the passing away of older generations in
both countries. Today young people in both China
and Russia tend to look to the West and fail to
take up the historical friendship between the
two countries."
Unwarranted
ecstasy According to the Chinese
interpretation, Moscow was administering a stern
warning to Beijing recently in an incident where
when the Russian border guards fired on a Chinese
fishing boat flying the national flag and fishing
illegally in the Russian economic zone in the Sea
of Japan in mid-July. The Global Times felt
outraged that the Russian act was unacceptable,
was boorish and that such "aggressive behavior…
[not] only harms Chinese confidence in fostering a
long-term friendship with Russia, but also
provides excuses for forces seeking to undermine
China-Russia ties."
In a second commentary
a week later, the daily revisited the subject and
put the incident in the Sea of Japan in the
broader political context of the China-Russia
partnership:
"There is strategic cooperation on
major international issues… especially on issues
of international security, including opposition
to efforts at the UN Security Council to enact
tougher measures against Russia. China views
Russia as the most important strategic partner.
"However, problems do exist between the
two nations. China and Russia have a
comprehensive and coordinated strategic
partnership. Nevertheless, it doesn't mean that
there is no gulf or conflict between the two.
China and Russia both have own national
interests. Just like any other bilateral
relationship in the world, Sino-Russian
relations are finally determined by national
interests. Conflicts or even confrontations are
inevitable."
The comments were
unusually sharp even for the daily and by
coincidence or not, they appeared on the eve of
the visits of the Vietnamese president and the
Japanese foreign minister to Russia.
To be
sure, a certain impression grew when Putin snubbed
United States President Barack Obama's invitation
to the G8 summit in Camp David in May and then
chose to head for Beijing in June for the first
state visit of his new presidency. China probably
helped such an impression come about in the first
instance by being so openly ecstatic about Putin's
return to the Kremlin in the last Russian
presidential election - almost as if it were a
stakeholder in the quick sands of Russia's
domestic politics.
However, in the light
of subsequent developments, China is revising its
opinion. When Hu and Putin meet on the sidelines
of the APEC summit in Vladivostok next week, the
ground beneath their feet would have shifted from
the time they last met in Beijing in June.
Beijing has measured Moscow's response to
the rising tensions in the Far East and found it
falling far short of the support it expected for
the Chinese stance on the territorial dispute -
while overlooking that Russia has its own
legitimate reasons stemming from its
self-interests for not taking sides. Thus, China
has been left to draw the conclusion that Russia
is in no mood to be drawn into China's diplomatic
storms with its neighbors or the US.
All sorts of fallouts This can
prompt a whole lot of diplomatic moves on the part
of not only China but all major players in the
Asia-Pacific. Already, there is a certain
mellowing of the Japanese attitude toward Russia
becoming apparent - notwithstanding Moscow's
repeated provocative actions with regard to the
Kurile Islands (such as Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev visiting the disputed region and Moscow
beefing up its military deployments on the
islands.)
Arguably, Moscow is testing the
waters of Japan's patience and probing the
frontiers of an assertive policy toward Kurile
Islands' integration without jeopardizing Japan's
goodwill. This could be a prelude to making a
compromise with Tokyo in due course. Putin has
been keen on a normalization of Russia's relations
with Japan. One formula that Moscow has floated is
that there could be Russian-Japanese collaboration
for the development of the Kurile Islands.
Russia would hope to tap into China-Japan
tensions to encourage greater Japanese investments
and commitment to the development of Siberia and
the Russian Far East, which would offset China's
presence and diminish Russia's current
over-dependence on Chinese investment and trade.
Again, Russia is making good progress
already in expanding business ties and generating
military exports to Vietnam, which has also agreed
to the use of Cam Ranh Bay by the Russian navy.
A point of immediate interest in the
coming weeks will be how the respective "national
interests" of Russia and China would play out in
the Middle East, especially over Syria. On August
14, the first round of the US-China Dialogue on
the Middle East was held in Beijing. Reviewing the
prospects of the newly created forum, Chinese
commentaries have attempted to harmonize the US
and Chinese approaches on the Middle East
situation.
People's Daily noted that the
Dialogue held in Beijing was "actually natural",
since the US and China have "common interests" and
"it will be good" for solving the Middle East's
problems if the two countries "strengthen their
dialogue and communication."
In the recent
interview with Rossiyiskaya Gazeta, Dai spoke at
length regarding the Chinese stance on Syria.
Interestingly, he stressed that China has no
"self-interest in dealing with the crisis, and had
always maintained an objective and just stance."
Dai added, "We respect the choice of the Syrian
people and do not take sides. What we are against
is interference with internal affairs."
Indeed, there is going to be all sorts of
fallouts if cracks develop in the Russian-Chinese
mutual understanding. China's perceptions of the
changes in Egypt significantly differ from
Moscow's. Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi's
choice of Beijing as his first destination for
state visit after assuming office is indicative of
China's relative openness toward the tidings of
the Arab Spring in comparison with the extreme
distaste and reserve in Moscow's judgment of the
Muslim Brotherhood.
Again, Russia's ties
with the Gulf Cooperation Council states have
touched a low point as ties with Qatar and Saudi
Arabia nosedived over the Syrian question. Russia,
arguably, has little to lose in comparison with
its stakes in Syria. On the contrary, China is
keen to maintain robust ties with the oil-rich
Persian Gulf region. Saudi Arabia, for instance,
is the primary source supplying oil for China's
Strategic Reserve. Qatar has invested in China
while China is investing in Kuwait. In comparison,
China has hardly any stakes in the Bashar Al-Assad
regime's continuance.
Indeed, unlike in
the 1950s, Washington is not going to lose time to
probe any signs of new thinking in Beijing on the
range of regional issues. The "unexpected visit"
by a senior Chinese military official to the US
last month coincided with Dai's mission to Moscow.
The government-owned China Daily reported
on August 23 that Cai Yingting, deputy chief of
the general staff of the PLA's visit to the US,
which began four days earlier, was not announced
in advance in Washington or Beijing and it related
to "escalating tension between China and Japan"
and hoped to "work on more specific and
transparent development plans for the two
militaries".
The China Daily report said
Cai's delegation included "several chiefs of
Chinese military areas and Chen Shoumin, deputy
head of the strategic planning department of the
PLA General Staff Headquarters." Its itinerary
included a visit to the US base in Hawaii and the
bases at Fort Hood, Texas, and in Missouri,
followed by talks at the Pentagon.
Most
certainly, Cai's discussions will provide the
input for the forthcoming visit by the US Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta to China in mid-September.
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton has included a halt in Beijing during her
current tour of the Asia-Pacific. Interestingly,
she will be touching Beijing en route to Russia to
attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) summit. Senior US officials have said that
Clinton hopes to discuss with the Chinese
leadership the North Korea problem, Iran nuclear
issue, Syrian crisis and Afghanistan. Obviously,
the once-in-a-decade transition in China due in a
matter of weeks or the hurly-burly of the US
presidential election in November wouldn't hold
back the two countries from quickening the pace of
their diplomatic engagement.
To be sure,
the meetings on the sidelines of the APEC summit
meeting this weekend in Vladivostok promise to be
far more engrossing and fateful for the
Asia-Pacific region than the outcome of the tepid
regional process itself. The statesmen gathering
in Vladivostok will be keenly assessing the
rumblings as the tectonic plates of the
Russian-Chinese "comprehensive strategic
cooperation and partnership" show signs of moving.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a
career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His
assignments included the Soviet Union, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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