The late patriarch Deng Xiaoping said
famously about US-China relations: "There are
limits as to how good - or how bad - Sino-US ties
can become." Can the same be said for China and
Japan?
While relations between the two
most powerful Asian countries have apparently been
heading toward a downward spiral since the early
2000s, the on-going row over sovereignty claims
over the Diaoyu islets (known in Japan as the
Senkakus) also demonstrates a considerable degree
of willingness by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
leadership to keep the altercations within
manageable parameters. This is despite the fact
that a number of high-profile Chinese commentators
- who have cast themselves as the victims of
"Japanese neo-imperialism" - have threatened to
resort to arms to settle the 40-year-old dispute.
The latest run-in between both countries,
which was ignited when several Hong Kong
"patriots" landed on the Diaoyu-Senkaku islets on
August 15, has proven to be particularly
ferocious. Echoing the horrendous anti-Japanese
demonstrations in 2005, tens of thousands of
nationalists in the last two weeks staged rallies
in more than 20 cities throughout the country.
Late last month, a protestor in Beijing even
ripped off the flag from the Japanese ambassador's
car.
The official Chinese press was
replete with hard-line if not war-mongering
voices. Major General Peng Guangqian proposed
Beijing dispatch personnel to the Diaoyu islets
for purposes of conducting scientific and
environmentally-related research. "If Japan dares
to dispatch soldiers [to stop the Chinese], we'd
retaliate with missiles," wrote General Peng.
Renmin University social sciences professor Chen
Xiankui went one better by suggesting the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) conduct "regular war games
in the vicinity of the Diaoyu islands" so as to
better demonstrate Chinese sovereignty.
In
a similar vein, popular commentator Major General
Luo Yuan suggested the Diaoyu islets become a
"shooting range for the PLA Navy and Air Force"
should Japan dare to boost its military presence
near the archipelago. The usually hawkish Global
Times even published a commentary, which was soon
carried elsewhere, entitled: "If war breaks out
between China and Japan, it will be a war that
washes away the humiliation that China has
suffered the past century".
The Japanese
administration also seems to be displaying signs
of unusual combativeness. While Tokyo has stuck to
its long-standing policy of not allowing members
of right-wing organizations to land on the
archipelago, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
administration of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko is
proceeding with plans to "nationalize" the
disputed territory through acquiring it from its
private owner. Despite the fact that Japan's
public debts are roughly two times its GDP, the
Noda government has earmarked extra outlays for
maritime defense procurement. Most Chinese
commentators have attributed Tokyo's
aggressiveness to the fact that the unpopular DPJ
administration is gunning for votes from
right-wing sectors in the run-up to probable
general elections in November.
Yet it is
also clear that despite the relentlessly
escalating tension, Beijing - and to a
considerable extent Tokyo - thinks its national
interests are best served if the row over the
islets would not degenerate into small-scale naval
skirmishes, let alone a full-fledged military
conflict. Moreover, both countries seem eager not
to allow nationalistic sentiments damage mutually
beneficial economic ties.
Signs that the
CCP administration has been circumspect about the
Diaoyu-Senkakus issue are not hard to find. For
instance, Beijing has not allowed Chinese NGOs to
emulate their Hong Kong counterparts by hiring
boats to set sail to the islets. More significant
is the fact that the CCP leadership has this year
exercised more restraint compared to 2005, when
protests were held against then-Prime Minister
Koizumi Junichiro's visits to the controversial
Yasukuni Shrine as well as the "whitewash" of
Japanese war crimes in the country's history
books.
Immediately upon the outbreak of
the first wave of demonstrations on August 19 this
year, the CCP Propaganda Department ordered all
print and electronic media not to "overplay" the
protests. Appeals made by individual firebrands to
boycott Japanese merchandises were not allowed to
see the light of day. This was despite the fact
that a provincial newspaper, the Wuhan Morning
Post, listed big-name Japanese firms such as
Mitsubishi and Kajima Corporation which had
allegedly provided funding and other kinds of
support to "right-wing Japanese organizations." By
contrast, an online petition in 2005 appealing to
the public to stop buying Japanese products
managed to collect about 2 million signatures
before it was closed down by authorities.
Moreover, Beijing has so far refrained
from using economic weapons to penalize Japan.
During the late 2010 Diaoyu-Senkakus crisis, which
was precipitated by the detention of the captain
of a Chinese fishing junk by Japanese coast guard
in the vicinity of the islets, Beijing curtailed
the export of rare earth minerals to Japan and
restricted the number of Japan-bound Chinese
tourists. This time around, there has been no
evidence of "mixing economics with diplomacy" and,
given Beijing's restraint so far, there might not
be as the result of this latest incident.
Equally significant is the fact that even
at the rhetorical level, the official media late
last month ran a number of surprisingly moderate
pieces on bilateral ties. For example, the Global
Times carried an article by Han Xiaoqing, a senior
Tokyo-based correspondent of People's Daily, that
accused the Hong Kong "patriots" who landed on the
Diaoyu-Senkakus in mid-August of "having hurt
China's national interests."
Han argued,
given that China still required Japanese
investment and technology for modernizing its
economy, the most rational course would be to heed
Deng Xiaoping's 1978 dictum of "setting aside
sovereignty and focusing on joint development."
She offered this advice to pro-Diaoyu
nationalists: "Since the time for resolving the
Diauyu issue has not arrived, desist from rattling
the sensitive nerves [of both peoples] and desist
from challenging the limits of both peoples'
tolerance".
Indeed, strong symbiotic
economic links between the two powerful neighbors
may predispose both capitals to adopt rational
measures to resolve the sovereignty disputes. The
phenomenon of "cold politics, hot economics" has
characterized bilateral relations since the
Koizumi era - and it is possible that the same
rationale will prevent a rupture of relations now
that both countries are facing tough economic
realities. The Japanese economy seems to be
running out of steam.
The still-healthy
sales of Japanese cars and other products in the
China market are one of the few silver linings on
the horizon. For the first time in recent memory,
the Chinese economy is having problems maintaining
taken-for-granted high-growth rates. As exports to
the United States and European Union are slumping,
major Asian markets, including Japan, have assumed
added importance. Moreover, Chinese manufacturers
are still eager to acquire Japanese know-how in
areas ranging from information to green
technology.
Moreover, quite a number of
commentators have viewed the Diaoyu-Senkaku
imbroglio via the prism of power politics in the
region, especially the long-standing involvement
of the United States in Pacific affairs. Instead
of focusing on ways and means of snatching the
Diaoyus from the Japanese right-wingers, these
experts have dwelled on the more long-term
strategy of dissuading Tokyo from hitching itself
onto the bandwagon of Washington's alleged
"anti-China containment policy."
While
speaking at an academic conference marking the
40th anniversary of the establishment of ties
between China and Japan, former State Councilor
Tang Jiaxuan pointed out Washington was behind the
Sino-Japanese discord. "If Japan were willing to
give up [the policy of] joining the United States
in containing China, [tension between] China and
Japan will cool down," Tang said. "Japan should
undertake a fundamental strategic make-over," he
added, "Instead of helping the [United States]
tackle China, Tokyo should become the bridge
between China and the [United States]".
Similarly, in a commentary on the
Diaoyu-Senkakus standoff, the Global Times dwelled
on the intriguing China-Japan-US triangle. "The
era of Japan's friendliness toward China is over,"
wrote the paper. "Japan's enmity toward China is
more entrenched than that of the US ... Compared
to South Korea, Japan is a lot further away from
China; yet it is very tightly bundled together
with the US". The paper concluded that "Japan's
foreign-affairs strategy has gone awry: this is
the underlying cause of the current nervousness in
China-Japan ties".
The implicit corollary
of these views is, once Japan has chosen to
disengage itself from the perceived Washington-led
encirclement policy against China, the
Diaoyu-Senkaku problem will cease to wreak havoc
on bilateral ties. Apparently anti-Japan scholars
such as Renmin University's Chen have gone so far
as to suggest, if Tokyo were willing to say no to
the US containment policy, Beijing should support
Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council.
Yet
another crucial geopolitical development is
Tokyo's intensifying territorial struggle with
Seoul and Moscow over respectively the Takeshima
Island (called Dokdo in South Korea) and the
Northern Territories (called the South Kuril
Islands in Russia). Compared with the
Diaoyu-Senkaku row, the Japanese government
suffers a disadvantage to the extent that Seoul
and Moscow exercise de facto control over the
islands in question. Hard-line commentators in
Beijing have called for some form of an alliance
with South Korea and Russia to put pressure on
Tokyo.
This means Beijing, which has so
far displayed neutrality over these disputes,
would side with South Korea and Russia in return
for these countries supporting China's claims over
the Diaoyu-Senkakus. For example, the Global Times
indicated in an editorial last month that "China
should support the territorial claims of Russia
and South Korea so that [the three countries] can
jointly deal with Japan".
Beijing seems
confident that, despite the Japanese government's
apparent ability to secure US support over the
Diaoyu-Senkaku issue, it has in its disposal
carrot-and-stick ploys to persuade Tokyo to at
least prevent the sovereignty row from escalating
into a full-blown bilateral crisis.
Dr
Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The
Jamestown Foundation. He has worked in senior
editorial positions in international media
including Asiaweek newsmagazine, South China
Morning Post, and the Asia-Pacific Headquarters of
CNN. He is the author of five books on China,
including the recently published Chinese Politics
in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges.
Lam is an Adjunct Professor of China studies at
Akita International University, Japan, and at the
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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